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Abstract
Nash’s Theorem is a famous and widely used result in non-cooperative game theory which
can be applied to games where each player’s mixed strategy payoff function is defined as an
expectation. Current proofs of this Theorem neither justify why this constraint is necessary
or satisfactorily identifies its origins. In this Thesis we change this and prove Nash’s
Theorem for abstract games where, in particular, the payoff functions can be replaced
by total orders. The result of this is a combinatoric proof of Nash’s Theorem. We also
construct a generalised simplicial complex model and demonstrate a more general form of
Nash’s Theorem holds in this setting. This leads to the realisation Nash’s Theorem is not
a consequence of a fixed-point theorem but rather a combinatoric phenomenon existing in
a much more general mathematical model.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In 1950 when John Nash published his paper ‘Equilibrium Points in N -Person Games’
[Nash, 1950b] the long term consequences of his work were not immediately clear. However,
since then game theory has become of increasing interest as its applications appear in fields
as diverse as economics to evolutionary biology. This Thesis explores the now famous Nash
equilibria and shows that, in fact, this phenomenon occurs in a much more general model
of which non-cooperative game theory is a specific example.
1.1 Overview
A game is a mathematical model used to imitate real life situations where two or more
people (players) make strategic decisions. Game theory then provides the tools and con-
cepts needed to analyse such models and, in particular, provides reasoning to the strategic
decisions each player should make. In light of this, the application of game theory is not
restricted to traditional games, although games which do not rely on luck, for example
Chess and Naughts and Crosses, are good examples of the theory. A wide variety of
every-day events can be interpreted and analysed in terms of game theory, with examples
including business mergers, predator-prey interactions, bidders at an auction eg ‘Ebay’,
military strategies in times of conflict, evolutionary biology, economics ... the list is as
diverse as it is long. Using [Hallinan, 2005],[Kelly, 2003], [Nasar, 1999], [Osborne, 2004]
and [Thomas, 1984] and as our reference material we discuss the origins and basic concepts
of this versatile tool.
1
1.2 History of Game Theory
Although game theory is a modern branch of mathematics, with the key developments
being made in the 20th Century, the basic concepts have appeared in some shape or form
for a much longer period of time. This section highlights some of the significant stages in
the development of game theory which have ultimately shaped it into the diverse field it
is today.
The term game theory was not officially coined until the 1900’s. However the fundamental
ideas can be traced back to the 17th Century and found in the solutions mathematicians
put forward to help solve the gambling problems of the French nobility. As a result of the
popular games of the time, for example Chess, development was confined to two player,
zero-sum games: that is, games which either have a clear winner and looser, or they
result in a tie. In 1713 formality was introduced to game theory by Pierre-Re´mond de
Montmort who defined the concept of a minimax solution for popular card game Le Her.
This definition is still used today and describes the situation where each player chooses his
strategy so to minimise his maximum loss. It was James Waldegrave, the games creator,
who first identified the minimax solution of Le Her. This work was extended in 1738 by
Daniel Bernoulli and included the introduction of the concept of a payoff function, used
to determine the winner. Developments in game theory remained restricted to finding
minimax solutions of two player games until the 1920’s with the publication of a series of
short papers by E´mile Borel on gaming strategies.
It was John von Neumann who provided the major turning point in game theory. He
introduced enough formality to allow game theory to be considered as its own independent
mathematical discipline. Additionally von Neumann’s work marks the first time game
theory was used to solve long standing problems in economics. The first paper of significant
importance published by von Neumann in this field was in 1928 [von Neumann, 1928]1 and
was a proof of the so called Minimax Theorem for 2-player zero-sum games. This
Theorem can be summarised as follows:
In a 2-player, zero-sum game, each player can select an optimal strategy such
that for a value v the maximum payoff awarded to player 1 given player 2’s
strategy is v and the maximum payoff awarded to player 2 given player 1’s
strategy is −v.
1Translated in “Contributions to the Theory of Games” [Tucker and Luce eds., 1959] as “On The Theory
of Games of Strategy”, pages 13-42
2
In particular each player maximises his own minimum payoff by minimising the maximum
payoff which can be achieved by his opponent.
In 1937 von Neumann published his second significant contribution to game theory
[von Neumann, 1937]2. In this publication von Neumann had successfully found a so-
lution to a long standing problem posed by Leon Walras in 1874 regarding the system of
equations, influenced by supply and demand, governing production. The proof of this re-
sult is also a generalisation of the Minimax Theorem and was achieved by using Brouwer’s
Fixed Point Theorem. Von Neumann continued to develop his results and in doing so
created the area of game theory. This culminated in 1944 with the collaboration with
Oska Morgenstern and the publication of “Theory of Games and Economic Behavior” [von
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944]. A second edition appeared in 1947 and, despite this
publication being the first text in this field, many of the ideas and concepts it contains are
still used today.
John von Neumann was resident at Princeton for the majority of the time he devoted
to game theory and shortly after the publication of “Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior” it is was where von Neumann and John Nash, a student, crossed paths. While
at Princeton, Nash attended a series of seminars on game theory and became captivated by
the range of interesting and unsolved problems it contained. As an undergraduate student
at the Carnegie Institute of Technology, Nash took an economics course which sparked
original ideas of his own. However it was only after he became interested in game theory
at Princeton did Nash develop these ideas further. In 1949 Nash approached Albert Tucker,
who helped run the game theory seminars at Princeton, with the request of supervision for
his Thesis. This request was duly accepted. Shortly after this Nash visited von Neumann
to discuss his idea for an equilibrium point in a game with more than 2 players. Before
Nash was allowed to fully explain his proof and reach his conclusion it is reported von
Neumann interrupted abruptly and said
“That’s trivial, you know. That’s just a fixed point theorem” [Nasar, 1999]3
The two mathematicians had approached N -person game theory from two opposing an-
gles. Von Neumann’s work emphasised the importance of coalitions while Nash focused on
independence among players. Fortunately Nash communicated his ideas of a generalisation
of von Neumann’s work to games with multiple players to David Gale who immediately
recognised its significance and became an ambassador for Nash. Interestingly von Neu-
2Translated in “A Model of General Economic Equilibrium” [von Neumann, 1945]
3As told to Harold Kuhn
3
mann’s rejection of Nash’s idea combined with Tucker’s request of amendments to his
Thesis almost saw Nash abandon his theorem to tackle a problem in algebraic geometry.
Thankfully, Tucker was able to persuade Nash to continue with his original Thesis and in
1950 Nash published his work on equilibrium situations [Nash, 1950b]. This was quickly
replaced with a modification in 1951 [Nash, 1951] which, like the work by von Neumann,
uses Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem. Around this time Nash also produced a third paper
in game theory, this time describing the Bargaining Problem [Nash, 1950a].
The foundations of non-cooperative game theory are regarded to rest upon the theorems by
von Neumann in 1928 and Nash in 1950. Nash considered his result as a direct extension
of von Neumann’s work, and given von Neumann’s reported reaction it is likely he shared
Nash’s opinion on this. However, Nash’s work also provided a deviation. Von Neumann’s
work, while important, focused on the 2-player zero-sum case which has little relevance to
the mathematical models of real life situations.
It is not a coincidence the development of game theory coincided with the Second World
War. During this period some of the greatest mathematicians and scientists of the time
were assembled to help build and develop sophisticated weaponry. When weapons had
become too complicated to be used efficiently attention was turned to strategy. At this
time the work on 2-player zero-sum games was the only theory which was complete and
could be seen as reasonable to work from. Such games rely on the concept ‘my win your
gain’ and some mathematicians started to doubt how well this model fitted the real life
scenarios they were studying. With the development of more advance weaponry, including
nuclear bombs, it became clear an outright war was not a realistic solution. News of
Nash’s work was therefore met with great excitement. Finally there was a model which
was not required to identify a clear ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ and allowed independent decisions
to be made without the need for cooperation with the ‘enemy’. Since then interest has
been wide and diverse with the game theory model being used in a range of surprising
disciplines including politics, and psychology.
In 1994 John Nash shared the Nobel Prize for his work on Nash Equilibria with mathe-
matician John C. Harsanyi and economist Reinhard Selten who said
“Nobody would have foretold the great impact of the Nash equilibrium on
economics and social science in general. It was even less expected that Nash’s
equilibrium point concept would ever have any significance for biology theory”
[Nasar, 1999]
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1.3 Terminology - Non-cooperative Game Theory
We now introduce game theory formally and discuss the definitions and concepts which
will be important in this Thesis.
Consider a scenario involving N people where each person has to choose one of a finite
number of options (or strategies) to pursue which may have the affect of influencing the
outcome. Then in the game theory model each person is referred to as a player and a game
is described once every player has selected a strategy to ‘play’. When each player chooses
his strategy with the sole purpose of optimising his own personal outcome alone then the
game is said to be non-cooperative. In the N -player non-cooperative game define Si to
be the set of strategic decisions or pure strategies available to each player i = {1, . . . , N}
where |Si| = li is finite. If player i chooses strategy sji ∈ Si then define
s := (sj11 , . . . , s
jN
N ) ∈ S1 × · · · × SN (1.1)
where for all i = {1, . . . , N} we have ji ∈ {1, . . . , li} and call s a strategy profile or
situation of the game. For every situation s ∈ S := S1 × · · · × SN each player is
awarded a personal outcome. This outcome can be assigned a numerical value which can
be calculated for each player i in accordance to his personal utility or payoff function:
Hi(s) : S1 × · · · × SN 7→ R (1.2)
For example, the payoff function maybe a measure of how much money a player has gained
or lost. It is assumed each player’s objective is to maximise their payoff function therefore,
while the interpretations of the payoffs will be different for each game, success is generally
recongised when the highest (or lowest) payoff value is achieved. If all players know every
player’s payoff function then the game is said to be one of complete information. For
the purpose of this Thesis this property will be assumed in all games discussed.
Game theory models situations where each player’s personal outcome will depend on how
he interacts with all other players. Therefore each player will be hoping to select a strategy
which will result in the outcome of the game (or situation being modelled) being in their
favour. This selection process is inevitably non-trivial and becomes more complicated as
the number of players and strategies available increases.
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1.3.1 Optimal Strategies
For every player i = {1, . . . , N} the situation s ∈ S contains a pure strategy from Si which
player i hopes will maximise his payoff function Hi(s). However this strategy choice may
result in an opponent being unable to attain his maximum payoff. This is true for all
players i and consequently the strategies selected by each player will not only affect their
personal payoff but also that of their opponents.
It can be assumed all players are working with the aim of maximising their payoff. Since
all players are trying to achieve this, it is highly probable each player’s payoff will be
significantly less than had been anticipated. In 1950 John Nash [Nash, 1950b] introduced
the concept of an equilibrium situation (or equilibrium point) which addresses this
problem. An equilibrium point is a situation of the game where no player can achieve an
improved payoff by altering his strategy choice alone. Equivalently each player’s payoff is
maximal with regards to the strategies played by his opponents. Observe this may not
result in each player achieving his most maximum payoff value, but since no player has
any incentive to change their strategy the outcome is one which will result in all players
being ‘happy’. Let (s, sj
′
i ) be the situation where the pure strategy chosen by player i in s
is replaced by sj
′
i ∈ Si. Then the formal definition of Nash equilibria is as follows:
Definition 1.1 (Nash Equilibrium)
A situation s satisfies the conditions of Nash equilibrium if for all players i and all sj
′
i ∈ Si
Hi(s) ≥ Hi(s, sj
′
i ) (1.3)
For player i, and all sj
′
i ∈ Si, this is equivalent to identifying a situation s ∈ S :=
S1 × · · · × SN which satisfies the set of li inequalities given in (1.3). Then for all players,
solving the resulting
∑N
i=1 li inequalities will determine any equilibrium points which exist
in the game. An example of Nash equilibrium is given in Section 1.3.3.
1.3.2 Bimatrix Games
In a 2 player game each player’s payoff function can be expressed as a matrix. Consequently
2-player games are often referred to as bimatrix games. If player 1 has two pure strategies
and player 2 has three such that S1 = {s11, s21} and S2 = {s12, s22, s32} then the payoff matrix
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for player i, i = {1, 2}, is given by
Ai =
(
Hi(s11, s
1
2) Hi(s
1
1, s
2
2) Hi(s
1
1, s
3
2)
Hi(s21, s
1
1) Hi(s
2
1, s
2
2) Hi(s
2
1, s
3
2)
)
(1.4)
Where in this representation player 1’s strategies are the rows of the matrix and player
2’s are the columns. In reality it does not matter which way round these two are written,
provided the same order is used for the corresponding matrix for the second player. In the
case
A1 = −A2 (1.5)
we have a zero-sum game which is equivalent to
A1 +A2 = 0 (1.6)
and the reason for the name given to this subset of games is clear. Since in this case a
single matrix can be used to define the whole game such games are referred to simply as
matrix games. The game Naughts and Crosses is an example of a zero-sum game.
Observe the dimension of the matrix Ai is l1 × l2 (where recall |Si| = li). Therefore
the extension of this to represent a 3-player game would result in ‘matrices’ of dimension
l1× l2× l3. Similarly for a game consisting of N -players. Consequently choosing to express
the payoff values in this form for games with three or more players does not provide an
easy or useful representation of this information. In a bimatrix game the two matrices A1
and A2 are often expressed in one table given in Figure 1.1.
H1(s11, s
1
2), H2(s
1
1, s
1
2) H1(s
1
1, s
2
2), H2(s
1
1, s
2
2) H1(s
1
1, s
3
2), H2(s
1
1, s
3
2)
H1(s21, s
1
2), H2(s
2
1, s
1
2) H1(s
2
1, s
2
2), H2(s
2
1, s
2
2) H1(s
2
1, s
3
2), H2(s
2
1, s
3
2)
Figure 1.1: Example payoff table
7
The first element in each position of the table in Figure 1.1 refers to the payoff awarded
to player 1 and the second to player 2.
1.3.3 Prisoner’s Dilemma
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a popular example of game theory and was devised to inves-
tigate the psychology behind ethics and in particular the conflict between morality and
self-interest. The example involves the arrest of two suspects of a serious crime who make
a pact not to confess their guilt. While there is sufficient evidence to convict each individ-
ually of other smaller crimes the police do not have enough proof to charge them both for
the more serious crime unless one acts as an informant and confesses. In light of this the
police offer both prisoners the same deal. If one prisoner testifies and one remains quiet,
the informant will escape a jail term while the other prisoner will receive the maximum 10
years. If neither prisoner testifies then they will both receive a jail term of 1 year and in
the case that both prisoners testify against each other then they both will be sentenced to
5 years. Neither prisoner will have information regarding the choice the other is making,
so the dilemma is do the prisoners testify or keep quiet?
Remark
Games, like this, where each player has the option of just two (pure) strategies are called
dyadic.
The table in Figure 1.2 summarises the ‘payoffs’, or jail terms handed to each prisoner, for
each scenario using the representation given in Figure 1.1.
Prisoner 2 - quiet Prisoner 2 - testify
Prisoner 1 - quiet (1, 1) (10, 0)
Prisoner 1 - testify (0, 10) (5, 5)
Figure 1.2: Payoff table for the game Prisoner’s dilemma
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In Figure 1.2 if the payoff is given by (a, b) then prisoner 1 will be jailed for a years and
prisoner 2 for b years. If both prisoners are working together and aiming to keep both
jail terms to a minimum then both prisoners realise they should remain quiet. However
problems arise when either one of the prisoners believe the other may break the original
pact in the hope they will escape jail and secure a better position for themselves. In
this case we have a non-cooperative game as each player is only focused on improving
his outcome. Given neither prisoner will know the choice the other makes, what decision
should each prisoner make?
Neither prisoner can predict what the other will do - if they can then the decision is easy.
If prisoner 1 knows prisoner 2 will stay silent then prisoner 1’s best option is to testify and
avoid a prison sentence. Surprisingly if prisoner 1 knows prisoner 2 will testify then again
his best option is to testify and reduce the jail term he will receive. Therefore betraying is
the best option in both of these cases and is the dominant strategy. Prisoner 2 thinks
similarly so both choose to testify. This is an equilibrium point of the game as neither
player can reduce his jail term by altering his decision to testify alone. Interestingly this is
the only equilibrium point of the game, since when both prisoners remain quiet either one
can improve their jail term by testifying, the same is true (for one player) when one testifies
and one does not. In this example breaking the pact to improve the individual resulted
in both prisoners being worse off. In particular this very nicely demonstrates how a Nash
equilibrium situation may not be the perfect result. What is interesting about this result
is that both prisoners will choose to testify realising the other prisoner will have reached
the same decision using the same analysis. Despite this they both still testify knowing that
both keeping quiet would lead to a better outcome.
1.3.4 Mixed Strategies
By definition Nash equilibrium points are those situations where, for the given situation,
each player is content in the payoff value they have been awarded. Consequently such
situations are often regarded as the solution set to a game. However within our current
definition of a game there is no guarantee such equilibrium situations exist.
Example 1.2 (Rock-Paper-Scissors)
The game Rock-Paper-Scissors is traditionally a two player game where each player’s
strategy set is given by {r=rock, p=paper, s=scissors}. The rules of the game are rock
beats scissors, scissors beats paper and paper beats rock. If both players chose the same
strategy the game is a draw. Let 1 denote a win, 0 a draw and -1 a loss then the payoff
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table for this game is as given in Figure 1.3
P1 / P2 R P S
R 0, 0 -1, 1 1, -1
P 1, -1 0, 0 -1, 1
S -1, 1 1, -1 0, 0
Figure 1.3: Payoff table for the game Rock-Paper-Scissors.
Observe this game contains no equilibrium situation.
(End Example)
The problem with the game Rock-Paper-Scissors is that both players are required to out
guess their opponent. Another example of this would be a simplified version of poker where
each player is required to ‘bluff’. This guessing introduces uncertainty into a game and in
such cases there will be no Nash equilibrium situation. To interpret this scenario the notion
of a mixed strategy is introduced. To define this formally we require the definition of a
probability distribution and discrete random variable:
Definition 1.3 (Probability Distribution)
A probability distribution is a vector of probabilities X = (x1, . . . , xn) where for every
i = {1, . . . , n}, xi ≥ 0 and
n∑
i=1
xi = 1 (1.7)
Definition 1.4 (Discrete Random Variable)
A discrete random variable is a pair of vectors, one containing a set of outcomes A =
(a1, . . . , an) and a probability distribution X = (x1, . . . , xn) where xi is the probability of
outcome ai occurring.
Then a mixed strategy is defined as:
Definition 1.5 (Mixed Strategy)
A mixed strategy for player i is a discrete random variable or equivalently a probability
distribution over his set of pure strategies Si.
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Returning to the original motivation for a mixed strategy observe the probability distri-
bution reflects the uncertainty player’s exhibit towards the strategy choice made by an
opponent. For each player i let a mixed strategy situation pi be defined by
pi := (x1i , . . . , x
li
i ) (1.8)
where as before li = |Si| and each xji is the probability pure strategy sji ∈ Si is chosen.
Denote the set of all mixed strategies (probability distributions) for player i by Pi where
the each mixed strategy can be represented as a vector in Euclidean space. Let the product
space of all mixed strategies be P where
P := P1 × · · · × PN (1.9)
and then a (mixed strategy) situation of the game is given by
p := (p1, . . . , pN ) ∈ P (1.10)
Definition 1.6 (Support)
The support Yi ⊂ Si of a mixed strategy pi ∈ Pi is the non-empty subset of pure strategies
assigned a non-zero probability in pi.
Definition 1.7 (Totally Mixed Strategy)
For mixed strategy p and all players i = {1, . . . , N}, if the support Yi for player i satisfies
Yi = Si then p is a totally mixed strategy.
Example 1.8
Returning to Example 1.2. For player 1 let p1 = (x11, x
2
1, x
3
1) then for any game x
1
1, x
2
1 and
x31 are the probabilities player 1 chooses rock, paper or scissors respectively.
(End Example)
For a fixed j ∈ {1, . . . , li} consider the mixed strategy pi with xji = 1 and xj
′
i = 0 ∀j′ ∈
{1, . . . , li} with j 6= j′. This is equivalent to the vector (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0) where the value 1
lies in position j and is identified with player i selecting pure strategy sji ∈ Si. This is true
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for all j ∈ {1, . . . , li} and thus we must have Si ⊂ Pi. In particular the situations where
players do have enough information and confidence to predict the strategy choice made by
an opponent with 100% certainty is still represented within this definition. Since pi is a
probability distribution the following relation is true
x1i + · · ·+ xlii = 1 (1.11)
and without loss of generality rearranging gives
xlii = 1− (x1i + · · ·+ x(li−1)i ) (1.12)
Consequently if each of the pure strategies belonging to Si are considered as variables
then equation (1.12) tells us the probability assigned to one variable is dependent on all
others. Further because each xji represents a probability it must be that 0 ≤ xji ≤ 1 for all
j = {1, . . . , li}. Using this with equation (1.11) the set Pi has a geometric interpretation.
From (1.12) we know only (li−1) of the variables from Si take independent values therefore
we construct Pi over a space of dimension (li − 1).
Given Si ⊂ Pi the set of pure strategies must be identifiable within the geometric repre-
sentation of Pi. Such strategies are described by the set
{xji = 1, xki = 0 | ∀ j, k ∈ {1, . . . , li}, k 6= j} (1.13)
which identifies li unique points within the geometric object. The geometric represen-
tation of P contains exactly all mixed strategies and so in particular must contain all
1-dimensional edges given by the set
{xji + xj
′
i = 1, x
k
i = 0 | ∀ j, j′, k ∈ {1, . . . , li}, j 6= j′ 6= k} (1.14)
In this set note when xj
′
i = 0 we have the set given in (1.13) and in particular the pure
strategy situations are the end points of the 1-dimensional edges given in (1.14). Then
observe the resulting geometric representation of the mixed strategy set Pi is equivalent
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to the convex hull of all pure strategies in Si (as represented in (1.13)), or equivalently a
simplex of dimension (li− 1). Figure 1.4 illustrates this with an example of the simplex Pi
when li = 2 and li = 3.
1
0
(a)
1
xi1
xi10
1
(b)
xi2
Figure 1.4: Constructing Pi as a geometric object where in (a) li = 2 and (b) li = 3
Remark
Observe for all i = {1, . . . , N} the mixed strategy set Pi is infinite.
For a mixed strategy situation denote the payoff assigned to player i by
Gi : P1 × · · · × PN 7→ R (1.15)
Then the payoff value Gi is an expectation of the payoffs Hi.
Definition 1.9 (Expectation)
For a discrete random variable of events A = (a1, . . . , an) with probability distribution
X = (x1, . . . , xn) the expected outcome, or expectation is given by
n∑
i=1
xi · ai (1.16)
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Observe the payoff functions Hi take as input a value from S. Therefore for a 2 player game
with Si = {s1i , . . . , slii } and mixed strategy pi = (x1i , . . . , xlii ) for i ∈ {1, 2} the expected
payoff awarded to player 1 is given by
G1 :=
l1∑
j=1
l2∑
k=1
xj1 · xk2 · H1(sj1, sk2) (1.17)
This extends to all finite number of players N . In particular Gi in an N -player game is
defined as
Gi :=
l1∑
i1=1
· · ·
lN∑
iN=1
xi11 · · · · · xiNN · Hi(si11 , . . . , siNN ) (1.18)
Remark
When p = s then Gi(p) = Hi(s).
Notation
Let Γ denote the N -player non-cooperative game with mixed strategy sets Pi and payoff
functions Gi.
Let (p, p′i) denote the situation where the mixed strategy chosen by player i in p is replaced
by p′i ∈ Pi. Then a Nash equilibrium point in game Γ is defined to be:
Definition 1.10 (Nash Equilibrium for Mixed Strategies)
For a non-cooperative game Γ, a situation p is said to be a Nash equilibrium situation if
for all player’s i
Gi(p) ≥ Gi(p, p′i) ∀ p′i ∈ Pi (1.19)
Once again Nash equilibrium points will be referred to as equilibrium points or equi-
librium situations.
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Example 1.11
Continuing from Example 1.8. When player 1’s mixed strategy is given by x11 = x
2
1 =
x31 =
1
3 and if player 2 selects the same mixed strategy the resulting situation is a Nash
equilibrium situation.
(End Example)
Every non-cooperative game Γ can be further sub-categorised depending on the character-
istics of its payoff functions. In particular any game is said to be either non-degenerate
or degenerate. We return to this in Section 1.4.
It is not obvious that within any game Γ we should be able to identify an equilibrium
point. However this is exactly what Nash’s Theorem allows us to assume.
Theorem 1.12 (Nash’s Theorem [Nash, 1950b])
Every non-cooperative game Γ has at least one equilibrium situation.
This result was proved differently for bimatrix games by Lemke and Howson in 1964 [Lemke
and Howson Jr, 1964] and in 1971 Rosenmu¨ller [Rosenmu¨ller, 1971] and Wilson [Wilson,
1971] both independently achieved the same result for general non-cooperative N -person
games. Collectively their work has resulted in the following, more common, version of
Nash’s Theorem
Theorem 1.13 (Nash’s Theorem - Extension)
In every non-cooperative game Γ there exists at least one equilibrium situation. When Γ is
non-degenerate then the number of equilibrium situations is finite and odd.
An overview of current proofs of Theorem 1.12 and 1.13 are given in Section 1.7. From
this point forward Nash’s Theorem will refer to the formulation given in Theorem 1.13.
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1.3.5 Best Response Correspondences
First some important notation
Notation
s(i) ∈ S(i) := S1 × · · · × Si−1 × Si+1 × · · · × SN (1.20)
p(i) ∈ P (i) := P1 × · · · × Pi−1 × Pi+1 × · · · × PN (1.21)
Remark
The notation P (i) is equivalent to the notation P−i popular in game theory publications.
An important tool used to determine equilibrium situations in a non-cooperative game Γ
are the set of best response correspondences. First notice we can define a situation
p ∈ P by p := p(i) × {pi}, where p(i) ∈ P (i) and pi ∈ Pi.
Definition 1.14 (Best Response Correspondence)
For all i = {1, . . . , N} and for every situation p(i) ∈ P (i) player i’s best response corre-
spondence Ai is defined by
Ai(p(i)) := {p(i) × {pi} | Gi(p(i) × {pi}) ≥ Gi(p(i) × {p′i}) ∀ p′i ∈ Pi} (1.22)
for pi ∈ Pi
Remark
Then situation p¯ = (p¯1, . . . , p¯i, . . . , p¯N ) is a Nash equilibrium point of Γ when p¯(i) × {p¯i}
belongs to Ai(p¯(i)), and in particular p¯ ∈ Ai, for every player i. Equilibrium situations
can therefore be identified as the elements belonging to
A1 ∩ · · · ∩ AN (1.23)
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Equivalently equilibrium situations occur at the points of intersection of all functions Ai.
This clearly becomes increasingly more complicated as the number of players, and their
strategy sets, increase in size.
The use of best response correspondences to identify the set of equilibrium situations leads
to an important observation. Suppose for a fixed situation p(i) ∈ P (i) player i’s optimal
strategy is mixed strategy pi with support Yi. Then every pure strategy in Yi must also
be an optimal strategy for player i for situation p(i). For contradiction assume this is not
the case. Let Yi = {s1i , s2i , s3i } and assume the payoff awarded to player i when he chooses
these pure strategies are a, a, b respectively, where a > b. Then if x1i = x
2
i = x
3
i =
1
3 the
expected payoff earned by player i is a+a+b3 < a. If however player i changes his strategy
to x1i = x
2
i =
1
2 and x
3
i = 0 then player i’s expected payoff is now
a+a
2 = a. Therefore
the mixed strategy originally chosen does not correspond to an optimal strategy and this
contradicts our initial assumption. This holds for all probability distributions of x1i , x
2
i , x
3
i
where x3i 6= 0.
This leads to an important characterisation to the definition of a mixed strategy equilibrium
point, Definition 1.10. In this definition an equilibrium point p = (p1, . . . , pi, . . . , pN ) is
required to satisfy the following set of infinite inequalities:
Gi(p) ≥ Gi(p, p′i) ∀ p′i ∈ Pi (1.24)
For all i = {1, . . . , N}, since the probability distribution pi ∈ p is an optimal strategy
for player i, the support of pi must only contain those pure strategies from Si which are
optimal pure strategies for player i. In light of this, the condition for p to be an equilibrium
situation is equivalent to p satisfying the following set of finite inequalities:
Gi(p) ≥ Gi(p, sji ) ∀ sji ∈ Si (1.25)
In particular a mixed strategy belongs to the best response correspondence if and only if all
pure strategies in its support are pure best responses to the same situation. Geometrically
player i’s best responses to a situation from P (i) must be a face of Pi.
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Identifying Optimal Strategies
For an N -player non-cooperative game Γ the first step in constructing the best response
correspondence for each player i = {1, . . . , N} is to identify player i’s optimal strategies in
response to all situations from P (i).
For every payoff function Gi and for all pure strategies s
j
i ∈ Si consider the set of li
restricted payoff functions given by
Gji : P1 × · · · × Pi−1 × {sji} × Pi+1 × · · · × PN 7→ R (1.26)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and sji ∈ Si where
Gji (p
(i)) = Gi(p, s
j
i ) (1.27)
As the strategies from P (i) vary the function Gji (p
(i)) produces a different real valued
output. Consequently this function can be plotted in cartesian co-ordinates with an axis
for each of the independent strategies (variables) from S(i) and one for the payoff awarded
to player i. Repeating for all sji ∈ Si produces li distinct graphs which can be compared
to identify player i’s optimal strategies for all situations from P (i). This information is
then represented over P to produce player i’s best response correspondence. The following
example illustrates this process and the use of best response correspondences to identify
equilibrium situations.
Example 1.15
For a 2-player dyadic game Γ let the mixed strategy for player i in {1, 2}, be denoted by
pi = (x1i , x
2
i ). By equation (1.12) we have x
2
i = 1−x1i and pi = (x1i , 1−x1i ). Consequently
each player has just one independent pure strategy and the simplices P1 and P2 are of
dimension 1. Since each player has just one independent strategy denote the mixed strategy
strategies for player 1 and player 2 by x1 and x2 respectively.
By definition the payoff functions Gi, i ∈ {1, 2}, are expectations of the payoff functions
Hi. Assume the payoff function H1 is given by the matrix
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(
a1 a2
a3 a4
)
(1.28)
with the corresponding matrix for H2 being
(
b1 b2
b3 b4
)
(1.29)
Then the payoff functions G1 and G2 are given by
G1 : P1 × P2 7→ a1x1x2 + a2x1(1− x2) + a3(1− x1)x2 + a4(1− x1)(1− x2) (1.30)
G2 : P1 × P2 7→ b1x1x2 + b2x1(1− x2) + b3(1− x1)x2 + b4(1− x1)(1− x2) (1.31)
Remark
The payoff functions given in equations (1.30) and (1.31) are polylinear. That is each
term is linear with respect to each player’s strategy set Si.
Focus initially on determining the optimal payoffs for player 1 and so in particular consider
the restricted payoff functions Gj1 for pure strategies s
j
i ∈ Si, j ∈ {1, 2}. For mixed strategy
situation p the restricted payoffs for player 1 are
G11 = G1(p, s
1
1) : {s11} × P2 7→ a1x2 + a2(1− x2) = x2(a1 − a2) + a2 (1.32)
G21 = G1(p, s
2
1) : {s21} × P2 7→ a3x2 + a4(1− x2) = x2(a3 − a4) + a4 (1.33)
Observe equations (1.32) and (1.33) are linear. Assume a4 < a1 < a2 < a3 then Figure 1.5
shows the two restricted payoff functions.
From Figure 1.5 when x2 < y0 the payoff function G11 produces player 1’s optimal payoff;
equivalently player 1’s optimal strategy is pure strategy s11. When x2 > y0 payoff function
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3a
2a
1a
4a
0y 2x0 1
G12
G11
G1
Figure 1.5: Player 1’s two restricted payoff funtions
G21 is optimal and player 1’s optimal strategy is pure strategy s
2
1. Finally when x2 = y0
both payoff functions are optimal and player 1’s optimal strategy will be a totally mixed
strategy. This information is translated to form the best response correspondence for player
1. This is shown in Figure 1.6
10
x2
y0
1
x1
Figure 1.6: Player 1’s best response correspondence
The same procedure can be repeated for player 2 and once again the two restricted payoff
functions Gj2, for j ∈ {1, 2} are 1-dimensional. Without loss of generality let the relation
b4 < b1 < b2 < b3 be true then the plot of the two restricted payoff functions is the same
as that given in Figure 1.5 with aj = bj for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and the point y0 labelled by
z0. As before construct player 2’s best response correspondence. This is given in Figure
1.7
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10
x2
1
z0 x1
Figure 1.7: Player 2’s best response correspondence
Each point of intersection of the best response correspondences for player’s 1 and 2 cor-
respond to a situation from Γ where neither player will benefit by playing an alternative
strategy and as such must correspond to an equilibrium situation of the game. Figure
1.8 shows the intersection of the best response correspondences for player 1 and 2. There
are clearly three points of intersection and thus there are three equilibrium situations;
(1, 0) and (0, 1), represent pure strategy equilibrium situations while the point (z0, y0)
corresponds to a totally mixed strategy situation.
z0
x2
y
1
x110
0
Figure 1.8: The intersection of the best response correspondences for player’s 1 and 2
In a non-degenerate 2-player dyadic game each player has just two possible distinct best
response correspondences. Figure 1.9 illustrates the three remaining interesting configura-
tions of the best response correspondences for player’s 1 and 2. Observe, as expected by
Theorem 1.13, all have an odd number of equilibrium situations.
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Remark
Suppose player 1 has a pure strategy which is strictly dominated, i.e., player 1 always
prefers one pure strategy for all mixed strategies selected by player 2. Then the corre-
sponding best response correspondence is a vertical line at the corresponding point on the
axis labelled x1. Similarly for player 2.
Remark
Any point (a, b) from the space [0, 1] × [0, 1] (as portrayed in Figure 1.6-1.9) completely
describes a mixed strategy for both players where x1 = a and x2 = b.
1
10
x1
x1
x1
x2
x2 x2
1
1 1
1
0 0z0 z0
z0
y0
y0 y0
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 1.9: Remaining configurations of the intersetion of best response correspondences:
(a) and (c) have 1 equilibrium point and (b) has 3 equilibrium points.
(End Example)
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1.4 Degenerate Games
In addition to identifying equilibrium situations, properties of the best response correspon-
dences also provide clarification into the distinction between degenerate and non-degenerate
games. Returning to Example 1.15 assume the payoff function for player 1 remains as given
in (1.30). Then alter player 2’s payoff function from (1.31) such that his optimal strategy
when x1 = 1 is a totally mixed strategy and for all other situations of the game player 2’s
optimal strategy is s12. In Figure 1.10, (a) shows the new restricted payoff functions for
player 2 and (b) is the resulting intersection of both player’s best response correspondences.
0 1
G
x
2
1 0 1
G21
G22
b2
b1 b3=
b4
x1
1
x2
y0
(a) (b)
Figure 1.10: (a) the restricted payoff functions for palyer 2 and (b) the intersection of the
best response correspondences for player’s 1 and 2.
In (b) of Figure 1.10 there are two points of intersection and by Theorem 1.13 this game
is degenerate. The first is (0, 1) and corresponds to a situation which is completely de-
termined; that is the probabilities assigned to x1 and x2 are unique. The second is an
intersection of dimension 1 and occurs when x1 = 0 and for all x2 ∈ [0, y0]. Observe at
this 1-dimensional intersection the tangents of both A1 and A2 coincide.
For bimatrix games the definition of degeneracy is well defined and numerous (equiva-
lent) definitions exist (see [von Stengel, 2002] for example). A popular definition of non-
degeneracy for these games is as follows and can be found in [von Stengel, 2002].
Definition 1.16 (Non-Degenerate and Degenerate Bimatrix Games)
A bimatrix game is called non-degenerate if the number of pure best responses to a mixed
strategy never exceeds the size of its support. A bimatrix game is then degenerate if this
condition fails for at least one situation of the game.
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Unfortunately the notion of degeneracy becomes increasingly more complicated as the size
of a game increases and currently there is no formal or precise definition for games with
more than 2 players. This is not a question we aim to answer in this Thesis so instead
we make use the definition presented by Rosenmu¨ller in his proof of Nash’s Theorem for
N-person games [Rosenmu¨ller, 1971] (this proof is discussed in Section 1.7).
Definition 1.17 (Non-Degenerate and Degenerate N -Player Games)
A game is said to be non-degenerate if each segment of all best response correspondences
is a smooth manifold and all intersections of such correspondences are transverse.
Remark
By transverse we mean the intersection of an additional best response correspondence
reduces the dimension of the intersection by 1. Additionally each intersection must be a
smooth manifold.
In particular, in a non-degenerate game, at the point of intersection the linear approxima-
tion, or tangent, of each best response correspondence does not coincide with the tangent
of any other best response correspondence.
Example 1.18
In Figure 1.11 the intersection seen in (a) is transverse while the intersection in (b) is not.
(  ) (  )a b
Figure 1.11: Tranversal and non-transversal intersections
(End Example)
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Observe a slight alteration to strategy choice or payoff function for player i results in a small
perturbation to the best response correspondence Ai. Then, in the non-degenerate game,
such changes will not affect the transversal property of these intersections. Consequently
non-degenerate games are ‘stable’ and account for almost all games. This is in contrast
to the degenerate case where in this scenario a slight perturbation within the game will
cause the positioning of the best response correspondences to alter enough to satisfy the
conditions to be non-degenerate.
Remark
The condition of non-degeneracy also extends to the intersection of k ≤ N best response
correspondences.
1.5 Extensive Form
The extensive form representation of a game displays all relevant information using a
tree. Within this tree each node represents a position of the game, the edges are the
strategy decisions made by the player’s and the end nodes give the payoff values. Consider
a two player dyadic game where player 1 can choose between strategies s11 and s
2
1 and
player 2 between s12 and s
2
2. Let p1 = (x1, x2) ∈ P1 and p2 = (y1, y2) ∈ P2. The first node
represents the beginning of the game and without loss of generality we assume player 1
selects his pure strategy first. He has two choices to make, he can either select strategy s11
or s21 and to represent this choice there are two edges leading from the first node. These
edges then terminate with a second node which represent player 2’s choice of strategy, and
once again two edges lead from each node. The final nodes give the payoffs assigned to
each player. Figure 1.12 represents this simple game.
An important definition connected to extensive form games is that of an information set.
This is a set of nodes associated to one player for a single position of the game (i.e., the
number of moves before each node in the set, for all players, is the same). The distinguishing
feature of the information set is that, given the information the player currently has, he
cannot distinguish between the different nodes at the time he makes his move. Therefore
at each node he will make the same choice of strategy.
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Player 1
s 11
s 21
Player 2
Player 2
s21
s22
s21
s22
G1(x2 , y2) and G2(x2 , y2)
G1(x2 , y1) and G2(x2 , y1)
G1(x1 , y2) and G2(x1, y2)
G1(x1 , y1) and G2(x1, y1)
Figure 1.12: Example of a 2-player dyadic game in extensive form
Remark
While this is an important representation of a game, this form will not be considered in
the original work of this Thesis.
1.6 Game Theory in Practice
This section provides some examples to highlight the diverse range of applications of game
theory.
Military
The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 can be simplified as a two player game where each player
can choose from 2 pure strategies [Brams, 2001]. This crisis was the result of the US
observing the then Soviet Union building nuclear missile sites in Cuba. The Soviet Union
needed to decide if they would remove (R) their missiles or maintain them (M) while the
US considered both a blockade (B) and air strike (A) to remove these missile bases .
For this simplified representation of the situation the pure strategy set for the US was
{A,B} and for the Soviet Union was {M,R}. This generated four different outcomes to
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which each side could assign a number from 1 to 4, where 4 represents the most favourable
outcome. Figure 1.13 shows the corresponding payoff table.
A B
M (1,1) (4,2)
R (2,4) (3,3)
Figure 1.13: Payoff table for Cuban Missile Crisis [Brams, 2001]
The situation (A,M) with payoff (1,1) represents the outcome of a nuclear war while the
situation (B,R) with payoff (3, 3) represents a compromise. Neither of these situations
are equilibrium points of the corresponding ‘game’ as at least one side can achieve a more
favourable outcome by altering their strategy. This leaves the situations (B,M) with
payoff (2, 4) where the Soviet Union claim victory and the US are defeated and the reverse
situation of (A,R) with payoff (4, 2) as the pure strategy equilibrium situations. Observe
the situations representing Nash equilibria are not the ones representing compromise.
We now examine a more complex model, the relationship between China and Taiwan.
The BBC News Country Profile Report [BBC News, 2008] describes Taiwan as being
practically independent of China. However this is a situation China would like to change
and, if necessary, is prepared to use force to ensure Taiwan is reunited with the mainland.
Washington, USA, is the main weapons supplier to Taiwan, and this has contributed in
part to the offset of military threat. As such it appears the largest and most significant risk
of military conflict between China and USA would involve Taiwan. This is discussed and
examined using game theory in ‘A Game Theory View of Military Conflict in the Taiwan
Strait’ by Frank and Melese [Frank and Melese, 2003]. The paper analyses the situation
and represents it as a game in extensive form; a summary of this can be seen in Figure
1.14.
The end node “US opts to defend” extends to a secondary graph (not given but included in
the referenced paper) which includes the different scenarios resulting from US and China
taking pre-emptive measures and deciding to strike first. The term blockade refers to
China taking the decision to prevent supplies reaching Taiwan. Therefore the outcome of
all possible scenarios can be effectively modelled as an extensive form game and thus can
be analysed as such to enable each side to arrive at the most optimal outcome. According
to the paper [Frank and Melese, 2003] the action taken by the US will depend on the
‘mood’ of China. In particular if China is patient rather than impatient, and provided the
likelihood of China succeeding is slim, it will be likely military conflict can be avoided. It
is in analysing these factors along with costs, economy and political realities which will
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Figure 1.14: Summary of extensive form game representing the risk of military conflict
between USA and China, adapted from [Frank and Melese, 2003]
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realise a solution. In particular a blockade may prove to be too costly to US/Taiwan and
so in the situation where either a blockade of force reunification exists choosing the latter
may turn out to be the best solution.
Economics and Cournot’s Model of Oligopoly
Cournot’s Model of Oligopoly [Cournot, 1838] was developed in the 19th Century, long
before game theory was first formalised, and models the interactions of firms competing
for business. Suppose there are N firms competing for consumers of a single product then
following Chapter 3.1 of “An Introduction to Game Theory” [Osborne, 2004] assume firm
i spends Ci(qi) producing qi units of the product. However producing more output will
require a larger expenditure therefore Ci is an increasing function for all i = {1, . . . , N}.
Each unit is sold at a single price which is influenced by the amount produced by all firms
and consumer demand. Let Z(Q) be the market price of each unit where Q = q1 + · · ·+qN .
As the total output Q increases it is assumed the price per unit will fall, therefore while
Z is positive it is a decreasing function. Then the revenue generated by each firm is given
by qi.Z(q). Let pii be a function representing profit for player i then
pii(q1, . . . , qN ) = qi.Z(Q)− Ci(qi) (1.34)
This can be expressed in traditional game theory terminology by taking each firm as a
player, the set of strategies as the amount of the product produced (this will necessarily
be non-negative) and each player’s payoff will be the profit made.
Politics
In 1929 Hotelling used game theory to model spatial competition [Hotelling, 1929]. Addi-
tionally he observed his work could be applied to fields as diverse as politics and in partic-
ular could be used as a tool to help politicians choose policies to increase their chance of
winning the largest proportion of the votes in an election. A simplified example takes the
candidates standing for election as the players and each policy as a number from a sliding
scale determining how ‘left’ or ‘right’ wing it maybe. A strategy is then a selection of
these polices and a situation is the set of policies chosen by all candidates. Those eligible
to vote select their personal preference from those policies put forward and the candidate
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who achieves the most votes wins. Each player wants to win, would prefer to win than to
tie for first place, but would prefer to tie for first place than to come in any other position.
Should a player tie for first place they want to do this with as few other candidates as
possible. A payoff function is then defined and is dependent on the position each strategy
achieves; i.e., if it wins outright, ties for first place or achieves a different position. This is
described in “An Introduction to Game Theory” [Osborne, 2004] (page 71) and relies on
each voter choosing the policy closest to their ideal position. Suppose each voter is asked
to describes their perfect policy, then this can be given a number corresponding to the
same scale as before. Using this information the median value can be determined and will
define the median policy. The equilibrium point of this scenario results in each candidate
selecting policies which lie as close as possible to this median policy. In his paper Hotelling
observed this trend in the US elections, where the policies chosen by the Republican and
Democratic parties are usually similar.
Predator-Prey
Chen, Bao and Yan’s article “A Predation Behavior Model Based on Game Theory” [Chen
et al., 2005] uses game theory to model the behaviour of predators. A predator can either
catch his prey by running fast or he can wait and remain still so the prey will come to
him. The prey can avoid being caught by either out running the predator or remain hidden
so the predator cannot sense he is there. The payoff given in the article is an algebraic
sum of energy income and expenditure and consequently relates directly to the size of the
animals under consideration. It is assumed this can be modelled using a zero-sum game
and neither prey or predator will know the tactics of the other.
The payoff matrix for the predator is given in table in Figure 1.15
Prey Runs Prey Hides
Predator Runs e1 e2
Predator Hides e3 e4
Figure 1.15: Payoff matrix for predator behaviour, taken from [Chen et al., 2005]
Where e1, e2, e3, e4 is the notation used in [Chen et al., 2005] to define the solutions given
by the payoff sum. Their result coincides with observations made in nature with larger
animals choosing to chase their prey rather than trying to hide while smaller animals are
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better at conserving energy and hiding to avoid their predators. This analysis assumes
animals are able to select different strategies for different behaviour, but which there is no
evidence to support this. However the authors believe
“There must be an optimum solution behind any biological behavior.”
[Chen et al., 2005]
1.7 Proving Nash’s Theorem
In section 1.6 the example given for an application of game theory in economics details
Cournot’s Model of oligopoly which describes the interactions of firms competing for busi-
ness. In addition to defining this model, Cournot also describes a method to find its
solution. This method was first devised and used in the 19th Century, long before any
formalisation of game theory. However when describing Cournot’s model in terms of game
theory it becomes apparent its solution set corresponds exactly to the equilibrium situa-
tions of the game. While Nash’s Theorem extends Cournot’s work to the formal description
of game theory, even in 1950, Nash’s work was not completely original. In 1947 von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern provided a proof of the Minimax Theorem for 2 player zero-sum
games [von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944]. Therefore John Nash’s achievement was
to be the first mathematician to provide a proof of Theorem 1.12 for all non-cooperative
games with a finite number of players, each with a finite number of pure strategies. We
detail this proof and Nash’s subsequent improvement to it in 1951. This is followed by a
chronological overview of other proofs for this Theorem and in particular to the proof of
the extension of Nash’s Theorem, Theorem 1.13.
1.7.1 John Nash - 1950 & 1951
John Nash provided two proofs of his famous result. His first result was presented in 1950
[Nash, 1950b] and makes use of Kakutani’s Theorem [Kakutani, 1941]: a generalisation of
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem.
Theorem 1.19 (Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem [Borowski and Borwein, 2002])
Every continuous mapping of a compact convex set into itself has a fixed point.
Kakutani’s Theorem generalises this result:
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Theorem 1.20 (Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem [Borowski and Borwein, 2002])
Every correspondence Φ that maps a compact convex subset C of a locally convex space
into itself, with a closed graph and convex non-empty images (i.e., Φ(x) is a non-empty
convex set of C for all x ∈ C) has a fixed point, x ∈ Φ(x).
Recall in an N -player non-cooperative game Γ, a situation p from the product space P is
a vector containing a single mixed strategy for each player. Then in terms of our notation,
the proof Nash presented in [Nash, 1950b] is as follows.
Definition 1.21 (Counters [Nash, 1950b])
A vector p ∈ P counters a second vector p′ ∈ P , if the strategy of each player in p yields
the highest obtainable expectation (payoff) for that player against the N − 1 strategies of
the other player’s in p′.
Observe Nash’s definition of counters is equivalent to the set of best responses for a player
i to a situation from P (i). Assume p is given by (p1, . . . , pN ) where pi ∈ Pi for all i =
{1, . . . , N}. Then by Definition 1.21 if p counters itself then, for all i = {1, . . . , N}, player
i’s optimal payoff for situation {p1, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , pN} is achieved at strategy pi. This
is identical to the definition of an equilibrium point, Definition 1.10. Therefore the set of
all self-countering vectors p is the set of equilibrium points in Γ.
For every p(i) ∈ P (i) an optimal strategy for player i can be identified and consequently
every vector p must have a countering set. For all i = {1, . . . , N} let Zi ⊂ Si denote the
set of pure best responses for player i for strategy p(i). Then the set of all best responses is
the convex hull of Zi, which is a convex and closed set. Then the graph of a given vector p
to its countering set is a one-to-many correspondence from the product space P1×· · ·×PN
into itself. Therefore the conditions of Kakutani’s Theorem hold and can be used to prove
the existence of a fixed point. These fixed points are the self-countering N -tuples and
consequently there is at least one equilibrium point.
In 1951 John Nash game a different proof to his work [Nash, 1951]. By constructing a con-
tinuous function with fixed points corresponding once again to the equilibrium situations
of the game, Nash was able to use Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem directly.
Define the game Γ as before. Recall (p, p′i) is the situation p ∈ P with player i changing
his strategy to p′i ∈ Pi. Similarly for (p, sji ) with player i choosing pure strategy sji ∈ Si
instead.
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Nash’s proof requires the following function:
ϕji (p) := max{0, Gi(p, sji )−Gi(p) } (1.35)
Then for each mixed strategy pi ∈ Pi a modification p′i is defined by:
p′i :=
pi +
∑
Si
ϕij (p)s
j
i
1 +
∑
Si
ϕij (p)
(1.36)
with associated vector p′ = (p′1, . . . , p′N ).
Define T : p 7→ p′ to be a continuous mapping. Since the aim is to use Brouwer’s Fixed
Point Theorem to establish the result, Nash verifies the fixed points of T to be equilib-
rium situations by considering situation p. At an equilibrium situation no player has any
incentive to change their strategy, therefore each player’s payoff is at a (local) maximum.
In particular if p is an equilibrium situation, and if player i’s pure strategy sji is optimal
for p(i), then (Gi(p, s
j
i ) − Gi(p)) = 0 and by definition ϕji (p) = 0. Alternatively if sji is
not maximal then (Gi(p, s
j
i ) − Gi(p)) < 0 and once again ϕji (p) = 0. Therefore in the
definition of p′i the denominator is 1 and the numerator is pi. This must be true for all
players i = {1, . . . , N} and therefore pi = p′i for all i.
For the inverse implication consider a fixed point of the function T i.e., a situation p ∈ P
such that T (p) = p. Then for all i = {1, . . . , N} it must be the case that pi = p′i and in
particular, by (1.36), ϕji (p) = 0 for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , li}. This is equivalent to each player
being unable to improve his payoff by changing his strategy choice alone and thus must
represent and equilibrium situation.
Finally, since Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem guarantees the existences of at least one
fixed point there is at least one equilibrium situation.
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1.7.2 Lemke and Howson - 1964
In 1964 Lemke and Howson [Lemke and Howson Jr, 1964] produced an algebraic proof of
Nash’s Theorem for 2-player non-degenerate games. This proof allowed Nash’s Theorem
to include the statement
the number of equilibrium points is finite and odd.
Consider a bimatrix game where player 1 has m pure strategies and player 2 has n. Denote
the payoff matrices for each player by A and B with mixed strategy vectors x0 ≥ 0 and
y0 ≥ 0 for player’s 1 and 2 respectively. Let e be a column vector with all elements
equal to one, and whose order can be understood from the context, then we must have
eTx0 = eTy0 = 1.
The equilibrium situations of a game can be identified by solving the appropriate m + n
inequalities. In their paper, Lemke and Howson solved this problem by transforming the
game into a linear complementarity problem (LCP) (see their paper [Lemke and Howson Jr,
1964] for details). When transforming the standard game theory problem into an LCP two
additional variables, which were not described in the preceding paragraph, appear. These
variables can be ‘removed’ via a normalisation procedure. However this simplification to
the LCP requires matrices A and B to be strictly positive. If this is not the case then for
a matrix E, of the same order as A and B and with all elements equal to 1, and for some
constant k, replace A by A+ kE and B by B + kE such that both matrices are (strictly)
positive. This process does not alter the best responses of the game. Moreover, Lemke and
Howson assumed that A and B are costs to be minimized, not profits to be maximised.
Therefore A and B are positive cost matrices.
The resulting LCP is
BTx− e ≥ 0, x ≥ 0 yT (BTx − e) = 0
and (1.37)
Ay − e ≥ 0, y ≥ 0 xT (Ay − e) = 0
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Then since (1.37) is equivalent to the conditions which need to be satisfied for a Nash
equilibrium situation, any pair of vectors (x,y) satisfying (1.37) will also be called an
equilibrium situation. Observe, while x and y are vectors of the same dimension as the
mixed strategies x0 and y0 they are not probability distributions. The subsequent proof of
Nash’s Theorem by Lemke and Howson is then equivalent to solving an LCP. They achieve
this using geometric considerations, in particular convex polyhedra.
For vector x, associated to player 1, define the convex polyhedron X as:
X = {x |x ≥ 0, BTx − e ≥ 0} (1.38)
Then points in X are required to satisfy m + n inequalities. Explicitly if matrix B =
(b1, . . . , bn) and the n×n identity matrix I = (e1, . . . , en) then these inequalities are given
by
eTi x ≥ 0 i = 1, . . . ,m
bTj x− 1 ≥ 0 j = 1, . . . , n (1.39)
A face of X is identified when a subset of these inequalities are satisfied as an equality.
Equalities occur when either the corresponding component of vector x is 0 or satisfies the
equation bTj x − 1 = 0. Reverting back to the game theory interpretation, that is either a
given pure strategy does not belong to the player’s support, of the situation in question, or
it identifies a pure best response for the opponent. Those inequalities which are satisfied
as an equality are said to be binding.
The definition of non-degeneracy in the Lemke-Howson paper is equivalent to restricting
the maximum number of inequalities a given vector x can satisfy as an equality to m. Any
points which satisfy the full m equalities will be called extreme points. The non-empty
subset of points which satisfy the same m − 1 equalities are called open edges. Within
the set of open edges we can identify a subset of edges with a specific property. These
edges are referred to as unbounded edges of X and occur when the m − 1 equalities
satisfied all define components of x to be 0. Equivalently this corresponds to the vector
in Euclidean space which represents a unique pure strategy choice for player 1. However
since we are working with vectors x and not probability distributions x0 this vector is of
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infinite length extending away from the polyhedra.
Remark
This coincides with the definition of non-degeneracy we will use this in this Thesis. In
particular in the geometric setting an extreme point will correspond to a vertex of the
convex polyhedron X while an open edge is a 1-dimension face.
The same is repeated for player 2, with the convex polyhedron Y being defined as:
Y = {y |y ≥ 0, Ay − e ≥ 0} (1.40)
Then once again the conditions of non-degeneracy ensures any point can satisfy a maximum
of n of the m + n inequalities defined in Y as an equality. Any point which does satisfy
this maximum number is extreme.
Define the set Z = (X,Y ) to be the cartesian product of the polyhedra X and Y . A point
z = (x,y) is extreme is both x and y are extreme and belongs to an open edge if one
of x or y is an extreme point and the other lies on open edge. Finally an edge in Z is
unbounded if both x and y lie on unbounded edges in X and Y respectively. Each open
edge in Z has two end points and if two distinct open edges have the same end point then
they are called adjacent. The proofs of all results and statements which follow can be
found in the referenced publication, [Lemke and Howson Jr, 1964].
Referring back to the LCP described in (1.37), a point z ∈ Z is an equilibrium situation if
it satisfies the following set of (m+ n) equations:
(eTi x)(a
T
i y − 1) = 0 i = 1, . . . ,m
(1.41)
(eTj y)(b
T
j x− 1) = 0 j = 1, . . . , n
Where matrix AT = (a1, . . . , am) and B = (b1, . . . , bn).
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If a point z satisfies the conditions given in (1.41) then z necessarily satisfies m + n of
the equalities described in (1.38) and (1.40). Consequently any equilibrium situation is
also extreme (note the reverse implication does not hold). The proof of Theorem 1.13 is
achieved by constructing paths of adjacent open edges through Z which terminate with an
extreme point.
For a fixed r ∈ {1, . . . ,m + n}, define the set Sr to be the subset of points from Z
such that all (m + n) of the equilibrium conditions (1.41), with the possible exception of
(eTr y)(b
T
r x−1) = 0, are satisfied. Then the sequence of adjacent open edges of Sr together
with their end points, are called r-paths. Each point of Sr is either an extreme point of
Z or a point on an open edge of Z and further there is precisely 1 unbounded edge of
Z composed of points of Sr (this is proved in two Lemmas from [Lemke and Howson Jr,
1964]). Recall, by definition, such an edge has just one end point.
A Lemma from the paper demonstrates if a point z ∈ Sr is extreme there are one or two
open edges consisting entirely of points from Sr which have z as an end point. Further z
is an equilibrium point if and only if there is just one such edge.
By the Lemmas given in the referenced paper at least one extreme point of Z belongs to
Sr. Select such an extreme point and construct the adjacent r-path through Sr (and hence
Z) to which it belongs to. Suppose z1 is such an extreme point then z1 belongs to at least
one open edge. Traverse this edge then if it is not the unique unbounded edge it terminates
with an extreme point z2 6= z1. If z2 is an equilibrium situation then it belongs to just
one open edge of Sr, the edge we have used to arrive to this point, and hence the path
terminates. If this is not the case then, since z2 must be the end point of two open edges
in Sr, there must be a unique edge to traverse along. Since the number of extreme nodes
in Z (and hence Sr) is finite all such paths must terminate. This may happen in one of
the following ways
• The path enters the unique unbounded edge
• The path returns to its starting point z1
• The path reaches an equilibrium point
If a path terminates with its start point z1 then the path is said to be closed and in
particular does not contain an equilibrium point. Now consider those paths which are
not closed. Then we may assume z1 is the beginning point of the path and belongs to
just one open edge. In particular z1 is an equilibrium point. Observe these paths cannot
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be circular as this would result in some zi begin the end of three open edges which is a
contradiction. The path then terminates with either a second equilibrium point, disjoint
from z1, or enters the unbounded edge. In the first case the path identifies two equilibrium
points and in the second case just one. The paper shows there is a unique unbounded edge
in Sr and so in particular there is at least one equilibrium point in the original bimatrix
game. Given any other equilibrium point must appear as a pair the total number of such
points must be odd.
Finally the Lemke-Howson constructive procedure is reached. Fix a choice r and identify
the corresponding unique unbounded edge of Sr. Using this edge as a starting point traverse
the resulting r-path as defined above. This path will terminate with a single equilibrium
point.
When Γ is a degenerate game the sets X and Y can be perturbed to ensure they satisfy
the conditions of non-degeneracy. There are many well known ways to deal with this
perturbation but these details go beyond the scope of this Thesis. Further information
on this can be found in the original paper Lemke-Howson paper [Lemke and Howson Jr,
1964] or alternatively in [von Stengel, 2002]. However, since in the non-degenerate game
we can guarantee the existence of at least one equilibrium point this must also be true for
degenerate games.
L.S. Shapley - 1974
The work we will present in this Thesis will build upon the proof of Nash’s Theorem
provided by Lemke and Howson [Lemke and Howson Jr, 1964]. To allow a more intuitive
comparison between our work and theirs we give the graphical description of the Lemke-
Howson constructive procedure as presented by Shapley [Shapley, 1974]. We will refer back
to Shapley’s interpretation when wanting to discuss the Lemke-Howson paper in connection
to our work.
Using geometry, Shapley presents the constructive procedure contained in the Lemke-
Howson paper in an accessible and visual way. By defining a labelling system for bimatrix
games Shapley effectively explains the content of the Lemke-Howson paper.
Let Γ be a non-degenerate bimatrix game where each player i = {1, 2} has pure strategy
set Si = {s1i , . . . , slii } and mixed strategies pi = (x1i , . . . , xlii ). Let P1 and P2 denote the
set of all mixed strategies and A and B represent the payoff matrices for player’s 1 and
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2 respectively. Then, for i = {1, 2}, recall Pi is a simplex of dimension li − 1. For ease
of notation assume each pure strategy can be represented by a unique natural number; in
particular let S1 = {1, . . . , l1} and S2 = {l1 + 1, . . . , l1 + l2}.
Define the following two sets
P˜1 = P1 ∪
{
p1 ≥ 0 :
l1∑
i=1
xi1 ≤ 1 and
l1∏
i=1
xi1 = 0
}
(1.42)
P˜2 = P2 ∪
p2 ≥ 0 :
l2∑
j=1
xj2 ≤ 1 and
l2∏
j=1
xj2 = 0

Observe each P˜i contains the original mixed strategy simplex Pi plus faces of simplices of
higher dimension which have a non-empty intersection with at least one boundary face of
Pi. The condition on P˜i that the sum of mixed strategies xki must sum to 1 ensures such
‘extended simplices’ are bounded in the positive orthant by Pi. Within P˜i, Shapley defines
the following convex polyhedra.
P ji = {pi ∈ P˜i : xji = 0} for j ∈ Si
(1.43)
P ki = {pi ∈ P˜i : k ∈ Si′ is a pure best response for player i′ 6= i against strategy pi}
Then the sets P ji provide a covering of the space P˜i \Pi and since, for every strategy from
Pi player i′ 6= i must have a pure best response, the sets P ki must cover all of Pi. Note for
some k we may have P ki = ∅.
Every pi ∈ P˜i is then assigned the label(s) contained in the set
L′(pi) = {q : pi ∈ P qi } 6= ∅ (1.44)
Note every element in the set P ji will be assigned the same label. To complete the descrip-
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tion of Shapley’s labelling, the pair (p1, p2) ∈ P˜1 × P˜2 is naturally labelled as
L(p1, p2) = L′(p1) ∪ L′(p2) (1.45)
Observe L′(pi) is a subset of S1∪S2. Then any label from the set L′(pi) which belongs to Si
details the unplayed strategies selected by player i and those belonging to Sj , j 6= i indicate
the pure best responses for player j. These labels, with interpretation, can be compared
directly back to the Lemke-Howson algorithm. In particular the labels contained in L′(pi)
provide the indices of the binding inequalities defined for polyhedra X (if i = 1) or Y (if
i = 2) given in equations (1.38) and (1.40) respectively.
If L(p1, p2) = S1 ∪ S2 = {1, . . . , l1 + l2} then the point (p1, p2) is completely labelled. If
L(p1, p2) = (S1 ∪ S2) \ {r} for some r ∈ {1, . . . , l1 + l2} then the point (p1, p2) is almost-
completely labelled. Using this notation the conditions for a situation p = (p1, p2) to
be equilibrium is equivalent to L(p1, p2) = S1 ∪ S2, i.e., is completely labelled.
Shapley requires the following three conditions to hold for a bimatrix game Γ to be classified
as non-degenerate. For i = {1, 2} these are
1. Every non-empty region P ji is (li − 1) dimensional.
2. The intersection of any two sets of P ji is at most (li − 2)-dimensional
3. No point of P˜i can belong to more than li of the sets P
j
i .
Remark
These non-degeneracy conditions are equivalent to the intersection of the sets P ji being
transverse. Consequently this definition of non-degeneracy coincides with the one we shall
be using in this Thesis. In particular, since by definition each set P ji is a closed convex
polyhedra, point 1 from above is equivalent to the sets P ji being smooth manifolds. Con-
ditions 2 and 3 then provide the conditions required on the dimension of the intersections.
Note if any two of the sets P ji intersect with a dimension less than (li − 2) then the inter-
section must involve additional sets. If this was not the case the union of all sets P ji would
not form a covering of P˜i.
From the coverings over the space P˜i consider the subset of points from P˜i which belong
to as least (li − 1) of the sets P ji . An edge is then the maximal connected set of points
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which belong to the same (li − 1) sets. Those points which belong to the maximum li
sets are nodes. Then by the non-degeneracy assumptions these are 1-dimensional edges
and 0-dimensional vertices. A node shares the same label as the point it represents and,
since each point on an edge must be labelled identically, the edges are labelled in the same
manner. Denote this graph by Fi, then the cartesian product F1×F2 can be formed. The
property of non-degeneracy also allows us to observe at most two nodes can be identified
per edge (the end points), such nodes are described as adjacent, and each node is the end
point of li edges.
The set Fi and the labelling procedure described above are illustrated in the following
example taken from [Shapley, 1974]
Example 1.22
Let Γ be a non-degenerate bimatrix game where each player has 3 pure strategies. We
assume each pure strategy can be assigned a distinct numerical value so S1 = {1, 2, 3} and
S2 = {4, 5, 6}. We define the payoff matrices as follows
A = B =
 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
 (1.46)
We use this example to demonstrate how to construct the sets P˜1 and P
j
1 . The set P1 is
simply a 2-dimensional simplex. Then, by definition, P˜1 is constructed from P1 and the
faces of simplices of higher dimension which have a non-empty intersection with at least
one boundary face of P1. Additionally P˜1 is contained within the non-negative orthant
and bounded by P1. Equivalently P˜1 is the boundary of the 3-dimensional simplex shown
in Figure 1.16
We now discuss the labelling seen in Figure 1.16. First note the simplex P1 has been
constructed over a 3-dimensional axis and not 2-dimensional as seen in Section 1.3.4.
Consequently in this representation it is the upper most face which represents P1 and
is labelled as such. The three remaining 2-dimensional simplices of P˜1 are then labelled by
the pure strategy i ∈ S1 such that the condition xi1 = 0 is satisfied across the entire face.
Finally observe the graph of this simplex is simply the vertices and edges seen in Figure
1.16 and consequently is the same object. Note nodes are assigned 3 labels and edges 2.
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1
0
P1
x 12
x 13
x 11
Figure 1.16: The polyhedra P˜1
Now we are left to determine the sets P k1 , k ∈ S2 which forms the covering of P2. To do
this we need matrix B. Reading directly from matrix B we can determine
pure strategy 4 is player 2’s best response when player 1 chooses pure strategy 1
pure strategy 5 is player 2’s best response when player 1 chooses pure strategy 2
pure strategy 6 is player 2’s best response when player 1 chooses pure strategy 3
Player 2 is indifferent between all three of his pure strategies when player 1’s mixed strategy
is the solution to the following three equations
x11 + x
2
1 + x
3
1 = 1 (1.47)
x11 = x
2
1 (1.48)
x21 = x
3
1 (1.49)
The sets P j1 , for j = {4, 5, 6}, are defined using the above information and the solutions to
the following:
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x11 + x
2
1 + x
3
1 = 1 (1.50)
and
x11 ≥ x21 and x11 > x31 (1.51)
or
x21 ≥ x31 and x21 > x11 (1.52)
or
x31 ≥ x11 and x31 > x21 (1.53)
where when the inequalities are satisfied as an equality player 2 has two pure best responses
and just one when a strict inequality holds.
Then Figure 1.17 shows the graph F1 with labelled sets P k1 for k = {1, . . . , 6}.
4
6
5
32
1
x11
x12
x13
Figure 1.17: The polyhedra F1 with labelled sets P
j
1
For illustration, the labels at point A are (234), point B are (456) and point C are (135).
43
Remark
The actual matrix A has not been required to construct P˜1.
(End Example)
Observe the vertex 0 in Figure 1.17 is labelled (123). It is clear to see such a point will also
exist in P˜2 this time labelled by (456). Therefore the point (0, 0) ∈ F1 × F2 is completely
labelled but since it is not defined within P1×P2 it is not an equilibrium point of the game.
This is a consequence of the transformation of the convex polyhedra described in [Lemke
and Howson Jr, 1964] into a bounded polytope. The point (0, 0) is called the artificial
equilibrium point.
We now begin to describe the constructive procedure. Intuitively, within the product graph
F1 × F2, adjacent paths of nodes are followed which terminate with an equilibrium point,
or completely labelled node.
Let θr be the set of all points (p1, p2) ∈ P˜1 × P˜2 which are contained in at least l1 + l2 − 1
sets from P j1 ∪P k2 such that L(p1, p2) ⊇ {1, . . . , r−1, r+1, . . . , l1+l1}. Then θr contains the
almost completely labelled nodes and edges, with respect to label r, in F1×F2. Similarly let
θ contain all completely labelled nodes in F1×F2. Note this set will contain all equilibrium
points including the artificial equilibrium point (0,0). Observe θ ⊂ θr.
Replicating results from the Lemke-Howson paper, Shapley gives the following Lemma
Lemma 1.23
For fixed r ∈ S1 ∪ S2 every node in θ is adjacent to exactly one member of θr and each
member of θr \ θ is adjacent to exactly two members of θr.
By Lemma 1.23 any node from θr belongs to one or two edges of θr and exactly one if and
only if the node belongs to θ. Starting with a node of θr construct the maximal path of
adjacent nodes, then this path will take one of two forms. Either the path returns to its
starting point or it must terminate with a node from θ. In the first case no completely
labelled node can be encountered. In the second case the path must have two end points
and thus contain two completely labelled points. If this was not the case then there must
be a node of θr which belongs to three edges of θr which is a contradiction. Since θ ⊂ θr
this procedure determines there must be an even number of completely labelled nodes in
F1 × F2. However one of these nodes is the artificial equilibrium given by (0, 0) which
proves the Lemke and Howson theorem that every non-degenerate bimatrix game has an
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odd number of equilibrium points. By starting with the artificial equilibrium (0, 0) the path
of adjacent nodes, for a arbitrary choice r, must successfully terminate with an equilibrium
point. This procedure is illustrated with the following example taken from [Shapley, 1974]
Example 1.24
Let Γ be a bimatrix game where each player has 3 pure strategies and the payoff matrices
are as follows:
A = BT =
 0 3 02 2 0
3 0 1
 (1.54)
Then the graphs F1 and F2, relating to P˜1 and P˜2, with sets P
j
1 and P
k
2 are as shown in
Figure 1.18.
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6
4
5
Figure 1.18: Graphs F1 and F2 for Γ
Begin the procedure at point (0, 0). Without loss of generality we will consider the path
belonging to θ1. In particular we traverse the edge leaving the vertex (0, 0) missing label
1. The end point of this path is marked A in F1 which is labelled by (236) ∪ (456). Label
6 is now repeated so to continue following the path belonging to θ1 traverse the edge
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leaving the vertex (A, 0) missing label 6, found in F2, which takes us to vertex (A, b) with
label (236) ∪ (345). Note this choice is unique as there are just two edges which satisfy
this property but one was used as the ‘arrival’ edge. Drop label 3 and progress to vertex
(C, b) with label (126) ∪ (345) and we have reached a completely labelled node and hence
equilibrium point. This path is indicated by the arrows in Figure 1.18, each labelled by
the step they represent in the procedure.
(End Example)
Observe the difference here between the constructive procedure by Lemke and Howson and
that by Shapley. In particular the paths defined by Lemke-Howson require the identifi-
cation of an unbounded edge and traversing paths of a polyhedra. Shapley on the other
hand transforms the polyhedra defined by Lemke and Howson into a (bounded) polytope
containing an artificial equilibrium point.
1.7.3 Rosenmu¨ller and Wilson - 1971
In July 1971 two papers, one by Rosenmu¨ller [Rosenmu¨ller, 1971] and one by Wilson
[Wilson, 1971], appeared independently in the SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics.
The two authors had independently extended the result of Lemke and Howson [Lemke and
Howson Jr, 1964] to N -player non-cooperative games. Their descriptions are included here
as a point of interest in relation to Lemke-Howson.
Rosenmu¨ller
Using the same notation as before let Γ represent the N -player non-cooperative, non-
degenerate game. Define Ti to be a strict subset of Si, such that every s
j
i ∈ Ti is to be
assigned the probability zero in a mixed strategy situation. Then T1∪· · ·∪TN is the set of
all pure strategies which are not to contribute to the support of mixed strategy situation
p ∈ P . Denote by XT1,...,TN the subset of mixed strategy situations from P such that for
all i = {1, . . . , N} every sji ∈ Ti is selected with probability zero.
For pure strategy sji ∈ Si let Kiji be the subset of strategies from P (i) such that strategy
sji is optimal for player i. Then for Yi ⊂ Si let KYii be the subset of strategies from P (i)
such that all strategies in Yi are optimal for player i. Observe KYii =
⋂
sji∈Yi K
ij
i and the
set KY1,...,YN combines this information for all players. In particular KY1,...,YN is the subset
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of strategies from p such that every sji ∈ Yi is optimal across p(i) for all i = {1, . . . , N}.
Finally define AY1,...,YNT1,...,TN = A
Y
T to be the set of strategies from P which belong to both
KY1,...,YN and XT1,...,TN . In particular
AY1,...,YNT1,...,TN = A
Y
T = K
Y1,...,YN ∩XT1,...,TN (1.55)
If AYT 6= ∅ then p ∈ AYT satisfies the following sets of a equations
1. Gi(p, s
j
i )− λi = 0 ∀ sji ∈ Yi, i = {1, . . . , N}
for some λi.
2. xji = 0 ∀ sji ∈ Ti, i = {1, . . . , N}.
i.e., all pure strategies in the set Ti are selected with probability zero.
3. epi = 1 ∀ i = {1, . . . , N} e = (1, . . . , 1).
i.e., all probabilities assigned to strategies for player i satisfy the conditions of a
probability distribution.
For arbitrary T and Y if dimAYT = 0 then A
Y
T consists of finitely many 0-dimensional
points called polyhedra extreme points or PEP ’s. Alternatively if dimAYT = 1 then A
Y
T is
formed from finitely many smooth curves called polyhedra edges or PE ’s.
Lemma 1.1 from the paper tells us each PEP is the intersection of exactly
n−
∑
|Yi|=1
1 (1.56)
edges. Where, when Yi ≥ 2 each edge is constructed by removing a strategy from either
Ti or Yi (the condition on Yi is required as it is assumed Yi 6= ∅) and is referred to as “the
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edge AY1,...,Yi−{ij},...,YNT1,...,TN at x” for a situation x ∈ AYT . Lemma 1.2 determines if a given x is
both a PEP and a point of a PE then it must be that x is the end point of the PE.
Define the setB to contain all points which satisfy the conditions of an equilibrium situation
except perhaps with respect to strategy slNN ∈ SN . Then, from the paper, provided x is
not of the form xˆ (1.57), Lemma 2.1 shows if x is an equilibrium situation then it must
belong to B and satisfy the conditions of a PEP. In particular equilibrium situations are
characterised as the PEP’s which are end points of just one PE. All other PEP’s are the
end points of two PE’s. Define a sub-game of Γ by fixing one player’s strategy to one of
his pure strategies.
Using the proof by Lemke and Howson to guarantee an odd number of equilibrium situa-
tions in the 2 player game, the proof is completed by induction. By assuming there are an
odd number of equilibrium points in the sub-game of Γ a situation x can be defined such
that x belongs to B, thus proving B is a non-empty set.
Let xˆ(N) define an equilibrium point of the sub-game where player N ’s strategy is fixed to
elNN = (0, . . . , 1), i.e., player N has fixed his strategy to pure strategy s
lN
N . The assumption
this sub-game contains an odd number of equilibrium points leads to there being an odd
number of situations in Γ of the form
xˆ = (xˆ(N), elNN ) (1.57)
These are shown in the paper to be both PEPs and to lie in the set B. Pick one of these
points, xˆ and fix it. The paper shows if xˆ is an equilibrium point then it cannot be the
end point of an edge in B and if xˆ is not an equilibrium point then it is the end point of a
unique edge in B. Assume xˆ is not equilibrium then following the unique edge it belongs to
must lead to another PEP of B. If this point is an equilibrium situation then it cannot be
of the form given in equation (1.57) and the ‘arrival’ edge is the only edge which contains
this equilibrium point and the path terminates. If not then the end point is either another
PEP of the form of equation (1.57) (and the path terminates) or is another PEP in B and
there is a unique departure edge which we can follow and build up a path called a B-path.
Since no PEP is the end point of more than two edges, and the original start point xˆ is the
end point of a unique PEP, the B-path cannot meet itself. Further since the number of
PEP’s and PE’s is finite all such paths can be guaranteed to terminate. Paths must either
terminate in an equilibrium point or another PEP of the form given in (1.57). If it ends
in a PEP then the path B contains two of the PEP’s of the form given in (1.57). However
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there are an odd number of these points and consequently there must be an odd number
of paths which end in an equilibrium point. (This may indeed be the original start point
xˆ).
This procedure may not have accounted for all PEP’s from AYT . Since the end points of the
B-paths are equilibrium situations any additional equilibrium point must occur in pairs.
Thus the total number of equilibrium points in Γ is finite and odd.
Once again this proof provides a constructive procedure to identify an equilibrium situation
from Γ.
Wilson
Wilson’s proof [Wilson, 1971] follows a similar form to that of Rosenumu¨ller. Z∗ is defined
to be a closed set of situations from P which partially satisfy the condition to be equilib-
rium. Then Z is defined to be the subset of Z∗ containing the situations from P which
satisfy the conditions to be an equilibrium situation except with regards to one player’s
pure strategy. In particular let Z(i, ij) denote the set of situations from Z for which player
i’s pure strategy sji is allowed to fail the conditions of an equilibrium situation.
Those points in Z(i, ij) which are equilibrium situations are called complementary and
those which are not are defined to be (i, ij)-almost complementary or just almost com-
plementary. Then all equilibrium points are complementary situations of Z. The set Z
can be represented geometrically and as such nodes and arcs can be identified. The paper
also defines a finite set of boundary conditions for Z. Nodes correspond to situations in Z
which satisfy K =
∑N
i=1 |Si| boundary conditions, where K is the maximum number any
point can satisfy, and are called extreme points of Z∗. The arcs of Z are those situations
in Z which satisfy (K − 1) of the boundary conditions.
Within Z there are a finite number nodes and thus arcs. Those nodes/arcs which satisfy
the definition of complementary are called complementary nodes/arcs respectively. The
same is true for the definition of (i, ij)-almost complementary. Then for a given node from
the subset Z(i, ij), Lemma 1 from the paper proves it is an end point of either one or
two (i, ij)-almost complementary arcs and is the end point of one if and only if the node
is complementary. Define a (i, ij)-path to be the maximal connected set of (i, ij)-almost
complementary nodes and arcs. Therefore, since the number of nodes is finite, the set
Z(i, ij) is a the union of a finite number of (i, ij)-paths.
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Like the paper by Rosenmu¨ller [Rosenmu¨ller, 1971], Wilson’s proof relies on induction and
assumes in the sub-game, as described before, there are an odd number of equilibrium
situations. Let Γ(i, ij) represent the N − 1 player game where player i fixes his strategy to
pure strategy sji . Then Lemma 2 from [Wilson, 1971] states an equilibrium situation from
Γ(i, ij) corresponds to an (i, ij)-almost complementary node in Z(i, ij). Nodes which are
defined in such a way are called initial nodes and by Lemma 3 of [Wilson, 1971] are the
endpoints to precisely one unbounded arc; where an unbounded arc has just 1 endpoint.
(Those arcs from Z(i, ij) which start from any other node have 2 end points and are
said to be bounded.) Therefore the assumption Γ(i, ij) has an odd number of equilibrium
situations results in there being an odd number of initial nodes in Z(i, ij).
Choose an arbitrary node z in Z(i, ij). The following table highlights the number of almost
complementary arcs for which z is an end point.
Type of Node Complementary Arcs
complementary one bounded arc
almost complementary two bounded arcs
initial node one bounded and one unbounded arc
Traversing a bounded arc will lead to a second node z1 which will satisfy one of the
following conditions
1. z1 is a complementary node and hence there are no exit arcs
2. z1 is almost complementary and there is a unique bounded arc to exit along
3. z1 is an initial node and the only exit path is along an unbounded arc
There are a finite number of nodes in Z(i, ij) and therefore the path must terminate
with one of the above options. If it terminates with option two then z1 = z and the
path is circular. In particular the path does not contain any complementary nodes. If
a path terminates with one of the remaining options then the number of initial nodes
encountered needs to be considered. Since any point is the end point of at most two almost-
complementary arcs the maximum number of initial nodes in any one path is necessarily
2. In the case when the two end points of the path are unbounded the path once again
contains no complementary nodes. In the case where one end point is an unbounded arc
the second must be a complementary node and in the final case where neither end point
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is an unbounded arc then both end points are complementary nodes. Given there are
an odd number of initial nodes, there must be an odd number of paths containing just
one unbounded arc, thus producing an odd number of complementary nodes. The case
where neither end point is an unbounded arc contributes an even number of complementary
nodes. Since complementary nodes are equilibrium points it follows there are a finite and
odd number of equilibrium points in Γ.
Remark
Since every equilibrium situation is a complementary node it will be contained in every
Z(i, ij). Therefore the choice of i and s
j
i ∈ Si for the set Z(i, ij) is arbitrary.
Once again this proof naturally allows for a constructive procedure to be defined to identify
an equilibrium situation from the game Γ.
Remark
It is noticed the proof by Rosenmu¨ller and Wilson are very similar. In fact it is just in
the presentation and definition of the original geometric object which is different. The
resulting constructive procedure then builds upon that presented by Lemke and Howson.
1.7.4 Harsanyi - 1973
In 1973 J.C. Harsanyi [Harsanyi, 1973] offered a different approach to the proof of Theorem
1.13. Instead of tracing a path through some geometric object which had been defined
directly as a result of situations from P meeting certain criteria of an equilibrium situation,
he defined a new class of payoff functions and used these properties to achieve the result.
The new functions were logarithmic functions and as such Harsanyi introduced the concept
of a logarithmic game.
Remark
This proof will not contribute to our work. However we feel it is of interest as it provides
a different approach to proving Nash’s Theorem. Additionally we want to acknowledge its
existence as Harsanyi shared the Nobel prize with Nash (and Selton) in 1994 for their work
on Nash equilibria.
For a N -player game Γ, the logarithmic game Λ is defined with the same pure strategy and
mixed strategy set as Γ but replaces payoff function Gi with Li. For all i = {1, . . . , N} the
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function Li for mixed strategy situations p is defined to be:
Li(p) = Li(pi) =
li∑
j=1
log xji (1.58)
Where xji is the probability player i selects pure strategy s
j
i ∈ Si. Therefore the payoff for
each player in Λ depends only on the individual player. Extending this, Harsanyi defines
a one-parameter family of games {Λ∗(t)} for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 such that for a fixed parameter t
the payoff function for player i = {1, . . . , N} is
L∗i (p, t) = (1− t)Gi(p) + tLi(pi) (1.59)
Then Λ∗(0) = Γ and Λ∗(1) = Λ. For 0 < t ≤ 1 the game Λ∗(t) is said to be a logarithmic
game with Γ being the original game and Λ the pure logarithmic game. For Γ, the paper
introduces the following definitions
- An equilibrium point p = (p1, . . . , pN ) is strong if all components of p satisfy equa-
tion (1.19) with strict inequality for all i = {1, . . . , N} and pi, p′i ∈ Pi where pi 6= p′i.
- An equilibrium point is weak if it is not strong
- If Yi is the set of pure strategies which are assigned a positive probability in pi then
an equilibrium point p is said to be quasi-strong if player i has no pure strategy
best reply to p(i) which is not contained in Yi.
- An equilibrium point that is not quasi-strong is extra weak
- Γ is quasi-strong if all equilibrium points are quasi-strong and will be extra weak
if at least one equilibrium is.
It is known the best response for each player i in the original game Γ = Λ∗(0) maybe a
pure or mixed strategy. In contrast, for 0 < t ≤ 1, the game Λ∗(t) can only have a totally
mixed strategy as a best reply; if this was not the case then for at least one strategy we
have xji = 0 resulting in L
∗
i = −∞.
For i = {1, . . . , N} and k = 2, . . . li the equilibrium points of the logarithmic game can be
characterised by equations of the form
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(1− t)x1ixki [Gi(p, ski )−Gi(p, s1i )] + t(x1i − xki ) = 0 (1.60)
Let K∗ be the number of equations of the form (1.60) then K∗ =
∑N
i=1 li − n. Combined
with the N equations given by
li∑
j=1
xji = 1 (1.61)
the equilibrium points of game Λ∗(t), for t > 0, is given by the K∗ equations of (1.60)
and the N equations of (1.61). Let K∗∗ be the total number of such equations then
K∗∗ = K∗ +N =
∑N
i=1 li.
All equations which characterise the equilibrium points are algebraic equations in the
variables sji (each with probability x
j
i ) and t. Define Z to be the set of all (K
∗∗ + 1)-
vectors (t,p) satisfying the K∗∗ equations of (1.61) and (1.60). Then let T be the subset of
Z where all probabilities xji also satisfy the additional requirement of x
j
i ≥ 0. In particular
T is the subset of Z which lies within the compact and convex polyhedron R = P × I
where I = [0, 1]. T is called the solution graph for the set of equalities and inequalities
it solves. For a given point (t,p) the value t is the first coordinate. For game Λ∗(t) the
strategy space P is given by Rt: the set of all points in R with t as their first co-ordinate.
The set Et will be the set of all points in Rt which are equilibrium points of the game
Λ∗(t). Lastly T t is the intersection of the solution graph T with Rt. Then by Lemma 1 for
0 < t ≤ 1, Et = T t and in the original game when t = 0, E0 ⊆ T 0.
Let Γ be a non-degenerate and quasi-strong game (which the paper proves accounts for
almost all games) with finite number of players each with a finite pure strategy set. The
set T is a solution graph and as such it contains a finite number of branches. The paper
shows every equilibrium point p of Γ is an end point of some branch denoted by β(p).
Since there are two end points per branch the number of equilibrium points is finite.
Lemma 5 shows for a point p ∈ T there is a unique branch given by α(p) which originates
from the point (1,p′), where this point is shown to be the unique equilibrium point of Λ∗(1).
This branch is shown to terminate at the boundary of R with end point corresponding to
(0,p), i.e., an equilibrium point in Γ.
Any other equilibrium point in Γ is the end point of a branch which is shown to terminate
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with a second equilibrium point of Γ. Therefore the total number of equilibrium points in
Γ is finite and odd.
1.8 Algorithms
Section 1.6 provides a broad range of applications of game theory but is far from being
complete. One area yet to be discussed is the implications game theory has for computer
science. In particular, the competition element within game theory makes it perfect for
applications such as cryptography. One example in this area is the paper by Fischer and
Wright [Fischer and Wright, 1993] who have described the analysis of a certain crypto-
graphic system in terms of game theory. Game theory has also played its part in the
internet, including e-commerce, and also within the wider scope of networks and routing
problems. Game theory techniques can also be used to derive the lower bounds of algo-
rithms with the players of the game being the algorithm developer and someone in an
adversary role [Yao, 1977]. Additionally much work has been in done in developing algo-
rithms to determine equilibrium points. The progress of this can be divided into two broad
categories. The first being those algorithms which identify a single equilibrium point from
a game, the algorithms resulting from the proofs in Section 1.7 belong to this category.
The second group contains those algorithms which identify all equilibrium situations in
the game and are called Equilibrium Enumeration Methods [Winkels, 1979]. In zero-sum
games the problem of identifying an equilibrium point is equivalent to finding the solutions
to a linear program [Dantzig, 1963]. However it has been shown by Savani and von Stengel
[Savani and von Stengel, 2004] there is a class of bimatrix games such that the algorithm
resulting from the Lemke and Howson paper [Lemke and Howson Jr, 1964] is always ex-
ponential. As the number of players in a game increases the corresponding algorithms
become computationally harder. In fact Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou showed
in [Daskalakis et al., 2006] the problem of computing Nash equilibria in games with more
than 4 players is PPAD-complete; where the PPAD class is a complexity class of search
problems including those to find a Brouwer fixed point. It has since be shown by Chen
and Den [Chen and Deng, 2006] that in fact the problem of finding a Nash Equilibria in
all 2-player games is PPAD-complete. Since the problem of finding a Brouwer fixed point
has exponential complexity, it must be that algorithms to identify Nash equilibria are too.
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Chapter 2
Preliminary Definitions
In this Chapter the topological objects and Lemmas which will be fundamental to the
original proofs in this Thesis are defined. We begin with the definition of a simplex as
this will be one of the key building blocks in this Chapter and those which follow.
A 2-dimensional simplex is simply a triangle, a 1-dimensional simplex a straight line seg-
ment and a 0-dimensional simplex a single vertex. It is then natural to intuitively under-
stand a simplex in n dimensions, or equivalently an n-simplex, to be the analogy of the
triangle over Rn. Before we can express this formally we need the following definition.
Definition 2.1 (Affinely Independence [Fulton, 1995])
A set of n + 1 points z0, . . . , zn in a vector space are affinely independent if there is no
relation t0z0+t1z1+· · ·+tnzn = 0 with real numbers t0, . . . , tn satisfying t0+t1+· · ·+tn =
0 with not all ti = 0.
Definition 2.2 (Geometric Simplex [Fulton, 1995])
For a set of n+ 1 affinely independent points z0, . . . , zn the set
{t0z0 + t1z1 + · · ·+ tnPzn | ti ≥ 0, t0 + t1 + · · ·+ tn = 1} (2.1)
is called the (geometric) closed simplex of dimension n or n-simplex
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An open simplex is defined by the set
{t0z − 0 + t1z1 + · · ·+ tnzn | ti > 0, t0 + t1 + · · ·+ tn = 1} (2.2)
For p ∈ {0, . . . , n} a p-face of a n-simplex ∆ is the p-simplex constructed using any p+ 1
of the n+ 1 affinely independent vertices v0, . . . , vn of a simplex ∆. If p = n− 1 then the
face is a proper face and the prefix ‘p’ is dropped. A 1-simplex, or edge, is the simplex
using any 2 of the original points, and a 0-simplex, or vertex, is a single point.
Simplices can be ‘connected together’ to form a much larger topological object, a simplicial
complex.
Definition 2.3 (Geometric Simplicial Complex)
A geometric simplicial complex is the finite collection of (geometric) simplices such that
any two simplices are either disjoint or share a common face. Additionally every face of a
simplex in the simplicial complex must also belong to the simplicial complex.
Definition 2.4 (Abstract Simplices and Simplicial Complex [Fulton, 1995])
A finite abstract simplicial complex is a finite set V , called the vertices, and a collection
K of subsets of V called the (abstract) simplices, with the property that every subset of a
simplex is a simplex. Then K is the simplicial complex. An n-simplex is a set σ in K with
n+ 1 elements.
Observe the abstract simplicial complex is a combinatorial description of the geometric
simplicial complex. The dimension of a simplicial complex is equal to the largest dimen-
sion of any simplex it contains and is said to be open or closed if the simplices it contains
are open or closed. A simplicial complex is labelled if each vertex is assigned a unique
label from a finite set of possibilities.
Definition 2.5 (Sub-complex [Fulton, 1995])
A sub-complex L of a simplicial complex K is a subset of the simplices in K such that
whenever a simplex ∆ is in L, so are all its faces; then L is a simplicial complex with
vertex set being a subset of the vertices of K.
Definition 2.6 (Boundary)
If ∆ is a closed simplex let ∆0 denote its interior. Then the boundary of ∆ is
∂∆ = ∆ \∆0. (2.3)
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For an open simplex ∆ let ∆¯ denote its closure. In this case
∂∆ = ∆¯ \∆. (2.4)
Then the boundary of a simplicial complex of dimension n can be identified as the union
of the faces of dimension (n− 1) which belong to just one maximal simplex.
The definition of a simplicial complex can be tightened to satisfy some additional proper-
ties.
Definition 2.7 (Pseudomanifold [Spanier, 1966])
An n-dimensional pseudomanifold is a simplicial complex K such that
1. Every simplex in K is the face of some n-simplex in the complex. (Note that K itself
is contained in this definition)
2. Every (n− 1)-simplex of K is the face of at most two n-simplices of K.
This is the property of non-ramification.
3. If s and s′ are n-simplices of K, then there is a finite sequence s = s1, . . . , sl = s′ of n-
simplices of K such that si and si+1 have an (n−1)-face in common for 1 ≤ i < (l−1).
The boundary of an n-dimensional pseudomanifold K is defined to be the sub-complex of
K generated by the set of (n− 1)-simplices which are faces of exactly one n-simplex of K.
To enable us to connect multiple simplicial complexes together we introduce the join
operator which relies on the following definition.
Definition 2.8 (Disjoint Union [Spanier, 1966])
If J = {j} is a set and {Aj} is a family of sets indexed by J , their disjoint union, is
denoted by
∨
j ∈ J
Aj :=
⋃
j ∈ J
(j ×Aj) (2.5)
Equivalently the disjoint union of two sets combines the distinct elements of each set while
ensuring the original set membership is distinguishable in the union set.
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Definition 2.9 (Join of Simplicial Complexes [Spanier, 1966])
If K1 and K2 are simplicial complexes, their join K1 ∗K2 is the simplicial complex defined
by
K1 ∗K2 := K1 ∨K2 ∪ {s1 ∨ s2 | s1 ∈ K1, s2 ∈ K2} (2.6)
Thus the set of vertices of K1 ∗K2 is the disjoint union of the vertex sets of K1 and K2.
This definition will be illustrated in Example 3.2.
We now state, and provide our proof of, a Lemma defining the boundary of the join of two
simplicial complexes.
Lemma 2.10 (Boundary of Join)
Let C(1), C(2) be two pseudomanifolds with dim(C(i)) = di. Then ∂(C(1) ∗ C(2)) is generated
by all (d1 + d2)-dimensional simplices of the kind Σ(1) ∗ Σ(2), where Σ(i) lies in C(i) for
every i ∈ {1, 2} and Σ(i) lies in ∂C(i) for one i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. By definition the dimension of (C(1) ∗ C(2)) is equal to d1 + d2 + 1. Therefore the
dimension of the boundary ∂(C(1) ∗ C(2)), must equal d1 + d2. Let Σ lie in C(1) ∗ C(2) such
that dim(Σ) = d1 + d2 and represent Σ as the join of two simplices Σ(1) ∗ Σ(2), where Σ(i)
lies in C(i) for every i ∈ {1, 2}. We show Σ lies in ∂(C(1) ∗ C(2)) if and only if one of Σ(i)
lies in ∂C(i).
The conditions of dimension give
dim Σ = dim Σ(1) + dim Σ(2) + 1 = d1 + d2. (2.7)
It therefore follows that either dim Σ(1) = d1 − 1 while dim Σ(2) = d2 or dim Σ(1) = d1 and
dim Σ(2) = d2 − 1. Consider for definiteness the first possibility. If Σ(1) does not lie in the
boundary then there are two d1-dimensional simplices, say ∆′ and ∆′′, in C(1) such that
Σ(1) is their common face. This is equivalent to Σ being the common face of simplices
∆′ ∗Σ(2) and ∆′′ ∗Σ(2), and therefore to Σ not belonging to ∂(C(1) ∗ C(2)). This is also true
when considering the second possibility. Therefore Σ lies in ∂(C(1) ∗ C(2)) exactly when for
one i ∈ {1, 2}, Σ(i) belongs to ∂C(i)
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Definition 2.11 (Nerve [Fulton, 1995])
If U = {Uv| v ∈ V } is a finite collection of open sets whose union is a space X, define a
simplicial complex, called the nerve of U by taking V to be the vertices and defining the
simplices to be the subsets S such that the intersection of the Uv for v in S is nonempty.
Definition 2.12 (Star [Fulton, 1995])
If K is any simplicial complex and v is a vertex in K, define an open set St(v) in K, called
the star of v to be the union of “interiors” or the simplices that contain v i.e., St(v) is the
complement in K of the union of those simplices Σ for which the vertex set of Σ does not
contain v.
We now provide our definition of a ‘non-degenerate’ simplicial complex.
Definition 2.13 (Non-Degenerate Simplicial Complexes)
A simplicial complex K is said to be non-degenerate if it satisfies the conditions of non-
ramification.
Recall, from Definition 2.11, the construction of a nerve (a simplicial complex) relies upon
some finite covering of a space X. It is then natural to expect the properties of this
covering to affect the degeneracy status of the nerve. Therefore our definition of a non-
degenerate nerve will take account of this and as such will require the following definition
and operations.
Definition 2.14 (Simple Subdivision)
Let ∆ be a d-dimensional simplex with vertex set {v1, . . . , vd+1} and let w be its barycenter.
Then the simple subdivision of ∆ is a simplicial complex consisting of simplices of the kind
{w, v1, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vd+1}, for all i = {1, . . . , d+ 1}, and all faces of ∆.
Example 2.15
Figure 2.1 shows the simple subdivision of a 2-dimensional simplex
v
w
3
v1
v2
Figure 2.1: Simple subdivision of a 2-dimensional simplex
(End Example)
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Definition 2.16 (Detachment Operation)
Let the (d − 1)-dimensional simplex Λ with vertex set {v1, . . . , vd} be the common face of
exactly k d-dimensional simplices ∆1, . . . ,∆k in a simplicial complex K. The result of the
detachment operation in K, of ∆1, . . . ,∆k with respect to Λ is a simplicial complex K ′
obtained from K in the following way. Suppose w1, . . . , wk are barycenters of ∆1, . . . ,∆k
respectively. Refine K by taking simple subdivisions of ∆1, . . . ,∆k, removing simplices
{wi,Λ}, i = 1, . . . , k from K and identifying pairs of simplices
{w1, v1, . . . , vl−1, vl+1, . . . , vd}, . . . {wk, v1, . . . , vl−1, vl+1, . . . , vd}
for all l = {1, . . . , d}. In particular, vertices wi, wj become identical. In the case the
complex K is labelled, the new vertex wi = wj is assigned any label among the labels of the
vertices v1, . . . , vd.
Definition 2.17 (Regularisation)
The process of regularisation of a d-dimensional simplicial complex K is the removal of
all maximal simplices from K ′ which, after finite applications of the detachment operation,
no longer share any d− 1-face with any other simplex in K ′.
Remark
In a simplicial complex K consider two simplices ∆i,∆j where i 6= j and let {∆1, . . . ,∆k′}
be the set of simplices (not containing ∆j) which have a non-empty intersection with ∆i.
Then observe if the detachment (or regularisation) operation is applied to ∆i and ∆j then
every intersection between ∆i and any simplex in {∆1, . . . ,∆k′} is maintained.
Example 2.18
Figure 2.2 shows a simplicial complex failing the conditions of non-ramification. It is clear
all three simplices share the face {v1, v3}.
v5
v4 v3
v2v1
Figure 2.2: Simplicial complex to be regularised
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The regularisation of the simplicial complex in Figure 2.2 begins with detachment operation
and the simple subdivision of simplices {v1, v3, v4} and {v1, v3, v5} with barycenters of w1
and w2 respectively. This is shown in Figure 2.3.
v5
v4 v3
v2v1
w1w2
Figure 2.3: Regularisation: step 1
From the simplicial complex in Figure 2.3 remove simplices {w1, v1, v3} and {w2, v1, v3}.
Let w1 = w2 and pair simplices {w1, v1} with {w2, v1} and {w1, v3} with {w2, v3}. Then
the face {v1, v3}, from simplex {v1, v2, v3}, no longer belongs to a second maximal simplex.
Further, in this example, since faces {v1, v2} and {v2, v3} also do not belong to a second
simplex, simplex {v1, v2, v3} is detached from the simplicial complex and thus is removed.
The resulting simplicial complex is then regularised and can be seen in Figure 2.4.
5v
4v 3v
1v
w =1 w2
Figure 2.4: Regularisation: step 2
(End Example)
Definition 2.19 (Non-Degenerate Nerves)
A nerve is said to be non-degenerate if after regularisation the resulting simplicial complex
satisfies the conditions of non-ramification.
Remark
Regularisation of a nerve has the affect of perturbing the intersections of the sets forming
the underlying covering.
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Definition 2.20 (Regular)
A nerve is regular if it satisfies the conditions of non-ramification, and in particular is
non-degenerate, without the need for regularisation.
For the remainder of this Chapter we move away from topological definitions and concen-
trate on a Lemma which will be key to our work.
Lemma 2.21 (Sperner’s Lemma)
For a simplex ∆ of dimension (n−1) label each vertex uniquely from the set {0, . . . , n−1}
and form a finite non-ramified simplicial complex within ∆. If an unlabelled vertex is
identified to lie in a face Λ ⊂ ∆, where 1 ≤ dim Λ ≤ (n − 1), label the vertex by any
of the labels assigned to the vertices of Λ. Then in the resulting simplicial complex there
are an odd number of (n− 1)-simplices with vertices labelled by {0, . . . , n− 1}, also called
completely labelled simplices.
Proof. The proof of Sperner’s Lemma is by induction. Let ∆i be an i-dimensional simplex
with vertices labelled by {0, . . . , i}. A simple observation confirms any simplicial complex
contained within ∆1 contains an odd number of completely labelled simplices. For the in-
duction hypothesis we assume the result is true for ∆n−1. The simplex ∆n−1 is a face of ∆n
and in particular each completely labelled simplex from ∆n−1 is contained in the bound-
ary of ∆n. Then, by the property of non-ramification, the completely labelled simplices of
∆n−1 must be the face of exactly 1 n-simplex in ∆n. Denote such simplices by Σj for j ∈ J
where the size of indexing set J is equal to the number of completely labelled simplices in
∆n−1 and therefore, by assumption, |J | is odd. Observe all faces on the boundary of ∆n
labelled by {0, . . . , n−2} must be constructed in this way. Two simplices in ∆n are said to
be adjacent if they share a face labelled by {0, . . . , n−2}. Select simplex Σ1 and construct
its path of adjacent simplices. If Σ1 is completely labelled there is no adjacent simplex,
so assume this is not the case. Then by the property of non-ramification any simplex can
have at most two faces with vertex set {0, . . . , n− 2} and since, by definition, Σ1 has one
such face lying in the boundary the first choice of adjacent simplex must be unique. Let
the adjacent simplex be given by Σ11. Then either Σ
1
1 is completely labelled and the path
terminates or there is another face labelled by {0, . . . , n− 2} which is not shared by Σ1. If
this is the case then move to the next adjacent simplex given by Σ21. The path will either
terminate with Σj for j ∈ J , j 6= 1 or with a completely labelled simplex. Since there
are an odd number of simplices Σj , an odd number of paths must end with a completely
labelled simplex. However these paths may not identify all completely labelled simplices
in ∆n. If this is the case take such a simplex as a start point for a path then it is clear
to see this path must terminate with a second completely labelled simplex. Thus the total
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number of completely labelled simplices in ∆n is odd.
The following Lemma is an abstract form of Sperner’s Lemma and is given as written in
[Vorob’ev, 1994]1. The proof which follows is also from the same publication.
Lemma 2.22
Consider any finite un-orientated graph G = (V,E) with set V of vertices and set E of
edges where each vertex v ∈ V has deg(v) ≤ 2. From the set V we select a subset N ⊂ V of
vertices which we call normal, where if v ∈ N then deg(v) ∈ {0, 1}. A vertex v ∈ V \N is
extreme if deg(v) = 1 while a vertex v ∈ N is extreme if deg(v) = 0. Then the number
of normal vertices in a graph G has the same parity as the number of extreme vertices.
Figure 2.5 provides a graphical representation of this Lemma.
Te
Figure 2.5: Representation of Lemma 2.22, here the normal vertices are shown in black
and the extreme vertices are above the dashed line, taken from [Vorob’ev, 1994]
Remark
The degree of a vertex v, deg v, is equal to the number of edges incident to it.
Proof. Assume G has p vertices so the vertex set V is given by {vj | j = 1, . . . , p}. To each
vertex vj ∈ V assign the value aj = {1, 2} according to the rules
aj =
{
1 if vj ∈ N
2 if vj ∈ V \ N
(2.8)
1Section 3.16, Chapter 2
63
Set a =
∑p
j=1 aj . Then if the total number of normal vertices is odd a must be odd
too, similarly when the number of normal vertices is even. From (2.8), if vj is normal
then aj = 1. Observe if vj is not extreme, then the degree of this vertex is 1 and we
have aj = deg(vj). If on the other hand vj is extreme, the degree of the vertex is 0 and
aj = deg(vj) + 1. Identical results are achieved by analysing the case when vj does not
belong to the set N . In particular
aj =
{
deg(vj) if vj is not extreme
deg(vj) + 1 if vj is extreme
(2.9)
Therefore if G contains q extreme vertices
a =
p∑
j=1
aj =
p∑
j=1
deg(vj) + q (2.10)
Now invoke a popular result from graph theory which states the sum of the degrees of
all vertices is even. Therefore the parity of a is equal to the parity of q. However it has
already been shown the parity of a is equal to the parity of normal vertices. Consequently
the number of normal vertices in a graph G has the same parity as the number of extreme
vertices.
In Lemma 2.22 replace the extreme vertices of the graph G with the simplices Σj as defined
in the proof of Lemma 2.21. Then replace the notion of normal vertices with the definition
of a completely labelled simplex of ∆. It is then clear how Lemma 2.22 is an abstract form
of Lemma 2.21
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Chapter 3
Simplicial Complexes and Nash’s
Theorem
3.1 Motivation and Objectives
An important concept within game theory is the definition of a solution; that is an answer
to the question ‘Which strategy should each player select in order to achieve the most
optimal position within the game?’. Of course interpretation of this, and consequently the
resulting definition of a solution, can be (and has been) subjective. However there is wide
acceptance that those situations which are said to be equilibrium do in fact solve the game
in the required manner. As a result of the different variants of the game theory model,
the number of definitions of a equilibrium situation is numerous. In a non-cooperative
game the solutions are those points satisfying the definition of Nash equilibria, as given in
Definition 1.10, and when the payoff functions of a game are polylinear, Nash’s Theorem,
Theorem 1.13 ensures such equilibrium points exists. This is clearly an invaluable tool
when analysing a non-cooperative game and will provide the focus for this Thesis.
The proofs outlined in Section 1.7 verify Nash’s Theorem for non-cooperative games but
all require some geometric considerations and require the polylinear property of the payoff
function. We investigate these two things. In particular we aim to produce a combinatoric
proof of Nash’s Theorem and show Nash’s Theorem still holds when the payoff functions
are not expectations.
The set of all payoff functions determine each player’s outcome for a given situation
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of a game. Furthermore, in an N -player game, if the strategy choices for all player’s
{1, . . . , i−1, i+1, . . . , N} are known then this information can be used to determine which
strategies will produce the best repsponse for player i. It is this property that allows the
identification of equilibrium points which, by definition, are situations where no player
achieve an improved outcome by altering their strategy choice only. It is clear polylinear
functions are not the only functions which, for a given input, allow identification of an
optimal outcome. Therefore given the set of equilibrium situations are the solutions to
a finite set of inequalities it seems unlikely Nash’s Theorem is a special consequence of
the property of polylinearity. Subsequently there must be a less restrictive constraint on
the payoff functions which will still permit the determination of equilibrium situations and
satisfy Nash’s Theorem.
Remark
Those games with payoff functions which are not polylinear will be abstract in nature.
At an equilibrium situation each player’s strategy is optimal with respect to the strategies
chosen by the other players. For an N -player game Γ, and for all i = {1, . . . , N}, let
pi ∈ Pi be a mixed strategy for player i with support Yi. Then the situation (p1, . . . , pN )
is an equilibrium situation if and only if for all players i the set of pure best responses over
(p1, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , pN ) is a superset of Yi. This can be determined by purely knowing
which strategy is favoured at a given point, and the actual payoff value is not required.
In light of this, and our discussion in the previous paragraph, in this Thesis we examine
a new category of game where for all i = {1, . . . , N} each payoff function Gi is replaced
by a total order (defined with restrictions) denoted by i. Observe, for each player i,
total orders will continue to allow player i to identify his optimal strategies from Pi for all
situations from P (i). This leads us to establish our first objective for this Thesis:
Objective 1
To prove Nash’s Theorem for N -player non-cooperative games Γ where each polylinear
payoff function Gi is replaced by a total order i for all i = {1, . . . , N}.
The notion of a total order will be too general for games where an actual payoff value is
required. However proving Nash’s Theorem for a total order over the set of mixed strategy
situations will verify the result for any payoff function from which a total order can be
ascertained. This will provide a substantial increase in the number and range of ‘games’
66
for which Nash’s Theorem can be applied. In achieving this objective we will have provided
a new proof of Nash’s Theorem as given in Theorem 1.13.
The representation of all payoff functions Gi automatically provide a geometric setting in
which the outcomes, and thus solutions, of the game can be identified. Clearly this will
no longer exist when the payoff functions are replaced with total orders. In particular the
use of a total order instead of a payoff function will provide an abstract definition of a
game. However we will be able to use this new representation to aid our insight into the
foundations of Nash’s Theorem and to address why this result is true.
On the successful proof of Nash’s Theorem for a total order we will have demonstrated the
result is not a consequence of the properties of a payoff function. Given this has been a sig-
nificant focus for all other proofs of Nash’s Theorem, this will be an important step forward
in establishing its origins. However this will also lead to a much larger question; if the proof
of Nash’s Theorem is not founded on the properties of the payoff functions of a game, then
what are the underlying mathematical reasons for this phenomena? Equivalently what
special properties of game theory allow Nash’s Theorem to be true?
For all i = {1, . . . , N}, a simple observation allows us to see each total order i (and
consequently the payoff function Gi) can be translated into a covering of P (i). This allows
the construction of a simplicial complex representation of a game where vertices and edges
represent the adjacency conditions of the covering elements. This is now a very different
form to the traditional representation of a game and leads to the question is there a more
general mathematical model for which an equivalent version of Nash’s Theorem exists,
and, for which game theory is a specific example? If so it would appear to be a simplicial
complex. Therefore our second objective will be:
Objective 2
To identify the origins of Nash’s Theorem by defining a simplicial complex S such that:
1. A more general form of Nash’s Theorem can be proved for S.
2. The traditional statement of Nash’s Theorem for games Γ can be attained from S.
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3.2 Plan of Work
Our original work in this Thesis will begin with the definition of a simplicial complex S.
This simplicial complex will be defined independently from any notion of game theory and
will be shown to contain a finite and odd number of, what we shall define to be, equilib-
rium simplices. Our return to game theory is marked with our description of a simplicial
complex representation of an N -player non-degenerate, non-cooperative game, where all
equilibrium situations from Γ correspond exactly to the set of equilibrium simplices. In
relation to this we discuss why replacing the payoff function Gi with a total order i does
not alter this construction procedure in any way. Those games which rely on the total
order i will be referred to as generalised games. Finally by demonstrating our sim-
plicial complex representation of a game satisfies the definition of S, Nash’s Theorem (for
generalised games) will be proved. The use of simplicial complexes allows us to produce a
purely combinatoric proof of Nash’s Theorem for non-degenerate games.
We then provide an alternative definition of the simplicial complex S which can be used
to prove Nash’s Theorem for an important subset of non-cooperative games, bimatrix
games. This new definition will be simpler and more intuitive than S and will highlight
the problem of increasing complexity in representing games when the number of players
exceeds 2. We explain why our new definition does not extend naturally to the N -player
case and demonstrate how it is a particular example of the original simplicial complex S.
To conclude our work we provide some examples of generalised games. For a clear picture
of how our work is a deviation and improvement to previous proofs we follow this with a
discussion comparing our work to the proofs given in Section 1.7. Finally we provide some
thoughts on how our work can be developed and taken advantage of in future research.
Throughout this Thesis we will comment on the similarities between our work and the
Lemke-Howson constructive procedure presented by Shapley [Shapley, 1974]. In particular
we hope this will clearly enable the reader to appreciate how the work in this Thesis is a
generalisation of the Lemke-Howson constructive procedure [Lemke and Howson Jr, 1964].
In this Chapter we define the non-degenerate simplicial game complex S and provide
our proof that such (non-degenerate) complexes contain an odd number of equilibrium
simplices.
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3.3 Defining the Complex
We begin by providing the notations we will use to define our non-degenerate simplicial
game complex S. For a finite natural number m, our simplicial game complex S will rely
on the partitioning of the set m := {1, . . . ,m} into n subsets. For i = {1, . . . , n} each
partition element is defined by mi := {mi−1 + 1, . . . ,mi} with m0 = 0, mn = m and
|mi| > 1 such that m = m1 ∪ · · · ∪mn and all sets are pairwise disjoint. Let V denote the
set of vertices in S and be subject to the condition |V | ≥ m+ n. We define φ : V 7→m to
be a surjective labelling function which assigns each vertex in S a unique label from a
set of m possibilities. We are then able to identify and fix a subset V ′ ⊂ V such that the
restriction of φ to V ′ is bijective. Within the set V \V ′, and for every i, we insist on being
able to identify a non-empty subset of vertices Wi such that φ(Wi) ⊂mi.
Notation
For a simplex Σ let v(Σ) denote its vertex set.
Let Σmi be the simplex with vertices in V
′ such that φ(v(Σmi)) = mi then
dim Σmi = |mi| − 1 = (mi −mi−1 − 1) (3.1)
Let Σ¯mi be the closure of Σ, i.e. the complex consisting of Σmi and all its faces, and let
∂Σmi be the boundary of Σmi i.e., Σ¯mi \ Σmi .
The finite (combinatorial) simplicial game complex S with set of vertices V will be defined
by induction on the number of partition element used in its construction. Therefore for
k = {1, . . . , n} let Vk ⊂ V satisfy |Vk| ≥
(∑k
j=1(mj −mj−1) + k
)
= mk + k such that Vk
contains all elements from V which are mapped to the set m1 ∪ · · · ∪mk under φ. Then
φk : Vk 7→ m1 ∪ · · · ∪mk is the surjective labelling function φ restricted to input set Vk.
Fix V ′k ⊂ Vk such that the restriction φk|V ′k is bijective. Finally let Wk = Vk \V ′k 6= ∅ where
φk(Wk) = φ(Wk) ⊂mk, then this coincides with its previous definition.
For k ∈ {1, . . . , n} we now use these preliminary notations to define the finite (combinato-
rial) simplicial game complex Sk with set of vertices Vk.
Remark
When k = n the original notations are recovered. In particular S = Sn.
69
Definition 3.1 (Non-Degenerate Simplicial Game Complex Sk)
Define a non-degenerate simplicial game complex Sk of the order k as an (mk − 1)-
dimensional simplicial complex with finite set of vertices Vk = V ′k ∪
⋃k
j=1Wj such that
1. The subcomplex with vertices V ′k coincides with ∂Σm1 ∗ · · · ∗ ∂Σmk .
2. For all j = {1, . . . , k} each maximal simplex in Sk contains at least one vertex from
the set Wj.
3. For all j = {1, . . . , k − 1} any vertex with label from mj must belong to Sk−1.
4. Sk is an
(∑k
j=1(mj −mj−1)− 1
)
= (mk−1)-dimensional simplicial pseudomanifold
with boundary where the boundary is defined as follows.
Let ∆k be a maximal (i.e., (mk − 1)-dimensional) simplex in Sk, and for every j =
{1, . . . , k} let W∆k,j be the set of all vertices from ∆k which belong to Wj. Then by def-
inition W∆k,j 6= ∅ for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Let Σ∆k,j be the (possibly empty) set of vertices
from ∆k which belong to Σmj . Then an (mk − 2)-dimensional face Λk in Sk belongs to the
boundary of Sk iff there exists a maximal simplex ∆k in Sk and an j ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that
Λk is a face of ∆k obtained by removing a vertex x, with {x} = W∆k,j, from v(∆k). This
boundary definition is illustrated in Example 3.2
Remark
For the subsequent considerations the condition to be a pseudomanifold with boundary
can be replaced by a weaker condition to be a non-ramified complex with boundary i.e.
satisfying axiom 2 of Definition 2.7.
Remark
In line with Definition 2.13, if S is a not a non-ramified complex then S is degenerate and
fails property (4) of Definition 3.1.
Example 3.2 (Illustrating The Boundary)
We illustrate the boundary of a simplicial game complex of the order 2, S2. Assume
m = {1, 2, 3, 4} is partitioned into the two sets, m1 = {1, 2} and m2 = {3, 4}. Then
the simplices Σm1 and Σm2 are both 1-dimensional with vertices labelled by m1 and m2
respectively. By definition S2 must contain the join of the boundaries of these simplices
(which in this case will be the vertices) and the result of this can be seen in Figure 3.1
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1 3
24
Figure 3.1: ∂Σm1 ∗ ∂Σm2
For ease of representation assume the simplicial complex S2 can be represented as the join
of two smaller simplicial complexes T1 and T2 where in this case dimT1 = dimT2 = 1 (we
prove this is possible for a simplicial complex of the order 2 in Chapter 5). We assume the
simplicial complexes T1 and T2 are as given in Figure 3.2. Those vertices which belong to
just one edge are the boundary vertices of the simplicial complexes Ti.
3
1
1
2
4
1
3
4
2
T1 T2
Figure 3.2: The simplicial complexes T1 and T2
Then a maximal simplex in S2 is the result of a maximal simplex from T1 joined to a
maximal simplex from T2. The table in Figure 3.3 describes the vertex set of all maximal
simplices in S2. Column T1 describes the simplex from T1 as shown in Figure 3.2, similarly
for T2. For i = {1, 2} the vertex set of each simplex ∆ in S2 is divided into sets W∆,i
and Σ∆,i as defined in Definition 3.1. In Figure 3.3 the columns marked W∆,i contain
the vertices which belong to W∆,i and the column marked Σ contains those vertices which
belong to Σ∆,1 ∪Σ∆,2. The final column details the faces of S2 which Definition 3.1 depict
should be boundary faces. The vertex labels given in bold in the first two columns and
last column highlight their position as a boundary vertex.
Using Lemma 2.10 we can identify which simplices in S2 should have a face on the boundary.
Recall this Lemma tells us a boundary face Λ will be the join of two simplices C(1) and
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T1 T2 W∆,1 W∆,2 Σ Boundary Faces
3,1 1,3 1 3 1,3 {1,3,1}, {1,3,3}
3,1 3,4 1 3,4 3 {3, 3, 4}
3,1 4,2 1 4 2,3 {2,3, 1}, {2,3, 4}
1,1 1,3 1,1 3 1 {1, 1, 1}
1,1 3,4, 1,1 3,4 ∅ -
1,1 4,2 1,1 4 2 {2, 1, 1}
1,2 1,3 1,2 3 1 {1, 1, 2}
1,2 3,4 1,2 3,4 ∅ -
1,2 4,2 1,2 4 2 {2, 1, 2}
2,4 1,3 2 3 1,4 {1,4, 2}, {1,4, 3}
2,4 3,4 2 3,4 4 {4, 3, 4}
2,4 4,2 2 4 2,4 {2,4, 2}, {2,4, 4}
Figure 3.3: Table describing the vertex set of all maximal simplices in S
C(2) such that C(i) belongs to the simplicial complex Ti and C(j) to the boundary Tj for
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. That is either C(1) is a simplex of T1 and C(2) is a simplex of ∂T2 or
C(1) is a simplex of T2 and C(2) is a simplex of ∂T1.
In our example a simplex from ∂Ti is a single vertex. Therefore, following Lemma 2.10 if
a simplex from S2 lies in the boundary we will be able to identify a face, given by three
vertices, such that one belongs to ∂Ti and the other one to Tj for i 6= j. Observe Figure
3.3 shows this coincides with our expectations of the boundary taken from Definition 3.1.
Additionally if a simplex from S2 contains one boundary vertex, then since at least one
vertex must come from both of W1 and W2, Lemma 2.10 tells us to expect to be able to
identify exactly one boundary face. Similarly if a simplex contains two boundary vertices
then we can expect two boundary faces. Observe in this example this is the maximum
number of boundary vertices we can find in any one simplex. This analysis ties in with the
boundary faces of S2 as given in Figure 3.3.
(End Example)
In order to prove an analogy of Nash’s Theorem for the simplicial game complex Sn we
define equilibrium simplices
Definition 3.3 (Equilibrium Simplex)
A simplex Σ in Sk of dimension (mk−1) is said to be equilibrium if φ(v(Σ)) = {1, . . . ,mk}
and sub-equilibrium if φ(v(Σ)) = {1, . . . ,mk − 1}.
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Definition 3.4 (Sub-Equilibrium Face)
A face of Σ with vertex set {1, . . . ,mk − 1} is called sub-equilibrium. Observe such faces
will only belong to equilibrium or sub-equilibrium simplices.
This completes the definition of our simplicial complex Sk. We now formulate Nash’s
Theorem for simplicial game complexes.
Theorem 3.5 (Nash’s Theorem for Simplicial Game Complexes)
Every simplicial game complex S contains an equilibrium simplex. When S is non-degenerate
then the number of such simplices is finite and odd.
Remark
We make our first comparison to the Shapley paper [Shapley, 1974], discussed in Chapter
1.7. In particular we recall the nodes representing equilibrium situations are required to
be completely labelled. In our simplicial game complex we define our object of interest as
completely labelled simplices.
3.4 Preliminary Results
Before we prove Theorem 3.5 for the non-degenerate case, we provide some important
preliminary definitions and results.
Definition 3.6 (Subcomplex S ′)
For k = {2, . . . , n} let S ′ be a subcomplex of Sk constructed as follows. Consider the face σk
of Σmk such that φk(v(σk)) = {mk−1 + 1, . . . ,mk− 1} and construct the closure of the star
of σk denoted by St(σk). From St(σk) remove the (open) star of σk and the (open) stars
of all vertices belonging to Wk, then S ′ is the remaining simplicial complex from St(σk).
We illustrate this definition with the following example.
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Example 3.7
Consider the nerve (recall Definition 2.11, also described in more detail in Chapter 4) of
the covering in Figure 3.4 (this is actually the covering of a dyadic bimatrix game).
1
3 4
2
4
1
3
2
Figure 3.4: Two labelled coverings over P
Observe there are 2 coverings in Figure 3.4 superimposed over each other such that the
covering elements labelled by 1 and 2 divide the space horizontally and those labelled by
3 and 4 split the space vertically. The resulting nerve is then a 3-dimensional simplicial
complex satisfying the definition of simplicial game complex of S of the order 2, constructed
from m = {1, 2, 3, 4} with m1 = {1, 2} and m2 = {3, 4}. Following the notation from
Definition 3.6 we set σ = {3}.
The closed star of σ, St(σ), is the simplicial complex shown in Figure 3.5
1
3
2
3
2
4
Figure 3.5: The closed star of σ
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For clarity St(σ) consists of three 3-dimensional simplices with vertex sets {1,3, 2, 3}, {3, 2, 3, 4}
and {2,3, 2, 4} where the vertices in bold refer to their position as boundary faces. These
vertices can all be found on the bottom ‘edges’ of the simplicial complex in Figure 3.5.
The highlighted simplices in Figure 3.6 show the open stars of σ and the open stars of all
vertices from W2.
1
3
2
3
2
4
Figure 3.6: The open stars
Finally Figure 3.7 shows the closed star from Figure 3.5 minus the open stars highlighted
in Figure 3.6. As is clear to see the result is a 1-dimensional simplicial complex satisfying
the definition of S of the order 1 for m = m1 = {1, 2}.
1
2
2
Figure 3.7: The sub-complex
(End Example)
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This leads us to the following important Lemma.
Lemma 3.8
The subcomplex S ′, of a simplicial game complex Sk, is a non-degenerate simplicial game
complex of the order k − 1 i.e., S ′ = Sk−1.
Proof. Observe for all k ∈ {2, . . . , n} we have Sk−1 ⊂ Sk. In particular if σk is any face
of ∂Σmk then (Sk−1 ∗ σk) ⊂ Sk and consequently Sk−1 ⊂ St(σk). Further, if any vertex x
belonging to the St(σk) is labelled by an element from m1 ∪ · · ·mk−1 it must belong to
Sk−1. Therefore it must be the case that St(σk) restricted to the set Vk−1 is equal to Sk−1
and we deduce S ′ = Sk−1.
We now present a Lemma which will be key to our proof of Theorem 3.5 for non-degenerate
simplicial game complexes.
Lemma 3.9
A sub-equilibrium (m − 2)-dimensional simplex Λ belongs to the boundary of S iff there
is an equilibrium simplex Λ′ of S′ such that Λ = Λ′ ∗ σ, where σ is the face of Σmn with
φ(σ) = {mn−1 + 1, . . . ,mn − 1}.
Proof. Assume there is an equilibrium (mn−1 − 1)-dimensional simplex Λ′ of S ′ such that
Λ = Λ′ ∗ σ, then clearly Λ is sub-equilibrium. Observe by the definition of S ′ this join
is guaranteed to exist. We need to prove that Λ belongs to ∂S. Indeed, since S is a
non-ramified complex there is at least one vertex x 6∈ v(Λ′ ∗ σ) such that ∆ := Λ ∗ {x}
is a maximal simplex in S. Note σ = Σ∆,n. Since W∆,n 6= ∅ and by construction Wn ∩
v(Λ′ ∗ σ) = ∅ we arrive at W∆,n = {x}. It now follows from the definition that Λ lies in
the boundary.
Conversely, let Λ be a sub-equilibrium simplex belonging to ∂S. By the definition of the
boundary, there is a singleton {x} = W∆,i for some i = {1, . . . , n}, where ∆ := Λ ∗ {x} is
a maximal simplex in S.
If φ(x) = m, then {x} = W∆,n. Then φ(σ) = {mn−1 + 1, . . . ,mn− 1} for σ = Σ∆,n. Thus,
for an appropriate Λ′, the simplex Λ is of the required form Λ = Λ′ ∗ σ.
Suppose that φ(x) < m, then there is another vertex, say y, in Λ with φ(y) = φ(x).
Clearly, y is a vertex in Σ∆,i. Suppose first that φ(x) = t ≤ mn−1. Then there are vertices,
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say w1, . . . , wmi−mi−1−1 in Λ with φ({w1, . . . , wmi−mi−1−1}) = {mi−1 + 1, . . . , t − 1, t +
1, . . . ,mi}. None of these vertices can be in W∆,i = {x}, and can not all be in Σmi , else
{w1, . . . , wmi−mi−1−1, y} will be the set of all vertices of Σmi , hence Σmi is in S which is
impossible. Therefore the supposition that φ(x) = t ≤ mn−1 leads to a contradiction. It
follows that φ(x) ∈ {mn−1 + 1, . . . ,mn − 1}, thus {x} = W∆,n. Then for σ = Σ∆,n we
have φ(σ) = {mn−1 + 1, . . . ,mn − 1}. Thus, for an appropriate Λ′, the simplex Λ is of the
required form Λ = Λ′ ∗ σ
To complete this section we give a final definition
Definition 3.10 (Graph G)
For simplicial game complex S let V be the set of all (m−1)-sub-equilibrium simplices and
E the set of (m − 2)-sub-equilibrium faces. Then define G = (V,E) to be an undirected
graph with vertex set V and set of edges E.
Observe an edge exists between a pair of vertices in G iff the corresponding simplices share
a sub-equilibrium face in S. Then the non-ramification property of S ensures the degree
of G is less than or equal to 2. Therefore using the terminology from Lemma 2.22 a vertex
in graph G is normal if it corresponds to an equilibrium simplex. A normal vertex is
extreme if it is of degree 0. A non-normal vertex is called extreme if its degree is 1.
Remark
When n = 2, the graph G is equivalent to θm (minus the artificial equilibrium) as defined
in Shapley’s description of the Lemke-Howson algorithm [Shapley, 1974]. Consequently G
can be thought of as a subgraph of F1 × F2. The case n > 2 is discussed in Section 3.6.
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3.5 Nash’s Theorem for Simplicial Game Complexes
We now prove Nash’s Theorem for non-degenerate simplicial game complexes S.
Theorem 3.11 (Nash’s Theorem for a Non-Degenerate Simplicial Game Complex)
Every non-degenerate simplicial game complex S contains a finite and odd number of equi-
librium simplices.
Proof. We proceed by induction on n. In the case n = 1 we have m = m1 and therefore
v(φ(Σm1)) = m. Consequently φ(v(S)) = φ(v(Σm1)) ∪ φ(W1) and ∂S = ∂Σm1 . For
the simplicial complex S construct the graph G as defined in Definition 3.10. Observe
the extreme vertices of G are those with degree 1 less than maximal. In particular the
extreme vertices in G represent simplices with a sub-equilibrium face not belonging to a
second simplex and therefore correspond to simplices with a sub-equilibrium face lying in
the boundary of S. Further if Λ is a sub-equilibrium boundary face of S then it must
necessarily belong to a simplex which is not only represented in G but for which the
associated vertex is extreme. Therefore the number of extreme vertices in G is equal to
the number of sub-equilibrium simplices lying in ∂S. Then since there is a unique sub-
equilibrium face lying in ∂Σm1 the graph G contains 1 extreme vertex. Using Lemma 2.22,
we deduce the number of normal simplices in G is odd which by definition is equivalent to
the number of equilibrium simplices in S being odd.
Remark
The simplicial game complex S maybe a simplex satisfying Sperner’s Lemma, Lemma 2.21.
Alternatively it maybe, for example, a triangulation of a torus with one open simplex
removed.
For the induction step assume S′, the simplicial complex of order n−1, contains a finite and
odd number of equilibrium simplices. Then the remainder of the proof is almost identical
to that seen for the base of induction.
For the simplicial complex of order n, S, we have m = m1 ∪ · · · ∪mn. First observe the
number of simplices in S is bounded and in particular the number of equilibrium simplices
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in S must be finite. For the simplicial complex S construct the graph G as defined in
Definition 3.10. Then once again we observe the number of extreme vertices in G is equal
to the number of sub-equilibrium simplices lying in ∂S. According to Lemma 3.9 every
sub-equilibrium face Λ in ∂S is uniquely representable as Λ = Λ′ ∗ σ, where Λ′ is an
equilibrium simplex in S ′, and σ is the face of Σmn with φ(σ) = {mn−1 +1, . . . ,mn−1}. It
then follows that the number of extreme vertices in G is equal to the number of equilibrium
simplices in S ′, and in particular must be odd. Finally, using Lemma 2.22 we can deduce
the number of normal simplices in G is finite and odd and therefore so is the number of
equilibrium simplices in S.
3.6 Comparison to Lemke-Howson
To complete this Chapter we compare the method of identifying equilibrium simplices
within S with the constructive procedure contained in [Lemke and Howson Jr, 1964],
and as presented by Shapley [Shapley, 1974], to identify equilibrium situations in a non-
degenerate bimatrix game.
Our proof has relied on the ability to construct a graph from our simplicial game complex,
this is similar to the construction of Fi from P˜i as described in Chapter 1.7. With the
details of Chapter 1.7 in mind we analyse the method to identify equilibrium points within
our graph G and simplicial game complex S.
We begin by identifying an extreme vertex of G and from this point we follow the complete
connected path of edges and vertices which lead from it; where two nodes in G are distinct
end points of the same edge if and only if the corresponding simplices in S share a sub-
equilibrium face. Then in G either the path terminates with a unique normal (equilibrium)
node (which maybe the starting node) or it is a path containing no normal nodes but where
both end points are extreme nodes. The latter case is equivalent to following a path of sub-
equilibrium simplices in S which begins and ends on the boundary of the simplicial game
complex and consequently does not identify any equilibrium points of the game. However
since the number of extreme nodes is odd, if you follow all paths which start from these
extreme nodes you will eventually have to identify an equilibrium simplex. Observe that
in fact you will have to try no more than half (rounded up since the number of extreme
nodes is odd) of these paths as every path which ends in an extreme nodes eliminates two
options from your list of starting points.
To allow comparison to Shapley, as we consider paths through the graph G we interpret
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them in terms of the simplices contained in the simplicial game complex S. For this
subsection we therefore use the following notation.
Notation
Let Ei represent a node in the graph G and ∆i the corresponding simplex in the simplicial
game complex S
Within the graph G, to every node and edge assign the non-empty set of labels given to
the simplices they represent in S. Consider a extreme node E1 and simplex ∆1 with sub-
equilibrium labelling. Then by definition this node/simplex is missing label m and will
have a label from the set {1, . . . ,m− 1} repeated. Equivalently E1 belongs to the set θm
defined by Shapley. In S there will be two faces of ∆1 where no two vertices are identically
labelled; these will both be sub-equilibrium. However E1 is assumed to be extreme and
consequently one of the sub-equilibrium faces of ∆1 belongs to the boundary of S and so
does not belong to a second simplex. Recall the edges in G show simplices which share a
sub-equilibrium face. Therefore E1 is of degree 1 and there is a unique, sub-equilibrium,
edge to follow. This edge also belongs to the set θm. Traversing this edge is equivalent to
‘discarding’ one of the repeated labels.
The edge will terminate with a node E2 associated to simplex ∆2 and this corresponds to
the ‘collection’ of a new label. If ∆2 is a sub-equilibrium simplex then the new label is
a repeat of what is already present and there are two sub-equilibrium faces of ∆2 corre-
sponding to a node E2 of degree 2. Since we have entered this node along one edge, our
departure edge is uniquely determined. Traversing this edge (or passing through to the
next simplex in S via the shared sub-equilibrium face)is equivalent to dropping one of the
repeated labels. This process of dropping and collecting labels continues until Ek and ∆k
are completely labelled (or Ek is an extreme node). In this case there is no label to drop,
and so no edge to depart along in G, and the path terminates.
Remark
By definition G is equal to the set θm minus the artificial equillibrium point.
This method of constructing a path is identical to that described Shapley.
There are however some differences between the overall constructive procedures. Shapley
defined an artificial equilibrium which formed the starting point of a path which would
guarantee to terminate with an equilibrium point. Currently this can only be replicated
for simplicial game complexes of order 1. In this case a new vertex is added and connected
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to all vertices belonging to ∂S. This new object is of dimension one higher than S and S
can be identified as belonging to one of the faces, identical to as seen in Figure 1.17. Label
this new vertex by m then we can identify a completely-labelled simplex lying outside of S.
From this simplex we remove the new vertex and we are left with a sub-equilibrium face
belonging to ∂S. In line with the proof presented for Theorem 3.11 this is the only sub-
equilibrium face on the boundary of S. Then, by the property of non-ramification, this face
must belong to the simplex corresponding to the unique extreme point of G. Consequently
following this path, as described above, must result in reaching an equilibrium situation
of the game. In terms of G the new vertex is equivalent to adding a new completely
labelled node and m almost completely labelled edges, each dropping one of the labels
from {1, . . . ,m}.
Remark
We label the new vertex m to enable us to identify the unique sub-equilibrium face on the
boundary and consequently a node in G.
Remark
The addition of the new vertex is equivalent to identifying the unique extreme node of G.
Observe the added equilibrium simplex is equivalent to the artificial equilibrium introduced
by Shapley. However, in our case, the first choice of label to drop is fixed as we are currently
bound to following sub-equilibrium paths, or those belonging to θm.
For simplices of larger order we can once again repeat this procedure, with the additional
vertex joining to all vertices which belong to a boundary face of S. However, this time
we will be left with numerous additional equilibrium simplices to choose from to begin our
path, each one taking us to a different extreme point of G. This leads us to the same
problems discussed before as we have no way of knowing if our path will return to the
boundary of S or produce an equilibrium simplex. We return to this again in Chapter 5
when we return to simplicial game complexes of the order 2.
Remark
For simplicial complexes of order greater than or equal to two, this procedure will produce
a unique path precisely when there is a unique equilibrium simplex in the subcomplex as
defined in Definition 3.6.
A final important observation. Let S be a simplicial game complex of the order n, and
let every simplex in S represent a node, labelled identically to the simplex it represents.
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Then two nodes are joined by an edge if the corresponding simplices share a face in S.
Denote this new graph by G∗. Then G is a subgraph G∗ and G∗ is comparable to (but
not equal to) F1 × F2. In particular G∗ does not contain the artificial equilibrium point
{0, 0}. Additionally, the construction of the boundary of F1×F2 (product of two simplices)
differs to that of G∗ (join of the boundary of n simplices) and this is the cause of problems
in the cases where we are unable to identify a starting point for a path in G which will
guarantee to terminate with an equilibrium situation. In later Chapters we will refer to
these differences as dimensional considerations.
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Chapter 4
Non-cooperative Games as
Simplicial Complexes
We now return our focus to the motivation of this Thesis; Nash’s Theorem for non-
cooperative games. In this Chapter we begin by describing our interpretation of an N -
player, non-cooperative game Γ and culminate with our proof of Nash’s Theorem for non-
degenerate games. We also use this Chapter to define our generalisation of Γ. Such
generalised games will provide one of the most significant diversions when comparing our
results to previously published work in this field.
4.1 Non-cooperative Games
We define an N -player non-degenerate, non-cooperative game Γ, with set of players i =
{1, . . . , N}. Each player i has a finite pure strategy set Si with |Si| = li and mixed strategy
set Pi. The expected payoff awarded to player i is given by the polylinear function Gi.
Recall P (i) := P1×· · ·×Pi−1×Pi+1×· · ·×PN is the set of all possible strategy combinations
of players {1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , N}. An element from this set, p(i), represents just one of
these situations.
This traditional, or normal form, description of Γ will not be used explicitly in the original
work contained in this Thesis. Instead, we use it as a foundation from which we construct
an alternative representation of a game. Given our focus is Nash equilibria, for all players
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i = {1, . . . , N} and for all situations p(i) ∈ P (i), we are only interested in the strategies
from Pi which result in player i achieving his optimal payoff value. Using this as our
motivation we now describe how we will represent and consider Γ.
From Chapter 1.3.4 we know the mixed strategy set Pi is a simplex of dimension (li − 1).
Therefore the set P (i) is the product space of N − 1 simplices and P is the product space
of all N simplices, both can be considered as a bounded subset of Rl for appropriate l ∈ N.
This will be an important aspect of our representation of Γ.
Example 4.1
Let Γ be a 3-player non-degenerate dyadic game. Then for every i = {1, 2, 3} let pi =
(xi, 1 − xi) and observe the corresponding simplex Pi is 1-dimensional. Assume without
loss of generality i = 1 then P (1) = P2×P3 and P = P1×P2×P3 are shown in Figure 4.1.
x3
x1
x2
x3
x2
(a) (b)
Figure 4.1: (a) P (1) and (b) P as a geometric object
(End Example)
Recall for every i = {1, . . . , N} and sji ∈ Si, (p, sji ) := (p1, . . . , pi−1, sji , pi+1, . . . , pN ).
For every situation p ∈ P the payoff function Gi allows the identification of sji ∈ Si such
that
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Gi(p, s
j
i ) ≥ Gi(p, sj
′
i ) ∀ sj
′
i ∈ Si (4.1)
For each player i, let Zi be the non-empty subset of strategies from Si which satisfy
(4.1). Then, in particular, for each situation p(i), Zi is the non-empty subset of pure best
responses from Si.
Zi := {sji |Gi(p, sji ) ≥ Gi(p, sj
′
i ) ∀ sj
′
i ∈ Si} ⊂ Si (4.2)
Remark
Recall the definition of the support Yi, Definition 1.6, then a mixed strategy is a best
response if Yi ⊆ Zi.
Alternatively for every sji ∈ Si the (possibly empty) set of strategies from P (i) such that
sji ∈ Zi can be identified. Therefore for all situations p ∈ P and pure strategies sji ∈ Zi
define
B¯i(s
j
i ) := {p(i) |Gi(p(i) × {sji}) ≥ Gi(p(i) × {sj
′
i }) ∀ sj
′
i ∈ Si} (4.3)
Where we recall p(i) × {sji} defines a situation p ∈ P for all p(i) ∈ P (i) and sji ∈ Si.
Consider B¯i(s1i ) ∪ · · · ∪ B¯i(slii ). Then since the payoff function Gi ensures each player i
must have at least one optimal strategy across P (i) there exists at least one subset B¯i(s
j
i )
such that B¯i(s
j
i ) 6= ∅. Further since for every p(i) ∈ P (i) player i must be able to identify
his optimal strategy each p(i) must belong to at least one subset. Therefore we have
P (i) =
⋃
sji∈Si
B¯i(s
j
i ) (4.4)
and as such the sets B¯i(s
j
i ) form a finite covering over P
(i).
Example 4.2
Continuing from Example 4.1. By definition each player’s payoff functions Gi are polylin-
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ear. Therefore, by following the discussion above, for every i = {1, 2, 3} the covering over
P (i) takes the form seen in Figure 4.2. Each element of the covering is labelled by the set
B¯i(s
j
i ) it represents.
Bi(s i2)
Bi(si1)
Bi(si1)
Figure 4.2: Dyadic game covering over P (i)
(End Example)
We observe in Figure 4.2 the covering element defined by B¯i(s1i ) is disconnected. To ensure
our description of a game is clear we insist each element of the covering is a connected set.
In particular we redefine each element of the covering over P (i) to be a connected component
of a set B¯i(s
j
i ). Denote such connected components by Bi(s
j
i ). Then Bi(s
j
i ) is a maximal
connected subset of B¯i(s
j
i ). Observe the property of polylinearity inherent in the payoff
function ensures the number of such connected components is finite.
We refer to the subsets Bi(s
j
i ) as covering elements of P
(i).
Remark
Our covering elements are equivalent to the sets P ki defined in (1.43) of Chapter 1.7. In
particular, these sets identify pure best responses for one player given a situation from
P (i).
4.2 Generalised Games
Examining the properties of the covering defined over P (i) leads us to a generalisation
of the game Γ. By definition the sets Bi(s
j
i ) contain the situations from P
(i) for which
pure strategy sji ∈ Si yields an optimal payoff for player i. However the actual payoff
value received by player i does not feature in the construction of the covering. Instead
we have only used the payoff functions to order each player’s pure strategies with regards
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to preference. Consequently instead of a payoff function, we only require each player i to
define a total order over his set of pure strategies.
By definition, the axioms of a total order on a set A state for elements a, b ∈ A, if a ≥ b
and b ≥ a then a = b. However this is not quite the definition we require. Suppose player
i is indifferent between pure strategies s1i and s
2
i , then it is natural to expect a total order
on the set of pure strategies to reflect this. It is clear that because s1i 6= s2i a total order
applied to this set, as described above, would not achieve our desired outcome. To rectify
this problem we define a surjective map from the set of mixed strategies into a finite set
of totally ordered elements K, such that strategies of equal preference are mapped to the
same element. Naturally, the total order on K together with the surjective map will reflect
the preferences of player i.
Definition 4.3 (Total Order)
For every player i = {1, . . . , N} define the surjective function i: P1 × · · · × PN 7→ Ki,
where Ki is finite, totally ordered set, such that
1. For every fixed p(i) ∈ Pi the maximum with respect to i of p = {p1, . . . , pN} over
pi is attained at an element of Si.
2. If the maximum is attained at s1i , . . . , s
l
i ∈ Si then the maximum must also be reached
across the convex hull of these points and equivalently across the corresponding face
in Pi.
Definition 4.4 (Generalised Game)
In an N -player non-cooperative game Γ for all i = {1, . . . , N} replace each payoff function
Gi with a total order i. The resulting game is a non-cooperative generalised game, or
generalised game, and is denoted by Γ∗.
Remark
We will remain using the term ‘total order’ as this provides a clear and intuitive under-
standing of our requirements.
Within our generalised games the notion of a player’s pure best response and support are
equivalent to its definition in the traditional game setting. Then our constraints on a total
order, Definition 4.3, is equivalent to requiring that for every situation in P (i) player i’s
best response is a pure strategy. The support of a mixed strategy for player i is once again
the non-empty subset of pure strategies which are assigned a strictly positive value and
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consequently (at optimal strategies) Yi ⊆ Zi ⊆ Si still holds.
As before, we construct a covering over P (i) which can be formally expressed as connected
sets, indicating best responses, of the kind
Bi(s
j
i ) := {p(i) | (p(i) × {sji}) i (p(i) × {pi}) ∀ pi ∈ Pi} (4.5)
for all sji ∈ Si.
Suppose the best pure responses for player i, for a given situation p(i) ∈ P (i), are contained
in the set Zi. Then p(i) ∈ Bi(sji ) for all sji ∈ Zi. It is natural to except the intersection
of covering elements to represent situations where a player is indifferent between his pure
strategies and so will consider mixing them. Therefore property 2 of Definition 4.3 ensures
the sets Bi(s
j
i ) are closed, bounded and intersect properly.
Remark
The finite condition on the set Ki from Definition 4.3 is equivalent to the generalised game
containing a finite number of covering elements. In particular a given pure strategy can
only be optimal a finite number of times.
Example 4.5
Continuing from Example 4.2 we provide an intuitive example of this. Replacing the poly-
linear payoff functions Gi with a total orders i ∀ i = {1, 2} can produce the generalised
coverings seen in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Generalised dyadic game coverings
(End Example)
The following three examples of total orders (defined as payoff functions) all illustrate
Definition 4.3, either as a counter-example or as an example satisfying this definition.
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All three examples define a dyadic bimatrix game with mixed strategies given by (x1, 1−
x− 1) and (x2, 1− x2) for player’s 1 and 2 respectively. As we have seen in Example 1.15
the payoff functions will be given in terms of the independent strategy only, namely x1 and
x2. Since x1 and x2 are probability distributions we require xi ∈ [0, 1] for i = {1, 2}. In the
examples which follow the range of allowed values, [a, b], is larger than this. However the
functions and domains can be rescaled to satisfy the required conditions so does this not
cause any problems (we will work with the original formulation). Note the ’pure strategy’
set for each player is defined when xi takes the extreme values of the set i.e., at xi = a and
xi = b.
Example 4.6
Let Γ be a dyadic bimatrix game with mixed strategies (x1, 1−x1) and (x2, 1−x2) respec-
tively. Assume the payoff functions are given by
G1(x1, x2) = −x1 · x2 + (x2)2 for x1, x2 ∈ [−1, 1]
(4.6)
G2(x1, x2) = x1 · x2 − (x2)2 for x1, x2 ∈ [−1, 1]
Consider G1(x1, x2) then, for all values of x2, this function is linear with respect to player
1. In particular for any value x2 ∈ [−1, 1], G1(x1, x2) must achieve its maximum when
either x1 = −1 or x1 = 1. If the maximum is achieved at both points then the gradient
of the function is 0 and consequently all mixed strategies must also be best responses.
Consequently G1 satisfies Definition 4.3.
Now look at G2(x1, x2). Fix x1 = 0 then G2(0, x2) = −(x2)2 and the resulting graph is
a negative quadratic function which achieves its maximum at x2 = 0. Therefore this fails
Definition 4.3 and this example does not represent a genearlised game.
To graphically understand the necessity of the violaed condition, consider the best response
correspondences for these two payoff functions, given in Figure 4.4.
Once the appropriate scaling of the payoff functions has been done, the best response
correspondence of (a) is of the standard form seen in Chapter 1.3.5. Consequently the
covering over P2 (the interval [−1, 1]) using sets B1(si1) is finite. In contrast, the best
response correspondence of (b) is a straight line of constant non-zero gradient. As a result
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Figure 4.4: Best response correspondences for (a)G1 and (b)G2 for Example 4.6
of this we cannot determine a finite covering of P1 as there is a different best response to
every element from [−1, 1]. This contradicts Definition 4.3.
Remark
The two best response correspondences seen in Figure 4.4 do have a non-empty intersection
and therefore an equilibrium situation must exist. Therefore it maybe possible to find
an alternative definition to Definition 4.3 to replace the payoff functions which is less
restrictive. However this, or understanding why this example has an equilibria, will not be
considered in this Thesis.
(End Example)
Example 4.7
This example considers the reverse of the example given above so is a bimatrix game
described as in Example 4.6 with payoff functions as follows
G1(x1, x2) = x1 · x2 − (x2)2 for x1, x2 ∈ [−1, 1]
(4.7)
G2(x1, x2) = −x1 · x2 + (x2)2 for x1, x2 ∈ [−1, 1]
Once again G1 is linear with respect to player 1’s strategy and G2 is a quadratic with
respect to player 2. The difference this time is that G2 is always maximal at the end
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points, i.e., when x2 = −1 or x2 = 1 and therefore the first part of Definition 4.3 holds
for both payoff functions. However consider G2(0, x2) = (x2)2. Then G2(0, x2) achieves its
maximum when x2 = 1 and x2 = −1 but not for any x2 ∈ (−1, 1). The corresponding best
response correspondence for G2 is shown in Figure 4.5.
x
0 x
2
1
1
-1
-1
1
Figure 4.5: Best response correspondence for G2 in Example 4.7
In Figure 4.3 at x1 = 0 there is a discontinuity. In terms of the covering this equivalent
to the covering elements not intersecting properly; i.e., an intersection between covering
elements would not represent an indifference between strategies 1 and -1 and any combina-
tion of them. Hence the appropriate covering is once again unable to be constructed and
this example fails the second part of Definition 4.3.
(End Example)
Example 4.8
Consider the bimatrix game Γ defined by payoff functions
G1(x1, x2) = x2 · (x2 − 1) · (x2 − x1) for x1, x2 ∈ [−1, 2]
(4.8)
G1(x1, x2) = −x1 · (x2)3 for x1, x2 ∈ [−1, 2]
Then the best response correspondences for both functions are given in Figure 4.6
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Figure 4.6: Best response correspondence for (a)G1 and (b)G2 in Example 4.8
The first thing we observe in Figure 4.6 is the best response correspondence in (a) is a
generalised form to those seen previously. By definition, the best response correspondence
in (a) shows player 1’s best responses to all situations from P2. As such it is easy to
check that for all situations from P2 the best response correspondence includes at least
one of x1 = −1 or x1 = 2 and hence the first condition of Definition 4.3 is satisfied. Now
observe in (a) there are two (disconnected) line segments at x1 = −1 and one at x1 = 2
whose union is equal to [−1, 2], or player 2’s mixed strategy simplex P2. Therefore a finite
covering over P2 can be constructed. Finally there are no discontinuities. So for the two
strategies from P2 where player 1 is indifferent between his pure strategies, player 1 is also
indifferent between any of his mixed strategies. Hence Definition 4.3 is completely satisfied
with respect to G1.
The best response correspondence (b) is of the form traditionally seen and in any case
repeating the analysis above will determine that G2 also satisfies Definition 4.3. Conse-
quently this example is of a generalised game and by observation we see this game has 1
pure strategy equilibrium point and 2 mixed strategy equilibria situations.
(End Example)
In our generalised games the definition of a Nash equilibrium situation is a natural extension
of Nash’s original definition as given in Definition 1.10.
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Definition 4.9 (Nash Equilibria for Generalised Games)
A situation p = (p1, . . . , pi, . . . , pn) ∈ P is a Nash equilibrium situation if
p i (p1, . . . , pi−1, p′i , pi+1, . . . , pN ) (4.9)
for every i = {1, . . . , N} and every p′i ∈ Pi.
Before we state Nash’s Theorem for generalised games we introduce the (preliminary)
conditions of non-degeneracy for Γ∗. In the traditional game theory definition, Γ is said
to be non-degenerate if the intersection of its best response correspondences is transverse.
Observe in Γ segments of each best response correspondence can be interpreted as the inter-
sections between covering elements, defined with respect to one player, over P . Therefore
we require the intersection of the covering elements Bi(s
j
i ) be transverse and thus each
covering element must be a smooth manifold.
Then Nash’s Theorem for generalised games is as follows.
Theorem 4.10 (Nash’s Theorem for Generalised Games)
Within each non-cooperative generalised game Γ∗ there exists an equilibrium situation.
When Γ∗ is non-degenerate the number of equilibrium situations is finite and odd.
For a situation p ∈ P let Zi be the set of pure best responses for player i. Then for all
i = {1, . . . , N} replacing the order i in Definition 4.9 with the polylinear payoff function
Gi we arrive at:
Gi(p, s
j
i ) ≥ Gi(p, sj
′
i ) ∀ sji ∈ Zi, sj
′
i ∈ Si (4.10)
which is equivalent to equation (1.25) and thus to Definition 1.10. Additionally it is
clear the payoff functions Gi define a total order on the strategies in Si with regards
to the situations in P (i). Finally we have seen the characteristics which define Γ to be
(non)-degenerate impose the same property on Γ∗ (we return to this later). Therefore the
traditional description of the game Γ is contained in our generalised game Γ∗. In particular
any result which is true for Γ∗ will also hold for Γ. Consequently we will prove Theorem
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4.10, Nash’s Theorem for Γ∗, but in doing so we will have automatically constructed a
proof for Theorem 1.13, the traditional statement of Nash’s Theorem.
Remark
Using a total order i will define games of an abstract nature which are not required to
produce explicit payoff values. Should this property be necessary then we can revert back
to using a payoff function providing it defines a total order. However such functions are
no longer required to be polylinear.
The coverings over each P (i) only provide information about player i’s optimal strategies.
Recall all realisable situations from the generalised game Γ∗ are contained within P and
by definition P (i) ⊂ P for all i = {1, . . . , N}. Therefore for each player i and all sji ∈ Si
consider Bi(s
j
i )×Pi, then the union of all such sets must form a covering of P . Repeating
for all players will result in N distinct coverings of P . Observe the collection of all N
coverings will contain all optimal strategies for all player’s. We therefore redefine the
notation Bi(s
j
i ) as follows.
Definition 4.11 (Covering Element)
For all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and sji ∈ Si let Bi(sji ) denote a connected component of B¯i(sji )×Pi.
Then the union of all Bi(s
j
i ), for all connected components of B¯i(s
j
i ), will form a covering
of P . The sets Bi(s
j
i ) are the covering elements of P with respect to player i.
Remark
Recall from Definition 4.3 there will be a finite number of covering elements.
Example 4.12
Continuing from Example 4.2, Figure 4.7 shows the covering given in Figure 4.2 extended
to the space P . Observe how the intersection of each pair of covering elements forms a
cylinder.
Figure 4.8 then shows all 3 player’s coverings over the space P . Each of these coverings
take the form seen in Figure 4.7 and all are pairwise orthogonal.
For clarity Figure 4.9 shows the intersections around the vertex (1, 0, 1) from Figure 4.8 in
more detail where (a), (b) and (c) show the intersection of cylinders associated to player’s
1 and 2, 1 and 3 and 2 and 3 respectively while (d) is the intersection of all 3 cylinders.
(End Example)
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Figure 4.7: Dyadic game covering over P for player 3
Figure 4.8: Dyadic game covering over P for all 3 player’s
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 4.9: Intersection of covering elements
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By definition of the covering, the relative positions of all covering elements will determine
player i’s optimal strategies for all situations p(i) ∈ P (i). As such it is the relative positions
of the covering elements which will help determine equilibrium situations of the game. This
information can be represented by constructing the nerve of the covering, (Definition 2.11).
The red (bold) lines in Figure 4.10 illustrate the nerve of an arbitrary covering.
Figure 4.10: Constructing a nerve
Remark
The nerve of a covering can be considered the coverings dual.
This construction of the nerve only considers the optimal strategies for all players and does
not provide any information regarding the actual strategy played by each player at that
point. This is determined by the position of the intersection of the covering elements in
P . As such the support for each player, for the situation represented by the intersection,
can be determined by identifying the boundary faces (if any) the intersection belongs to.
Let p ∈ P be a situation lying away from the boundary, then p represents a totally mixed
strategy situation for all player’s. As such the support for every player i = {1, . . . , N} is Si.
Now suppose p belongs to boundary face Λ. If dim Λ = dimP−1 then there exists a unique
i ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that the support for player i is of size (li− 1) while the support for all
other player’s j = {1, . . . , i−1, i+ 1, . . . , N} is once again Sj . If dim Λ < dimP −1 then Λ
is the result of multiple faces (of dimension equal to dimP −1) intersecting. Consequently
Λ corresponds to the situations from P where the support for some (possibly all) player’s
is strictly less than maximal. The number of pure strategies assigned 0 in p increases until
p represents a vertex of P . At such points all players are selecting a pure strategy and
each player has a support of size 1. It is therefore clear the inclusion of the boundary faces
96
in the construction of the nerve will provide the ‘missing information’.
Remark
We are referring to the support Yi and not the set of pure best responses Zi as we are not
considering optimal strategy choices.
The boundary faces are represented in the nerve in the same manner as the covering
elements. In particular each boundary face is assigned an arbitrary point of representation
which will corresponds to a vertex in the nerve. Two vertices then share an edge if the
corresponding boundary faces have a non-empty intersection. It is then natural to connect
vertices corresponding to covering elements and boundary faces by an edge should the
associated covering elements and boundary faces have a non-empty intersection.
Figure 4.11 illustrates the nerve of a simple and arbitrary covering over a bounded set in
R2. The vertices labelled by 1,2,3 are the representative points of the covering elements,
and those labelled by a,b,c,d are the ones for the boundary faces. Note the boundary face
labels have been marked away from the boundary for clarity. The red (bold) lines then
form the resulting nerve.
a
d
c
b
1 2
3
Figure 4.11: The nerve of a bounded covering
By definition the covering elements Bi(s
j
i ) over the bounded space P are closed connected
subsets. There are also finitely many of them and hence the resulting nerve will contain
a finite number of nodes. However we cannot assume their intersections will behave in
a predictable way and we may have the situation where a subset of covering elements
intersect with multiple dimensions or in multiple disjoint segments. The following example
shows a simple example of this second scenario.
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Example 4.13
Let Γ∗ be a 3 player generalised game with pure strategy sets S1, S2 and S3 where |S1| = 3
and |S2| = |S3| = 2. Let a mixed strategy for player 1 be given by (x11, x21, x31) = (x11, x21, 1−
x11 − x21), and those for player 2 and 3 by (x12, 1 − x12) and (x13, 1 − x13) respectively. For
this example each player is interested in minimising his outcome and therefore the result
of each game is interpreted as a ‘cost’. As such the functions determining outcome are
referred to as cost functions.
Define the cost function for player 1, which is to be minimized and not maximized, by
G1 : P1×P2×P3 7→ x11
(
x12 −
1
4
)(
x13 −
3
4
)
+ x21(x
1
2− x13) + x31(x13− x12) (4.11)
Restricting player 1’s input to a pure strategy produces the following three restricted payoff
functions:
G11 = G1(p, s
1
1) : {s11} × P2 × P3 7→
(
x12 −
1
4
)(
x13 −
3
4
)
(4.12)
G21 = G1(p, s
2
1) : {s21} × P2 × P3 7→ (x12 − x13) (4.13)
G31 = G1(p, s
3
1) : {s31} × P2 × P3 7→ (x13 − x12) (4.14)
Then for each situation in P (1) we can identify which of the three functions given by
equations (4.12), (4.13) and (4.14) results in the optimal payoff for player 1. The covering
representing the optimal strategies for player 1 is shown in Figure 4.12 where each covering
element is labelled by the restricted payoff functions it represents.
We observe the covering elements representing pure strategies s21 and s
3
1 being optimal for
player 1 intersect in two distinct segments of equal dimension. The red (bold) lines in
Figure 4.13 show the nerve, a simplicial complex, of the covering given in Figure 4.12.
First observe there is just one edge in the nerve which represents the intersection of covering
elements labelled in Figure 4.12 by G21 and G
3
1; this is despite this intersection occurring in
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Figure 4.12: Covering of P (i)
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Figure 4.13: Nerve of the covering shown in Figure 4.12
2 disjoint components. As a direct result of this, the face {2, 3} belongs to three simplices
and the nerve fails the conditions of non-ramification (property 2 of Definition 2.7). This
may cause complications with the definition of a non-degenerate nerve, Definition 2.19.
Remark
For clarity in representation we are considering the covering over P (i) and not P . However
it is clear the same intersection problems will be present when the covering is extended
and represented over P instead.
(End Example)
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We return to the problem arising in Example 4.13 later in the Chapter, but for now we
consider the general geometric form the nerve takes. Observe at every point in the covering
there must be N covering elements present. If each player has a unique covering element
over P , so every player’s optimal strategy is a single pure strategy, the nerve will contain
N vertices. These vertices must necessarily be affinely independent, and since all covering
elements have a non-empty intersection, in the nerve an edge must exist between all pairs.
Consequently the nerve at this point is a simplex of dimension (N − 1). Now suppose at
a given point of intersection there are a total of k covering elements and boundary faces.
Since each of the k covering elements and boundary faces intersect with the remaining k−1
covering elements and boundary faces, at the corresponding point in the nerve each pair of
vertices must share an edge and thus is a simplex of dimension k− 1. If there are multiple
points of intersection across P then observe the set of covering elements and boundary
faces at each intersection cannot be disjoint. Consequently, in the nerve, the resulting
simplices have vertices in common and so the complete nerve is a simplicial complex of
dimension k¯−1 where k¯ is the maximum number of covering elements and boundary faces
intersecting at any one point.
Remark
Observe the nerve of a simplex is the original simplex. This is illustrated in Figure 4.14
where the red (bold) lines indicate the nerve
Figure 4.14: The nerve of a 2-dimensional simplex
Consider the bimatrix game where P = P1 × P2. Then the nerve of P must contain the
boundaries of P1 and P2, denoted by ∂P1 and ∂P2 respectively. Further in P each boundary
face of P1 is joined to every boundary face of P2 and this property must be maintained in
the nerve. Therefore the nerve of P is ∂P1 ∗ ∂P2. This extends to any finite size game and
in particular the nerve of P for the N -player game Γ∗ is equal to ∂P1 ∗ · · · ∗ ∂PN .
Notation
For the N -player non-cooperative generalised game Γ∗ denote the nerve constructed from
the N -coverings over P , including boundary, by η.
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4.3 Labelling Procedure
In order to identify each simplex in η and to associate it to the situation it represents from
the game Γ∗, without referring back to the orders i, we assign a unique label to each
vertex. Since each vertex is either associated to a covering element (defined by an order)
or a boundary face we define a labelling procedure for these two distinct sets. Each vertex
in η then shares the same label as the covering element or boundary face it represents.
Clearly these labels should reflect strategies played and therefore the set of all labels must
have a natural bijective correspondence to {S1, . . . , SN}. In light of this, and for clarity,
we use the pure strategies as the set of labels.
The covering elements Bi(s
j
i ) defined by i are naturally labelled by sji , player i’s optimal
strategy across the set under consideration.
The labelling of the vertices associated to the boundary faces is not as trivial. By defini-
tion the number of independent variables across P is equal to the sum of all independent
variables from Pi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Therefore situations which do not fall on the
boundary will involve all pure strategies and thus represent totally mixed strategy situa-
tions for all N player’s. The dimension of the boundary faces are (dimP − 1) and as such
contain one less independent variable than P . In particular each boundary face represent
the situations from P which use all bar one of the independent strategies. That is, there is
one pure strategy which does not feature in the support of any mixed strategy across the
entire face in question and therefore is assigned the probability zero. The boundary face
is then labelled by this pure strategy.
For simplex Pj the set of vertices correspond uniquely to all pure strategy situations avail-
able to player j. Therefore in the product space P the vertices are the situations where
all players assign probability 1 to one of their pure strategies. It is clear each vertex in P
corresponds to a unique vertex from Pi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. All combinations of vertices
from the simplices Pi ∈ P must be used and therefore the vertices in P represent all pure
strategy situations uniquely.
Consider a one dimensional edge in P then this is governed by a single equation in two
variables, namely xqj + x
q′
j = 1 for x
q
j , x
q′
j ∈ pj , q 6= q′ and for some j ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
All other probability distributions must remain the same at the two vertices and across
the entire edge. We can assume without loss of generality that at vertex 1 we will have
xqj = 1, x
q′
j = 0 and x
q
j = 0, x
q′
j = 1 at vertex two. Therefore the edge under consideration
represents the mixed strategy situation where player j assigns non-zero probabilities to pure
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strategies sqj and s
q′
j only with the remaining (N − 1) players choosing the pure strategies
defined at the vertices. Since for all players i = {1, . . . , N} Pi ∈ P is a simplex there
must be a unique edge for each pair of strategies belonging to the same Sj . Extending
this argument up to the boundary faces we are able to guarantee the number of boundary
faces is
∑N
j=1 lj where each face is labelled uniquely from the set S. In particular each
pure strategy from S is used to label exactly one boundary face.
Example 4.14
Figure 4.15 is the covering seen in Figure 4.7, from Example 4.12, labelled as described
above.
Left: Right:
Base:
Back:Top:
Front: s32
s22
s11
s21
s31 s12
s12s11
s11
x1
x2
x3
Figure 4.15: Labelled covering
(End Example)
Remark
The labelling described in this section satisfies the same conditions as that used by Shapley
[Shapley, 1974].
To complete this section we describe how a labelled simplex is interpreted. Let ∆ be a
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maximal simplex in η, where by maximal we mean ∆ does not appear as a face of any
other simplex and dim ∆ is maximal in η. Then ∆ fully describes the intersection of a set
of covering elements and boundary faces and so represents a situation from the game Γ∗.
The labels assigned to the vertices of ∆ provide us with the pure strategies chosen by all
players in the mixed strategy situation p it represents. Additionally for every p(i) ⊂ P (i),
i = {1, . . . , N}, the vertices also identify player i’s optimal strategies for situation p(i).
Let W ′∆,i denote the set of vertices in ∆ labelled by pure strategies from Si associated
to covering elements then these labels provide the optimal pure strategies for player i.
The labels of the vertices associated to the boundary faces are contained in Σ′∆,i for all
i = {1, . . . , N} and are the strategies not used by players {1, . . . , N}. Observe these do
not provide any information regarding optimality. Therefore for all i = {1, . . . , N} the
mixed strategy situation played by player i uses pure strategies Si \ Σ′∆,i.
This completes the description of our representation of a generalised game Γ∗.
4.4 Properties of Nerves
Lemma 4.15 (Identifying Equilibrium Situations in η)
For all N -player generalised games Γ∗, every completely labelled simplex in the nerve η
corresponds to at least one equilibrium situation. Further all equilibrium situations must
be represented in this way.
Proof. Let p = (p1, . . . , pN ) be an equilibrium situation from Γ∗. The by definition, each
player’s set of pure best responses to situation p(i) must be a superset of the support of
pi. Consequently, all pure strategies not belonging to the support of pi must correspond
to boundary faces of the original covering and so the set of labels assigned to vertices
corresponding to covering elements and boundary faces must be disjoint. Finally by non-
degeneracy the dimension of the simplex representing this situation in η must be m′ − 1
and therefore a simplex representing an equilibrium situation is completely labelled.
Remark
Observe this is a consequence of property 2 of Definition 4.3 where for a given player the
convex hull of all pure best responses must also be a best response.
Let ∆ represent situation p in the nerve. Then let W ′∆,i contain the vertices correspond-
ing to the strategies belonging to the support of player i’s optimal strategy for situation
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p(i), and Σ′∆,i contain those strategies which are not in the support for pi. Then W
′
∆,i
corresponds to the vertices representing covering elements in η and Σ′∆,i to those repre-
senting the boundary faces. Since by assumption p is an equilibrium situation, for all
i = {1, . . . , N}, Si \ Σ′∆,i = W ′∆,i, therefore W ′∆,i ∪ Σ′∆,i = Si and thus ∆ is completely
labelled or an equilibrium simplex.
For the converse, observe equilibrium simplices in ∆ correspond to those situations where
for all players i = {1, . . . , N} the optimal strategy for player i coincides with the strategy
he has played. This is the definition of an equilibrium situation. Finally assume ∆ is
not completely labelled then, in particular, the support for the mixed strategy played by
player i contains a pure strategy which is not optimal. Therefore player i’s payoff can be
improved by an alteration in his strategy alone and hence ∆ does not correspond to an
equilibrium situation.
We return to the non-degeneracy condition of Γ∗. In Section 4.2 we discussed how the
intersections of the coverings over P (i) must be smooth manifolds. This condition naturally
extends to the coverings over P . In traditional non-degenerate games we insist intersections
of these functions must be transverse. Therefore in the non-degenerate generalised game all
intersections of covering elements labelled by the same Si must intersect transversely with
the intersection of covering elements labelled by the same Sj . (By definition the boundary
intersections are automatically transverse).
Lemma 4.16 (Dimension of Nerve for Non-Degenerate Generalised Game)
In the non-degenerate game Γ∗, dim η = m′ − 1.
Proof. Given the condition of non-degeneracy ensures all intersections must be transverse
we can immediately conclude in the non-degenerate game Γ∗ there can be at most m′
covering elements and boundary faces intersecting at any one point. We then observe
such intersections can be identified at the vertices of the boundary and consequently the
dimension of η is m′ − 1 as required.
Consider a 0-dimensional intersection in the covering of P lying away from ∂P . Then
by Lemma 4.16 this corresponds to an intersection of m′ covering elements. The condi-
tions of non-degeneracy ensure the intersection of any subset of covering elements must be
transverse and consequently each combination of (m′−1) covering elements must intersect
with dimension 1. Therefore a 0-dimension intersection in the covering is the end point of
exactly m′ distinct edges, each corresponding to a unique face in the simplicial complex,
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and locally η will satisfy the properties of non-ramification.
Remark
The term locally refers to nerve of the covering elements (and boundary faces) formed form
the point of intersection and those edges leading to it only.
Remark
Compare our definition of non-degeneracy with that used by Shapley in [Shapley, 1974].
Then the discussion above has already included points 2 and 3 of Shapley’s definition
(given in Chapter 1.7). Property 1 is also contained within the conditions of transversal
intersections. For if a covering element is not of dimension (m′ − 1) then any non-empty
intersection with this covering elemet would contradict the dimension of a transversal
intersection. Then since every covering element must be contained within the bounded
space P1 × · · · × PN , which is of dimension m′ − 1, all covering elements must be of the
required dimension.
Observe when the 0-dimensional intersection involves boundary faces there will be strictly
less than m′ edges which have the original intersection as an end point. This is because
each edge leading to the intersection corresponds to a face in the nerve shared between two
maximal simplices. Therefore if faces of a simplex belong to the boundary the number of
edges the original intersection is an end point to must be reduced. However the nerve will
remain locally non-ramified.
In light of this, and Definition 2.19, we deduce the nerve of any non-degenerate game will
satisfy the following definition.
Definition 4.17 (Non-Degenerate Nerve)
The nerve η of a non-degenerate generalised game Γ∗ satisfies the following three properties:
1. dim η = m′ − 1
2. Locally each intersection in the covering corresponds to a simplex satisfying the con-
ditions of non-ramification.
3. The process of regularisation over the entire nerve η results in a non-ramified sim-
plicial complex.
Relating back to the Shapley’s interpretation of the Lemke-Howson paper, we comment
on one final observation. In Chapter 3.6 we discussed how taking the dual or nerve of the
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simplicial complex S would result in an object satisfying Shapley’s definition of F1×F2 (to
the appropriate dimension). Constructing the nerve of the coverings over P will result in a
simplicial complex, which we will show satisfies the definition of S, and further the nerve
of this complex will produce a labelled covering isomorphic to the original. Consequently
the coverings defined over P can be associated to the graph F1×F2, i.e., nodes/edges in P
(formed as a result of covering elements intersecting) correspond to nodes/edges in F1×F2.
Of course this is all with dimension considerations in mind (See Chapter 3.6).
4.5 Proving Nash’s Theorem
Our description of a non-cooperative generalised game Γ∗ has been shown to be a simplicial
complex. Therefore to prove Nash’s Theorem for non-degenerate games we need to first
show the nerve η is non-degenerate, and so in particular η satisfies Definition 4.17, and
secondly that η is a particular example of the simplicial game complex S as given in
Definition 3.1. Once this has been achieved we can apply Nash’s Theorem for Simplicial
Game Complexes, Theorem 3.11, to η to achieve our result.
We begin by proving η satisfies Definition 4.17 (we will se this will necessarily include a
process to ensure η also satisfies the boundary conditions of S). Properties 1 and 2 are
automatic from the definition of transverse intersections. This just leaves property 3 and
the use of regularisation to form a non-ramified simplicial complex. The following example
illustrates a case where regularisation is required.
Example 4.18
Continuing from Example 4.12. From Figure 4.7 it is clear that at any point of intersection
within P there can be at most two covering elements associated to any given player. We
focus our attention to intersections involving the maximum of six covering elements. It
is easy to construct examples where such covering elements have either 0,1 or 2 points of
intersection. In this example we assume the latter case for illustration. Observe if all six
covering elements have a non-empty intersection then by Lemma 4.15, such points must
necessarily be equilibrium situations of Γ∗. Fix one pair of covering elements and consider
the intersection of the coverings elements for the remaining two player’s. The fixed covering
elements will form a “cylinder”, as seen in Figure 4.7. Therefore consider the intersection
under investigation as the intersection of covering elements associated to 2 player’s over a
cylinder. Figure 4.16 shows the fixed cylinder and the two coverings for the remaining 2
player’s.
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e
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Figure 4.16: Intersection of 6 covering elements occuring at 2 distinct points
In Figure 4.16 the line joining c and e defines one covering while the line joining d and f
defines the second covering. These coverings clearly intersect in 2 distinct places.
In the nerve η, intersections A and B are both represented by the same simplex ∆. As
such within the nerve environment it will be impossible to distinguish between these two
situations. Now consider the larger simplicial complex and let ∆c,∆d,∆e and ∆f represent
the intersections labelled c, d, e, f respectively in Figure 4.16. Then each of these simplices
share a face with ∆. However ∆c and ∆e share the same face of ∆ and consequently the
conditions of non-ramification are violated. The same is true for ∆d and ∆f .
Let Λ denote the shared face of ∆, ∆c and ∆e. To rectify the problem of non-ramification
perform the regularisation operation, Definition 2.17, on simplices ∆c and ∆e. Then ∆c
and ∆e become detached from ∆ and Λ now satisfies the conditions of non-ramification.
Repeating for ∆d and ∆f will result in ∆ becoming disconnected from the nerve and as such
we can remove it from the simplicial complex. Recall ∆ corresponds to two equilibrium
situations. Therefore, after the removal of ∆, the parity of equilibrium simplices in η will
be equal to the parity of equilibrium situations in Γ. In terms of the covering, this process
has the affect of perturbing the covering elements into a covering belonging to the family
shown in Figure 4.17.
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Figure 4.17: Empty intersetion of 6 covering elements
It is clear the coverings shown in Figure 4.17 is an example where the six covering elements
have an empty intersection.
(End Example)
We return to the nerve η and to examining the form of this simplicial complex. Recall
in the non-degenerate generalised game dim η = m′ − 1. Consider an intersection of m′
covering elements and boundary faces and let this situation be represented by ∆ in the
nerve. First consider the scenario when this intersection is a single point, and in particular
is connected. Then since Γ∗ is non-degenerate each face of ∆ must represent at most one
1-dimensional edge in the covering and consequently each face belongs to at most one other
simplex. Therefore at such points the simplicial complex is non-ramified and no work needs
to be done.
Now consider the case when the same set of covering elements and boundary faces intersect
in multiple disjoint places, as seen in Example 4.18, then each connected component of
the intersection will be represented by the same simplex ∆. In particular assume a set
of m′ covering elements and boundary faces have a non-empty intersection occurring in k
isolated points, Tj , j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Then locally, by non-degeneracy, each intersection must
behave as in the simple case described in the previous paragraph when k = 1. Therefore,
since Γ∗ is a non-degenerate game, leading from each vertex must be at most m′ distinct
edges, each one corresponding to a maximal face of ∆.
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In the covering, all of the edges formed from the intersection of (m′−1) of the m′ covering
elements and boundary faces under consideration can be divided into two sets: internal and
external. An internal edge connects 2 of the vertices from the set of k isolated intersections,
the rest are external. For all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k} and for each intersection Tj we define the
following k sets:
Ej ∪ {Eji | i ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , N}} (4.15)
where Ej contain those edges with Tj as an end point and an empty intersection with all
other Ti, and the set Eij contains those edges which have vertices Ti and Tj as an end
points. The union of these sets form the set of all edges leading from Tj such that no edge
appears in multiple sets. Observe the union E :=
⋃k
j=1Ej contains all external edges.
If external edge e1 belongs to Ej for all j = {1, . . . , k} then the number of times this edge
is classified as external (and hence belongs to the set E) is equal to the number of vertices
k. Without loss of generality assume e1 ∈ E12 then we must have e1 ∈ E21 and by the
properties of non-degeneracy e1 6∈ E1 and e1 6∈ E2. Assume in addition e1 6∈ E3. Then
e1 ∈ E3j for some j ∈ {1, 2, 4, . . . , N}. However since we know e1 ∈ E12 and e1 ∈ E21 by
degeneracy conditions we also have j 6= {1, 2}. Therefore for some l ∈ {4, . . . , N} we have
e1 ∈ E3l and therefore e1 6∈ El either. Consequently the parity of the occurrence of a given
edge as an external edge coincides with the parity of k. In particular all external edges
occur with the same parity.
Assume e1 belongs to Ej for M1 intersections Tj where 1 ≤M1 ≤ k. Then e1 corresponds to
the face Λ1 of ∆ which also belongs to M1 additional (maximal) simplices in η. Label these
additional simplices by ∆1, . . . ,∆M1 and assume M1 ≥ 2 as then Λ1 fails the conditions of
non-ramification. While possible arbitrarily pair simplices ∆1, . . . ,∆M1 and perform the
detachment operation with respect to Λ1. If M1 is even, after regularisation ∆ no longer
shares the face Λ1 with a second maximal simplex in η and thus becomes detached. If M1 is
odd then ∆ shares Λ1 with just one other maximal simplex and thus ∆ remains connected
in the simplicial complex and the conditions of non-ramification are met. Repeat for all
external edges. Since for all external edges ei ∈ E, Mi is of the same parity as M1, ∆ is
either completely detached from the nerve, in which case we can remove it, or all faces of ∆
are non-ramified. However the parity of Mi is also equal to the parity of k and we observe
either all k vertices are equilibrium situations or none of them are. Therefore removing ∆
in the case k is even is equivalent to excluding an even number of equilibrium situations
from η. When k is odd regularisation removes all but 1 equilibrium simplex or an even
109
number of equilibrium situations. In either case the resulting simplicial complex η is a
non-ramified simplicial complex of dimension (m′ − 1) such that the parity of equilibrium
simplices in η is equal to the parity of equilibrium situations in Γ∗.
Remark
By construction of the nerve, any edge not belonging to Ej , for any j ∈ {1, . . . , N},
corresponds to a face belonging to ∆ only.
Remark
For j = {1, . . . , k} let ej be an edge with end point Tj such that all ej are formed from
the same set of covering elements and boundary faces. Then if k is odd at least one
ej ∈ Ej is external. In particular each face of ∆ is shared with at least one other maximal
simplex in η. This is not the case when k is even and this introduces the complication of
additional boundary faces. However in this case regularisation detaches ∆ from η and as
such, problems surrounding the boundary are removed.
The process described above assumes if the face Λ belongs to simplices ∆,∆1, . . .∆l, where
l ≥ 2 so the property of non-ramification fails, then ∆ 6= ∆1 6= . . . 6= ∆l. In particular
each edge which corresponds to the face Λ of ∆ has a second distinct end point. We now
consider when this condition does not hold. To do this we need the following definition.
Definition 4.19 (Multiple Edge)
Call e a multiple edge if there is at least one other edge e′ 6= e which corresponds to the
same face Λ of ∆ and ∆′. Call the number of such edges the multiplicity of ∆′ and of e.
Remark
If in the nerve e represents the face Λ shared by simplices ∆,∆1 then e is said to have
multiplicity 1 if a second edge e′ which also corresponds to the same face Λ of simplices ∆
and ∆1 cannot be identified.
Definition 4.20 (Single Edge)
If an edge e is not a multiple edge then call e a single edge.
For the set T1, . . . , Tk of isolated points, let e and e′ both be external edges represented
by the face Λ in η. Then if for both e and e′, Λ corresponds to the same simplex ∆′ the
edge e (and consequently e′) has multiplicity 2 (provided no other edge e′′ also satisfies
this condition, in which case the multiplicity will increase). In particular e′ is the result of
the intersection of the same (m′ − 1) covering elements and boundary faces as e and e∪ e′
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forms a disconnected edge within the covering. It follows that if e is a multiple edge there
is another set of isolated points T ′1, . . . , T ′k′ for which e (and e
′) is a multiple external edge.
Suppose edge e has multiplicity h ≥ 2. Then within the covering there are h edges leading
to h different end points. However within the nerve these points are represented by a single
face and a single simplex and in particular the property of non-ramification holds. When
h is even this can interfere with the outcome of the regularisation process described previ-
ously. In the case when all edges are single edges (i.e. all external edges have multiplicity
1), when k is even we showed regularisation removed the simplex ∆ from the nerve and
when k is odd ∆ remained and satisfied the conditions of non-ramification. If this was
not the case then either the parity of equilibrium simplices is not equal to the parity of
equilibrium situations in the game or we introduce boundary faces in η which do not satisfy
Definition 3.1. Therefore we need to produce the same result when the covering contains
multiple edges. Assume there is a face Λ of ∆ which corresponds to a simplex ∆1 more
than once, in particular we can identify at least one multiple edge. Then while the pair ∆
and ∆1 satisfy the conditions of non-ramification (considered in isolation from the rest of
the simplicial complex) they represent multiple situations in the game.
For each face Λ of the simplex ∆ there are four scenarios which can arise and these are
presented now along with the action required to ensure the the nerve not only satisfies the
definition of non-degeneracy but also the boundary requirements of S. Recall k denotes
the maximum number of isolated points represented by ∆ and we are assuming there is at
least one multiple edge. Additionally, from above, we know the parity of external edges
(counted with multiplicities) is equal to the parity of k and if e is a multiple edge. We do
not assume the multiplicity of each multiple edge leading from ∆ is of the same parity.
• Case 1: k is even and Λ corresponds to an even number of single edges
In η the face Λ corresponds to an even number of edges in the covering. Since
an even number of these are single edges it must be that an even number have a
multiplicity greater than or equal to 2. Further we can deduce there must be an
even number (or zero) of multiple edges with odd multiplicity. If simplex ∆1 is
of odd multiplicity then in the covering ∆1 represents an odd number of (possibly
equilibrium) situations from the game. Equivalently in the nerve representation an
even number of such situations are ignored thus the parity remains unchanged. This
is not the case when the multiplicity of ∆1 is even. In this case an odd number of
situations are excluded and we cannot compare the parity of equilibrium simplices in
η to equilibrium situations from Γ∗. Since it is only the simplices of even multiplicity
which cause problems, identify all simplices of odd multiplicity and those which can
111
be identified as the end points of a single edge (single simplices) into a single
set. In this case this set will contain an even number of simplices. Arbitrarily
pair these simplices together, then perform the detachment operation as described
previously with respect to the shared face Λ and simplex ∆. After this process has
been completed ∆ only shares a face with simplices of even multiplicity.
When k is even we saw previously this may introduce boundary faces in η which fail
Definition 3.1 therefore our aim is to remove ∆ during regularisation. To achieve
this detach every single simplex ∆′ of even multiplicity from Λ. Then regularisation
(Definition 2.17) will remove ∆ from the nerve, thus removing an even number of
equilibrium situations and any unwanted ‘boundary faces’ introduced during detach-
ment.
• Case 2: k is even and Λ corresponds to an odd number of single edges
Once again the face Λ corresponds to an even number of edges in the covering. This
time an odd number of these are single edges and so an odd number must be multiple
edges. In particular there must be an odd number of edges with odd multiplicity.
Then the set of single simplices and simplices of odd multiplicity contains an even
number of elements. Repeat as in Case 1 to achieve the same result.
• Case 3: k is odd and Λ corresponds to an even number of single edges
In this case Λ now represents an odd number of edges of which an odd number must
be multiple edges of odd multiplicity. Now the set of single simplices and simplices of
odd multiplicity contains an odd number of elements. While possible pair simplices
from this set together and detach with respect to face Λ. Then ∆ shares the face
Λ with one simplex from this set and regularisation does not remove ∆ from the
nerve as seen in Cases 1 and 2. Finally detach all simplices which occur with an
even multiplicity from the face Λ to prevent problems with non-ramification. Then
∆ satisfies the conditions of non-ramification and the difference between equilibrium
situations and simplices is an even number.
• Case 4: k is odd and Λ corresponds to an odd number of non-multiple
edges
In this final case Λ once again corresponds to an odd number of edges but this time
there must be an even number of edges with odd multiplicity so once again the set of
single simplices and simplices of odd multiplicity contains an odd number of elements.
Repeat as in Case 3 to achieve the same result.
We now reach our final consideration. So far we have considered non-ramification from the
view point of a fixed simplex ∆, where ∆ may have a face Λ which belongs to 2 or more
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additional simplices. In the covering this is equivalent to a disconnected edge e where at
least one end point of every connected component corresponds to the same simplex ∆ in
η. We now consider the scenario where a (m′ − 2)-face Λ belongs to more than 2 distinct
simplices but where the end points of the connected components of the corresponding edge
e in the covering need not be represented by the same simplex.
For ease of representation we consider each connected component of e as a separate edge.
Then these edges can be classified as either closed or open. A closed edge will have 2
distinct end points which will correspond to two distinct simplices ∆1,∆2 in the nerve with
shared face Λ. An open edge will have just 1 end point and so (with respect to this one
edge) Λ belongs to just one simplex and thus is a boundary face.
Suppose Λ is the face of simplices ∆1, . . . ,∆l. Then by the previous cases we can assume no
simplex represents more than one situation in the game and thus they must all be distinct.
Observe that the definition of external and internal no longer applies in this setting as
the points of non-ramification to which these are associated have now been removed. We
partition the l simplices into two sets, depending on if they correspond to an end point of
an edge which is closed or open. Let the first set contain the l1 simplices corresponding to
closed edges, then these simplices must necessarily occur in pairs. The second set consists of
the remaining l2 simplices corresponding to the open edges. Note it must be that l = l1+l2.
For every pair of (m′− 1)-simplices in the first set perform the detachment operation with
respect to Λ. Follow this by the detachment of every individual (m′ − 1)-simplex in the
second set with respect to Λ. Then Λ is detached from the nerve and so is removed during
regularisation. Repeat for all faces Λ which satisfy this property; this will necessarily be
the remaining faces in η which fail the conditions of non-ramification.
Finally we show our regularised simplicial complex η satisfies Definition 3.1. The first
step to achieve this is to describe Γ∗ in the same terminology as S. Let m′ = {1, . . . ,m′}
where m′ =
∑N
i=1 li and define φ
′ to be a bijective labelling function from S1× · · · ×SN
to m′. Then there is a natural partition of m′ into sets m′i = {mi−1 + 1, . . . ,mi} where
for all i = {1, . . . , N}, φ(Si) = mi. Therefore we have |Si| = li = mi − mi−1. Label
the vertices of η from the set m′ according to the following rules. A vertex associated to
covering element Bi(s) is labelled by φ(s). If a vertex is associated to the boundary face
which contains all mixed strategy situations not involving s′ ∈ S := S1 × · · · × · · ·SN then
label the vertex by φ(s′) (this choice will be unique, no two boundary faces will have the
same label and all labels from the set S will be used exactly once). Let ∆ be a maximal
simplex then ∆ represents a situation form Γ∗. Let W ′∆,i be the subset of vertices from
v(∆) associated to covering elements with label from m′i and Σ
′
∆,i be the subset of vertices
from v(∆) associated to boundary faces with labels from m′i. This is the direct analogy
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of W∆,i and Σ∆,i from Definition 3.1. Then for all players i = {1, . . . , N} those vertices in
Σ′∆,i define the situation ∆ represents in P by identifying the pure strategies not used by
player i, or equivalently selected with probability 0 in their mixed strategy. The sets W ′∆,i
then identify player i’s optimal pure strategies for the situation represented by ∆. Recall
for all i = {1, . . . , n}, Pi is a simplex of dimension mi − mi−1 − 1, therefore inline with
Definition 3.1 the simplex Pi is equivalent to the simplex Σmi .
Properties 1 and 2 of Definition 3.1 are confirmed by a simple observation. For all i =
{1, . . . , N}, the sets Σ′∆,i contain vertices from the simplex Pi ⊂ P . Recall the nerve of P
is equal to ∂P1 ∗ · · · ∗ ∂PN . Then the restriction of η to vertices from v(P1)∪ · · · ∪ v(PN ) is
equal to the union of (Σ′∆,1 ∪ · · · ∪Σ′∆,N ) for all maximal simplices ∆, this by definition of
the covering must be equal to the nerve of P . For the second property it is clear W∆,i 6= ∅
for all i = {1, . . . , N}.
Observe property 4 of Definition 3.1 contains two parts. The first is the verification η is a
non-ramified simplicial complex, which we have just shown, and second the boundary of η
coincides with the boundary of S.
Lemma 4.21
For a non-degenerate game Γ∗, the boundary of η satisfies the definition of ∂S.
Proof. Let ∆ be a maximal simplex in S, then the face Λ ⊂ ∆ belongs to the boundary
of η iff that face does not belong to any other simplex. Equivalently the set of covering
elements and boundary faces which form Λ all have a non-empty intersection with exactly
one other covering element or boundary face. It is clear to see, the properties of non-
ramification (which can be assumed by the above) only ensure this can happen when
all vertices associated to a player i represent boundary faces of Pi. Equivalently, in the
corresponding face, no vertex with a label from Si is associated to a covering element.
Therefore ∆ has a face on the boundary exactly when W ′∆,i contains one element.
Finally, property 3 is equivalent to determining Lemma 3.8 holds for the non-degenerate
simplicial game complexes; as it property 3 which ensures this result and consequently the
proof of Nash’s Theorem for Simplicial Game Complexes, Theorem 3.11.
For clarity we introduce some new notation. Let Γ∗N be the N -player non-cooperative
generalised game where each player’s optimal strategies are determined using a total order
i over P . Now define Γ∗N−1 to be the restriction of Γ∗N to an N − 1-player game. In
particular assume player N fixes his strategy choice to slNN ∈ SN and the remaining players
determine their optimal strategies once again using the total order i but this time over
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the set P (N) := P1 × · · · × · · · × PN−1 × {slNN }. Then observe P (N) is a face of the product
space P and Γ∗N−1 is the game described by the N − 1 coverings over the face P (N) ⊂ P .
Let ηN be the nerve formed from the game Γ∗N then we have already shown that this can be
compared directly to SN = S (with the exception of property 3). Then if η′ is the nerve for
the sub-game Γ∗N−1 the same regularisation procedure can be carried out to demonstrate
it satisfies the definition of SN−1 = S ′.
Suppose ηN is regular (Definition 2.20) then we can attain the subcomplex η′ representing
the (N − 1)-player game in the same manner as described in Definition 3.6. However since
the co-dimension of ηN and η′ is at least 2 we cannot determine if η′ is also a non-ramified
complex. If η′ is regular then we are done. Alternatively we perform the detachment
operation on η′ as described above for the case when ηN is not regular. Therefore for this
case Lemma 3.8 applies and property 3 of Definition 3.1 is satisfied.
Alternatively ηN needs to be regularised before it satisfies the conditions of non-ramification.
However due to the nature of the regularisation operation there is no clear way of arriving
at η′ from ηN (unlike the case when ηN is regular). This has the affect of being unable
to use Lemma 3.8 so we provide Lemma 4.23 in its place. Assume the notations η′ and
ηN refer to non-ramified simplicial complexes and therefore may have been subjected to
regularisation.
Definition 4.22 (Sub-equilibrium Situation)
Define a sub-equilibrium situation to be one where all conditions of an equilibrium situation
are satisfied except perhaps with regards to pure strategy slNN ∈ SN . In terms of the N
coverings over P a sub-equilibrium situation is represented by the intersection of m′ − 1
covering elements and boundary faces labelled by {1, . . . ,mn − 1}.
Lemma 4.23
If there are an odd number of equilibrium simplices in η′ then there are an odd number of
equilibrium simplices in ηN .
Proof. Assume there are an odd number of equilibrium simplices in η′ then by Lemma 4.15
(and regularisation discussions) there are an odd number of equilibrium situations in the
game Γ∗N−1.
Recall Γ∗N−1 is represented by a covering which appears across a face belonging to the
boundary of P . In particular within the join P (N) ∗σ, where σ ⊂ PN and v(σ) = {mn−1 +
115
1, . . . ,mn−1}, we can identify an odd number of sub-equilibrium situations in the (m′−2)-
faces of P . Observe this process must define all sub-equilibrium situations belonging to
the boundary of P .
By definition, sub-equilibrium situations belonging to the boundary of P are represented
as sub-equilibrium faces lying in the boundary of ηN . For ηN create the graph G as defined
in Definition 3.10, then the number of extreme vertices in G is equal to the number of sub-
equilibrium faces lying in ∂ηN . Therefore G contains an odd number of extreme vertices
and by Lemma 2.22 Γ∗N must have an odd number of equilibrium situations.
Consequently when the simplicial complex is a nerve of a covering defined via a total order
and is not regular an equivalent form of Lemma 3.8 has been proved. In particular for
simplicial complexes satisfying this property Lemma 4.23 should be used in place of Lemma
3.8 in the proof of Theorem 3.11, Nash’s Theorem for Simplicial Complexes.
We now prove Nash’s Theorem for non-degenerate generalised games.
Theorem 4.24 (Generalised Nash’s Theorem for Non-Degenerate Games)
There are a finite and odd number of equilibrium situations in a non-degenerate generalised
game Γ∗.
Proof. For a non-degenerate, generalised game Γ∗ we know the associated nerve η is finite
and so the number of equilibrium situations it contains must be finite too. Additionally
we know η a non-ramified simplicial complex without changing the parity of equilibrium
situations it represents. In particular, in this form η is a simplicial complex satisfying the
definition to be a non-degenerate simplicial game complex S of the order n as defined in
Definition 3.1. If η is regular then use Theorem 3.11 directly to show η contains a finite
and odd number of equilibrium simplices.
Alternatively if η needs to be regularised then Nash’s Theorem for Simplicial Game Com-
plexes, as proved for simplicial complexes defined as nerves using Lemma 4.23, should be
used. Then the result is once again achieved directly and η contains a finite and odd
number of equilibrium simplices.
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In both cases, Lemma 4.15 can then be used to demonstrate Γ∗ contains a finite and odd
number of equilibrium situations.
Remark
Restricting ourselves to games which generate regular nerves, and hence do not require
Lemma 4.23, is an interesting and rich area of game theory. However we will not pursue
this interesting area in this Thesis.
4.6 Nash’s Theorem for Traditional Non-Cooperative Games
We observed earlier in this Chapter any result for generalised games defined via a total
order would automatically hold for traditional games defined by polylinear payoff functions.
In particular Theorem 4.24 proves Nash’s Theorem, as given in Theorem 1.13, for non-
degenerate non-cooperative traditional games. However generalised games may require
Lemma 4.23 to complete the proof. We now show this Lemma is not necessary in the
traditional case.
Let ΓN represent anN -player non-degenerate, non-cooperative traditional game where each
player’s payoff function Gi : P 7→ R is polylinear. Then ΓN−1 is the N −1-player subgame
of ΓN defined when player N fixes his strategy choice to s
lN
N ∈ SN and the payoff functions
for the remaining N − 1 player’s i = {1 . . . , N − 1} are defined by Gi : P (N)×{slNN } 7→ R.
Observe ΓN−1 is contained within PN−1 := P1 × · · · × PN−1 × {slNN } which is a face of the
product space P . In particular ΓN−1 is the game described by the N − 1 coverings over
the face P (N) ⊂ P .
Let ηN be the nerve of the game ΓN then we have already shown this can be compared
directly to SN = S. Equivalently if η′ is the nerve of the sub-game ΓN−1 then regularisation
can once again be applied to ensure it satisfies the definition of SN−1 = S ′. The nerve
ηN will either be regular or regularisation will be required in order for it to be a non-
ramified simplicial complex. In the first case regularisation is not required and we repeat
the argument from the previous section. In particular it must be that η′ can be constructed
from ηN in the same manner as described in Definition 3.6. If necessary regularise η′ then
Lemma 3.8 applies and property 3 of Definition 3.1 is satisfied.
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Alternatively ηN is regularised to form a non-degenerate simplicial complex. Then in
this case there is no clear way of arriving at η′ from ηN . This has the affect of being
unable to use Lemma 3.8. To overcome this, without using Lemma 4.23, we make use
of a famous result by Bubelis [Bubelis, 1979] which states any N -player non-degenerate,
non-cooperative game can be reduced to a 3-player game such that the equilibria in one
corresponds to the equilibria in the other. This is also described in Chapter 2, Section 6
of [Vorob’ev, 1994].
By Bubelis’ Theorem, ΓN can be translated into a 3-player game, Γ3, such that the set
of equilibrium situations in ΓN has a direct correspondence to the equilibria points in Γ3.
Equivalently if η3 represents the nerve of Γ3 then the number of equilibrium situations
represented in η3 is equal to the number in ηN . Observe the subgame associated to η3 is a
bimatrix game Γ2 with nerve η2 where the codimension of η2 in η3 is at least 2. Therefore
the regularisation procedure applied to η3 (if required) does not affect η2. Then by Theorem
5.1 (stated and proved in the following chapter, Chapter 5) η2 is regular. As such η2 satisfies
the definition of S ′, regardless of the need for η3 to be regularised. Therefore once again
Lemma 3.8 applies and property 3 of Definition 3.1 is satisfied. In particular the proof of
Theorem 4.24 can use Theorem 3.11 as originally poved using Lemma 3.8.
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Chapter 5
Bimatrix Games
In Chapter 3 we defined the simplicial game complex S and in Chapter 4 showed its de-
scription contained the simplicial complexes generated from our definition of generalised
games. Observe the number of players in a game Γ∗ is equal to the order of the correspond-
ing simplicial complex S. In this Chapter we first show the nerve of traditional bimatrix
games Γ are non-ramified simplicial complexes without the need for regularisation. We
then suggest an alternative, and simpler, formalisation of the simplicial game complex S
for this important subclass of games. For this new simplicial complex we replicate the
proofs of the previous two chapters and show our simplification is a specific form of the
general case.
5.1 Nerves of Bimatrix Games
Lemma 5.1
For every non-degenerate bimatrix game Γ, the nerve of the coverings generated by the
polylinear payoff functions G1 and G2 is a regular non-ramified simplicial complex of the
appropriate dimension.
Proof. In Γ observe all covering elements defined by G1 and G2 are convex polyhedra. In
particular for i = {1, 2} the covering with respect to player i over P consists of a maximum
of li connected covering elements where each pure strategy s
j
i ∈ Si describes at most one
set Bi(s
j
i ). Therefore the intersection between any pair of covering elements (and boundary
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faces) must be a connected subset of P and as such η is a non-ramified simplicial complex.
The conditions of non-degeneracy ensures η is of the correct dimension and the boundary
conditions automatically follow through from Lemma 4.21. Consequently the nerve η is a
regular simplicial complex of appropriate dimension as required.
5.2 An Alternative Simplicial Game Complex
Let S∗ denote the new formalisation of the simplicial game complex S. For a finite natural
number m the simplicial game complex S∗ will rely on the partitioning of the set m :=
{1, . . . ,m} into two elements. For i = {1, 2} each partition element is defined by mi =
{mi−1 + 1, . . . ,mi} with m0 = 0, m2 = m and |mi| > 1 such that m = m1 ∪m2 but
m1 ∩m2 = ∅. Once again let V denote the set of vertices of S∗ where V satisfies the
condition |V | ≥ m+ 2. We define φ : V 7→m to be a surjective labelling function which
assigns each vertex in S∗ a unique label from a set of m possibilities. We can then identify
and fix a subset V ′ ⊂ V such that the restriction of φ to V ′ is bijective. Within the set
V \ V ′ we insist on being able to define two non-empty subsets, W1 and W2, such that
φ(Wi) ⊂ mi. Denote by Σmi the simplex with vertices in V ′ such that φ(v(Σmi)) = mi
then the dimension of Σmi is |mi| − 1 = (mi −mi−1 − 1). We now use these preliminary
notations to define our finite combinatorial simplicial game complex S∗ with set of vertices
V .
Definition 5.2 (Simplicial Game Complex S∗)
For i, j = {1, 2} and i 6= j, define S1i to be ∂Σmj . Then S2i is an arbitrary complex with
set of vertices (v(Σmj ) ∪Wi) such that
(i) The restriction of S2i on V ′ coincides with S1i
(ii) After the removal of some (possible zero) simplices from S2i \ S1i, the complex S2i
becomes an (m−mi+mi−1−n+1) = (m−mi+mi−1−1) dimensional pseudomanifold
with boundary S1i.
The simplicial game complex S∗ is then the join defined by S∗ := S21 ∗ S22. If S21 and
S22 are already simplicial pseudo-manifolds, the simplicial game complex S∗ is called non-
degenerate.
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Remark
The process of the removal of simplices in (ii) of Definition 5.2 is not unique and may
result in different pseudomanifolds for different processes.
Remark
The condition to be a pseudomanifold with boundary can be replaced by a weaker condition
to be a non-ramified complex with boundary i.e. satisfying axiom 2 of Definition 2.7.
The definition of equilibrium simplices within the simplicial game complex S∗ is iden-
tical to that given in Definition 3.3.
We now formulate and prove Nash’s Theorem for our simplicial game complex S∗.
Theorem 5.3 (Nash’s Theorem for Non-Degenerate Simplicial Game Complex S∗)
Every non-degenerate simplicial game complex S∗ contains a finite and odd number of
equilibrium simplices.
Proof. We begin by identifying a (m− 1)-sub-equilibrium simplex lying in S∗.
Let γ2 be the (m−m1− 2)-face of S11(= ∂Σm2) such that φ(v(γ2)) = {m1 + 1, . . . ,m− 1}.
Recall S11 is the boundary of S21 then since γ2 is a (maximal) simplex of S11 it must
be that γ2 lies in the boundary of S21. By definition, S21 is a non-ramified complex of
dimension (m−m1 +m0− 1) = m−m1− 1 and therefore we are able to identify a unique
vertex x from the set W1 such that the simplex γ2 ∗ {x} lies in S21. We assume without
loss of generality φ(x) = ` ∈m1.
Within S12 there is a face γ1 such that φ(v(γ1)) = {1, . . . , ` − 1, ` + 1, . . . ,m1}. Since
S∗ = S21 ∗ S22, the simplex γ1 ∗ γ2 ∗ {x} is a (m− 2)-dimensional sub-equilibrium simplex
contained in S∗.
By definition the dimension of S∗ is given by
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dimS∗ = dim(S21 ∗ S22)
= dim(S21) + dim(S22) + 1
= (m−m1 +m0 − 1) + (m−m2 +m1 − 1) + 1
= m− 1 (since m0 = 0 and m2 = m) (5.1)
and since S22 also satisfies the properties of non-ramification, we are able to identify a
unique vertex y ∈ W2 such that γ1 ∗ γ2 ∗ {x, y} is a (m − 1) simplex in S∗. It is clear
φ(v(γ1 ∗ γ2 ∗ {x, y})) ⊇ {1, . . . ,m− 1} and therefore this simplex is sub-equilibrium.
Construct the undirected graph G = (V,E), as defined in Definition 3.10 then, by the above
discussion, V 6= ∅. In line with Lemma 2.22 describe a vertex v ∈ V as normal if the
simplex it represents in S∗ is equilibrium. Then the property of non-ramification ensures
the degree of a normal vertex can be at most one and that of a non-normal vertex at most
2. Such vertices are extreme if they are of degree 0 and 1 respectively. We complete the
proof by determining there are an odd number of extreme vertices in G. On completion
of this Lemma 2.22 can be used to deduce there are an odd number of normal vertices
and hence equilibrium simplices in S∗. We refer to the vertices in V by the simplices they
represent in S∗.
We claim γ1 ∗ γ2 ∗ {x, y} is the only extreme vertex in G.
We first prove γ1 ∗ γ2 ∗ {x, y} is an extreme vertex in G. This requires us to distinguish
between the equilibrium and sub-equilibrium cases. Recall γ1∗γ2∗{x, y} is sub-equilibrium
and it is only the label assigned to y which is unknown. However we do know y is an element
of W2 and so in particular we must have φ(y) ∈ m2 = {m1 + 1, . . . ,m}. This leaves us
with two cases to consider, the first when φ(y) = m and the second when φ(y) 6= m.
In case 1 we assume φ(y) = m and so γ1 ∗ γ2 ∗ {x, y} is an equilibrium simplex. It is
therefore a normal vertex in G and is extreme if and only if it is of degree 0. By definition,
equilibrium simplices contain just one sub-equilibrium face, which in this case is given by
γ1 ∗γ2 ∗{x}. Since we know γ1 belongs to the boundary of S22 and γ2 ∗{x} belongs to S21,
by recalling S∗ = S21 ∗ S22, Lemma 2.10 determines γ1 ∗ γ2 ∗ {x} is a boundary face of S∗.
Therefore γ1 ∗γ2 ∗ {x, y} does not share its only sub-equilibrium face with another simplex
in S∗ and consequently the corresponding vertex in G is of degree 0 and is extreme.
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For case 2 assume φ(y) 6= m then γ1 ∗ γ2 ∗ {x, y} is a sub-equilibrium simplex. For
γ1 ∗γ2 ∗{x, y} to be extreme we show this is a vertex of degree 1 in G. Within this simplex
there are two vertices with the same label. One of these vertices is necessarily y and let the
second be denoted by z then φ(y) = φ(z). Removing each vertex in turn will identify two
sub-equilibrium faces. The first will be γ1∗γ2∗{x} and is achieved by removing vertex {y}.
Repeating the argument used in case 1 will once again determine this is a boundary face
and consequently will not contribute to the degree of the vertex. To construct the second
sub-equilibrium face we remove vertex z. We express this face as the join of C(1) and C(2)
where C(i) is a simplex lying in S2i. Observe since φ(x) ∈ m1 and φ(z) ∈ m2 we cannot
have the scenario x = z and so the 1-simplex {x, z} must belong to the sub-equilibrium
face under consideration. In particular within each C(i) we can identify a vertex which does
not belong to the boundary. We use Lemma 2.10 once again, but this time we determine
the sub-equilibrium face does not lie in the boundary of S∗. Consequently it must also be
a sub-equilibrium face of another (sub)-equilibrium simplex in S∗ and the corresponding
vertex in G is of degree 1 and is extreme.
To complete the proof of our claim we show γ1 ∗ γ2 ∗ {x, y} is the only extreme vertex in
G. Since the number of extreme vertices in G is equal to the number of sub-equilibrium
simplices lying in the boundary of S∗ this is equivalent to showing the only sub-equilibrium
face in the boundary of S∗ is γ1 ∗ γ2 ∗ {x}.
Let Λ be a sub-equilibrium face on the boundary of S∗. Then by Lemma 2.10 we can
identify two simplices C(1) and C(2) such that Λ = C(1) ∗C(2) where either C(1) belongs to
S11 and C(2) belongs to S22 or vice-versa, so C(1) belongs to S12 and C(2) belongs to S21.
Assume initially C(1) lies in S11 and C(2) lies in S22. Then by definition, and since Λ is sub-
equilibrium, the vertex set of C(1) must satisfy the relation φ(v(C(1))) ⊂ {m1+1, . . . ,m−1}.
Therefore the remaining vertices, {1, . . . ,m1}, must be contained in C(2) and equivalently
C(2) must have Σm1 as a face. This contradicts the definition of S∗.
As a result it must be that C(1) lies in S12 and C(2) lies in S21. Then φ(v(C(1))) must
be a strict subset of {1, . . . ,m1} and the vertex labels {m1 + 1, . . . ,m − 1} must belong
to φ(v(C(2))). Since dim Λ = dim C(1) + dim C(2) + 1 = (m − 2) we must have dimC(1) =
(m1− 2) and dimC(2) = (m−m1− 1). We have identified (m−m1− 1) of the vertices for
C(2) and so there exists a unique vertex w ∈ V \V ′ such that C(2)∗{w} lies in S21. Therefore
w ∈ W1. By our assumption Λ is a sub-equilibrium so φ(v(C(1) ∗ {w})) = {1, . . . ,m1}. In
particular C(1) = γ1 and C(2) = γ2 ∗ {x} as required.
Therefore there is a unique sub-equilibrium face on the boundary of S∗ and thus there is
a unique extreme node in G. From Lemma 2.22 this tells us there are an odd number of
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normal nodes in G and consequently there must be an odd number of equilibrium simplices
in S∗. Finally since the simplicial game complex S∗ contains a finite number of vertices
there can only be a finite number of equilibrium simplices.
5.3 Simplicial Complexes of Order 2 and Lemke-Howson
Now we have a new formulation for simplicial game complexes of the order 2 we continue
our discussion from Chapter 3.6. Observe the simplicial complexes S21 and S22 have a
direct correspondence to the graphs F1 and F2 respectively (minus the artificial equilibrium
point). In particular construct the nerve of these simplicial complexes. Then if a face of
S21 is the convex hull of vertices with label set equal to K, in the nerve the same face
becomes a vertex labelled by K. It is clear, after the addition of the artificial equilibrium
point 0 as discussed in Chapter 3.6, the resulting nerve will satisfy the same definitions as
F1 and F2. Therefore the procedure described by Shapley can be identically repeated here
to achieve the same result in the same way as Lemke and Howson. This should come of
no surprise that this is the case.
Remark
Of course instead of adding the artificial equilibrium we can identify the only sub-equilibrium
simplex belonging to the boundary of S∗.
5.4 Nash’s Theorem for Bimatrix Games
Let η be the nerve constructed from the 2-player non-cooperative non-degenerate (tra-
ditional) game Γ. Then in order to determine the relationship between η and the new
simplicial game complex S∗ it is clear we need to define η as the join of two smaller sim-
plicial complexes. From Chapter 4 recall in an N -player game Γ each player’s polylinear
payoff function generates a covering of connected sets over the bounded space P (i). For all
i = {1, . . . , N} denote the nerve of this coverings (with boundary) by ηi. Then in Γ and
for i = {1, 2}, ηi is the nerve of the covering over the bounded simplex Pj , j = {1, 2}, j 6= i
formed with respect to payoff function Gi. In this 2-player case we claim η = η1 ∗ η2 and
its proof is a simple observation. By definition the boundary of η = η1 ∗ η2 is ∂P1 ∗ ∂P2
which is the nerve of P . Further if ∆ is a maximal simplex in η then the vertices in sets
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W ′∆,i and Σ
′
∆,i for i = {1, 2} can be associated to a unique simplex in ∆j ⊂ ηj for a unique
j ∈ {1, 2}. Consequently η is equivalent to taking the nerve of the two coverings formed
with respect to G1 and G2 over P2 and P1 respectively. Therefore η = η1 ∗ η2 as required.
As before we now redescribe the nerve η using the terminology and notation used to define
S∗ in Definition 5.2. In particular for i = {1, 2} each ηi will be described as the simplicial
complex S2i and as such the bimatrix game will correspond directly to the simplicial
complex S∗ = S21 ∗ S22.
The labelling of each vertex in ηi is achieved in the manner described in Chapter 4.3. In
particular for any maximal simplex ∆ in ηi we have v(∆) = W ′∆,i∪W ′∆,j∪Σ′∆,i∪Σ′∆,j where
W ′∆,j = Σ
′
∆,i = ∅, W∆,i 6= ∅ and Σ′∆,j maybe empty. The vertices in W ′∆,i correspond to
covering elements Bi(ski ) and as such are labelled by the appropriate s
k
i ∈ Si. Any vertex
belonging to Σ′∆,j represents a boundary face of Pj . As before, across each boundary face
there exists a unique slj ∈ Sj which does not belong to the support of any mixed strategy
the face represents. Label the face by this pure strategy. Consequently the labelling
procedure for ηi ensures each vertex is assigned a unique label corresponding to strategies
from the set {S1 ∪ S2}. If |Si| = mi then the size of this labelling set is m1 + m2 = m′.
For the set of natural numbers m′ = {1, . . . ,m′} there is a natural bijection φ′ which
maps the set {S1 ∪ S2} into m′. In particular we may assume without loss of generality,
φ′(Si) = {mi−1 + 1, . . . ,mi} where m0 = 0 and m2 = m′. Observe since each player must
have at least two strategies it follows that |mi| ≥ 2 for i = {1, 2}. Assume without loss
of generality i = 1, then by definition the boundary of η1 is identical to the boundary of
the mixed strategy set P2 and so φ′(v(∂η1)) = φ′(v(P2)) = {m1 + 1, . . . ,m′}. In line with
Definition 5.2 assign Pi = Σmi then
∂η1 = ∂P2 = ∂Σm2 = S11 (5.2)
as required. Equivalently ∂η2 = S12 and the boundary of each ηi is identical to the
boundary of the simplicial complex S2i. This process has lead to the natural partition of
m′ into sets m1 = {1, . . . ,m1} and m2 = {m1 + 1, . . . ,m′}.
The set of vertices in η1 which are not described by ∂P2 represent player 1’s optimal
strategies for a given situation from P2. Denote this set of vertices by W ′1 (note W ′∆,1 ⊂W ′1
for every maximal simplex ∆ ⊂ η1). Player 1 must have at least one optimal strategy and
therefore W ′1 6= ∅. Further the labels associated to these vertices are a subset of m1 and
therefore W ′1 satisfy the same properties as the set W1 from Definition 3.1. Similarly
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let W ′2 denote the set of interior points of η2. We are then able to deduce the set of
vertices V ′ is equal to φ′(S1 ∪ S2) with the set of all vertices contained in η1 and η2 being
V = V ′ ∪ (W ′1) ∪ (W ′2).
Thus for i = {1, 2} the nerve ηi can be described as our simplicial complex S2i. It is left
to show each ηi also satisfies the following two additional properties required of S2i.
1. dim ηi = m′ −mi +mi−1 − 1
2. ηi satisfies the conditions of non-ramification
In Lemma 5.1 we observed the nerve η over P for a 2 player game Γ is a non-ramified
complex of dimensionm′−1. In particular each player’s payoff function generates a covering
where all covering elements are convex polyhedra such that no two covering elements share
the same label. Consequently it must also be the case that the nerves ηi, i = {1, 2} are
both non-ramified simplicial complexes.
Let ∆ represent a maximal simplex in η where sets Σ′∆,1 and Σ
′
∆,2 are maximal. Then
this intersection occurs at a vertex of the boundary and we must have dimPi + dimPj
boundary faces intersecting and 2 covering elements. In ηi this is equivalent to dimPj+1 =
(mj −mj−1 − 1) + 1 = mj −mj−1 vertices. Observe
mj −mj−1 = m′ − (mi −mi−1) = m′ −mi +mi−1 (5.3)
Therefore there exists a simplex in ηi of dimension (m′ − mi + mi−1 − 1) as required.
Repeating the argument in the proof of Lemma 4.16 determines this is the maximum
dimension we can expect when Γ is non-degenerate. Consequently η = η1 ∗η2 is equivalent
to Definition 5.2 and by Theorem 5.3 η contains an odd number of equilibrium simplices.
Repeating the argument from Lemma 4.15, regarding the relationship between equilibrium
situations and simplices, we can deduce there are finite and odd number of equilibrium
situations in the bimatrix game Γ.
Remark
In this section we have returned to using the traditional game Γ. We believe the result does
hold for the generalised game but additional work is needed to determine an appropriate
“regularisation” process which will ensure the nerves η1 and η2 are non-ramified simplicial
complexes.
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5.5 Comparison
5.5.1 Simplicial Complexes for Bimatrix Games
We now appear to have two simplicial game complex representations for bimatrix games
Γ, namely S and S∗. Therefore we use this section to show in this case the two definitions
coincide and in particular that S∗ satisfies Definition 3.1.
The first two properties of S as given in Definition 3.1 automatically hold for S∗ by Def-
inition 5.2. We also know each S2i is a non-ramified simplicial complex and so therefore
S∗ must be too. This just leaves the boundary, the subcomplex and ensuring S∗ is of the
correct dimension. We begin by addressing the latter.
The dimension of S2i as given in Definition 5.2 is (m−mi +mi−1 − 1). Then by (5.1) the
dimension of S∗ is equal to m′ − 1.
Therefore the dimension of S∗ is equal to the required dimension of S. Now consider the
boundary. We observe that since both S21 and S22 are bounded simplicial complexes then
S∗ must also be bounded. For contradiction we assume this boundary does not satisfy the
definition given for ∂S. Let ∆ be a (m− 1)-simplex in S∗ with a face, Λ, on the boundary
where φ(∆) = W∆,1∪W∆,2∪Σ∆,1∪Σ∆,2 such that neither W∆,1 or W∆,2 contains a unique
element. Recall sets Σ∆,1 and Σ∆,2 contain the boundary vertices of the simplex. Therefore
if a boundary face exists it must be constructed by removing a vertex from either of the sets
W∆,i. Assume without loss of generality Λ is a boundary face of ∆ which is constructed
by removing a vertex with label from m1 so belongs to the set W∆,1. Let the vertices of Λ
be divided into two sets WΛ,1,WΛ,2,ΣΛ,1 and ΣΛ,2 where as in Definition 3.1 WΛ,i contains
vertices from Λ belonging to Wi and ΣΛ,j contains the vertices from Λ belonging to Σmj .
By definition |W∆,1| 6= 1. Since each simplex must contain a vertex from W1 we must have
|W∆,1| > 1, and therefore the set WΛ,1 is not empty. Since the vertices in WΛ,1 are a strict
non-empty subset of W1 and WΛ,2 is also a non-empty subset of W2 the face Λ is the join
of a simplex from S21 and a simplex from S22. This contradicts the conditions given in
Lemma 2.10 to be a boundary face. Therefore if Λ is a boundary face of S∗ when at least
one of the sets WΛ,1 and WΛ,2 is empty. This just leaves the question of the subcomplex.
However Definition 3.6 and Lemma 3.8 can be applied here to ensure the result.
We have now successfully shown the simplicial complex S∗ satisfies the definition of the
simplicial game complex S of the order 2.
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5.5.2 Simplicial Complexes of the Order n
The definition of S∗ to be a simplicial game complex can be extended to represent games
with more than 2 players as follows. The preliminary description of S∗ will be indistin-
guishable from that given for S preceding Definition 3.1. Let S1i := ∂Σm1 ∗ · · · ∗ ∂Σmi−1 ∗
∂Σmi+1 ∗ · · · ∗ ∂Σmn then define S2i to be an arbitrary simplicial complex with vertex set
φ(v(S1i)) and Wi such that
1. The restriction of S2i on to V ′ is S1i.
2. After the removal of some (of possibly zero) simplices from S2i \S1i, the complex S2i
becomes an (m−mi + mi−1 − n + 1) dimensional non-ramified, bounded simplicial
complex. If S2i is already in this form then it is non-degenerate.
Then S∗ := S21 ∗ · · · ∗ S2n and is non-degenerate if, for all i = {1, . . . , n}, S2i is non-
degenerate.
Unfortunately, using the techniques from Chapter 3, the resulting simplicial game complex
can not be shown to contain a finite and odd number of equilibrium simplices. In particular
the resulting graph G fails to satisfy Lemma 2.22. Since this Lemma is the key concept
of Nash’s Theorem for simplicial game complexes this suggests the result is unlikely (but
not proven impossible) to be achieved in this setting. To understand why we first need to
consider the dimension of S∗.
By definition:
S∗ = S21 ∗ · · · ∗ S2n for n > 2
∴ dimS∗ = dimS21 + · · ·+ dimS2n + (n− 1)
= (m−m1 +m0 − n+ 1) + · · ·+ (m−mn +mn−1 − n+ 1) + (n− 1)
 m− 1 forn > 2 (5.4)
Our requirement that S∗ satisfies the condition of non-ramification only provides infor-
mation about those simplices in S∗ which are of maximal dimension. In particular the
property of non-ramification ensures each simplex of maximal dimensions shares a face
with at most one other maximal simplex; equivalently each face can belong to at most two
simplices. This property does not hold for simplices in S∗ which are of smaller dimension.
Figure 5.1 illustrates this by showing a simplicial complex of dimension 2.
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Figure 5.1: 2-dimensional non-ramified simplicial complex. Note that more than 2 edges
intersect at a point as non-ramification does not affect faces of this dimension.
In Figure 5.1 each 1-dimensional face within the complex belongs to at most 2 simplices
and so the conditions of non-ramification are satisfied, yet the highlighted vertex or 0-
dimensional simplex belongs to four 1-dimensional simplices and three 2-dimensional sim-
plices. This can be extended to any finite dimension.
When n = 2 the dimension of S∗ is (m−1). Therefore the equilibrium and sub-equilibrium
simplices under consideration are maximal simplices in S∗ and so their intersections within
the complex are restricted by the property of non-ramification. As such the vertices in the
graph G, as constructed in the proof of Theorem 3.11, will be of degree less than or
equal to two. When n > 2 equation (5.4) tells us the dimension of S∗ is now in excess
of (m − 1). Therefore the equilibrium and sub-equilibrium simplices of S∗ are no longer
maximal and the corresponding graph G will contain vertices of degree strictly greater
than two. Consequently we are unable to use Lemma 2.22 and the result is undetermined.
We return briefly to the nerves ηi constructed from the coverings over the bounded sets
P (i) in the N -player generalised games. Observe in this case η1 ∗ · · · ∗ ηN is a simplicial
complex larger than η as defined in Chapter 4. This causes additional complications as
the simplicial complex η1 ∗ · · · ∗ ηN will contain simplices representing situations which are
not realisable in the game (i.e., situations which do not represent a situation defined by
the N coverings or contained within P ). Similarly within the simplicial game complexes
when n > 2 we observe S ⊂ S∗ which coincides with the properties of the nerves.
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Chapter 6
Degenerate Games
Our work so far has been restricted to examining the behaviour of the generalised games
and simplicial complexes which satisfy the condition to be non-degenerate. However we
recall Nash’s Theorem, as given by John Nash in 1950 [Nash, 1950b], is concerned with
proving the existence of an equilibrium situation in any non-degenerate and degenerate
game. As such, while our work has extended Nash’s Theorem in the non-degenerate case,
the degenerate case still needs to be answered. Therefore to ensure completeness we use
this Chapter to discuss degeneracy firstly in terms of the simplicial game complex model
and then generalised games Γ∗.
6.1 Simplicial Complexes
By definition, the simplicial complex S is non-degenerate if it is of dimension (m − 1)
and if it satisfies the properties of non-ramification. Consequently if S is degenerate then
condition 4 from Definition 3.1 is not met. In such cases we must be able to remove a finite
number of simplices to generate a subcomplex of S which satisfies all of Definition 3.1 and
in particular is non-degenerate. Example 6.1 demonstrates this process.
Example 6.1
Let S be a simplicial complex of order 1, as defined in Definition 3.1, except with regards
to the property of non-ramification, constructed with respect to set m = {1, 2, 3}. Label
the vertices of S by {a, . . . , g} where each label corresponds to a unique value from m
such that Definition 3.1 is satisfied. Then, by definition, if S is non-degenerate then it is
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of dimension 2 and is a non-ramified simplicial complex. Figure 6.1 shows a segment of S
transformed from being degenerate to non-degenerate.
a
b
(i)
c
g
f e
d
b
g
e
d
c
(ii)
Figure 6.1: Transforming a simplicial complex S from degenerate to non-degenerate.
Observe simplicial complex (i) in Figure 6.1 is degenerate on two accounts; firstly simplex
{a, b, c, g} is of dimension 3 and not 2 and the face {g, d} belongs to 3 simplices and thus
fails the condition of non-ramification. Complex (ii) shows a non-degenerate simplex which
has been attained by removing vertices {a} and {f} from complex (i), this is equivalent to
removing simplices
{a, b} {f, d}
{a, c} {f, g}
{a, g}
However these are not the only vertices we could remove to achieve an appropriate complex,
removing vertex {b} instead of {a} and/or {e} instead of {f} would also be sufficient.
Remark
Removing vertices {a} and {f} from complex (i) are the minimum which need to be
removed to ensure S is non-degenerate. However, if (i) shows the entire simplicial complex
S, removing {b} and/or {e} in addition to these vertices will also result in the complex
being non-degenerate. Observe removing any vertex from {c, d, g} will have the reverse
affect.
(End Example)
Recall a degenerate simplicial game complex S can be identified by simplices containing
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too many vertices or by faces belonging to too many simplices. Therefore we must always
be able to successfully identify a non-degenerate sub-complex by removing a finite number
of simplices.
By Lemma 3.11 we know any non-degenerate complex S contains a finite and odd number
of equilibrium simplices, in particular it must contain at least one. Then since in every
degenerate complex S a non-degenerate subcomplex S¯ can be identified, S must contain
at least as many equilibrium simplices as S¯. Therefore there is at least one equilibrium
simplex in S.
This leads us to the full version of Nash’s Theorem for simplicial game complexes.
Theorem 6.2 (Nash’s Theorem for Simplicial Game Complexes)
The simplicial game complex S contains at least one equilibrium simplex. When S is
non-degenerate the number of equilibrium simplices is finite and odd.
Remark
The conditions for the simplicial complex S2i from Definition 5.2 to be degenerate are
identical to those for S. Therefore the above result and reasoning also applies to these
simplicial complexes.
6.2 Non-Cooperative Generalised Games
Focus now returns to game theory and we work to extend Theorem 4.24, Generalised
Nash’s Theorem for non-degenerate games Γ∗, to include the degenerate case. Previous
discussions within this Thesis allows us to be assured all traditional degenerate games Γ
are contained in the set of all generalised degenerate games Γ∗.
By Definition 4.17 a nerve η of a degenerate game will fail at least one of the following
conditions.
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1. dim η = m′ − 1
2. Locally each intersection in the covering corresponds to a simplex satisfying the
conditions of non-ramification.
3. The process of regularisation of the entire simplicial complex nerve η results in a
non-ramified simplicial complex.
The following examples demonstrate the first two of these conditions failing.
Example 6.3
Consider a traditional degenerate bimatrix dyadic game and assume the game is degenerate
with respect to player 1. Figure 6.2 shows the best response function for player 1.
0 1
2x
1
1x
Figure 6.2: Degenerate best response function
Figure 6.3 shows the corresponding nerve η1.
x1=1
x1= 0
x2= 0 x2= 1
Figure 6.3: Nerve η1 of a degenerate game
Recall from Definition 5.2 in a non-degenerate game we expect the dimension of the nerve
η1 to be
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(m′ −mi +mi−1 − 1) = (4− 2 + 0− 1) = 1 (6.1)
Then the nerve η1 in Figure 6.3 is not of the correct dimension. However a slight pertur-
bation of the original covering elements can result in the best response function shown in
Figure 1.6 with resulting nerve in Figure 6.4
x2= 0 x2= 1x1= 1x1= 0
Figure 6.4: Nerve of a degenerate game after pertubation
(End Example)
Example 6.4
The intersection of covering elements seen in Figure 6.5 corresponds to an intersection in
a 3-player degenerate dyadic game.
A
B
Figure 6.5: Degenerate intersection of covering elements
The intersection marked A is transverse where the intersection marked B is not. Let ∆
represent the intersections A and B in the nerve. Observe the simplex ∆ satisfies the
conditions of non-ramification therefore, it appears η is non-degenerate and nothing need
to be done. However in this instance ∆ represents two situations and the total number
of equilibrium simplices in η is neither equal to or of the same parity as the number of
equilibrium situations in the game. This is a direct result of the covering failing property
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2 at B.
As in Example 6.3 a slight perturbation of the covering elements removes the degenerate
intersection, such that either intersection B is removed from the covering completely or
1 additional intersection is introduced. This corresponds to transforming the degenerate
game into a non-degenerate one with one less or one additional equilibrium situation.
(End Example)
The intersection of covering elements in a degenerate game can always be slightly perturbed
to ensure all intersections are transverse and as such every degenerate game can always be
transformed into at least one non-degenerate game.
Suppose perturbing the covering elements in a degenerate game results in a non-degenerate
game with fewer intersections corresponding to equilibrium situations. Consequently the
nerve of the non-degenerate transformation will be a subcomplex of the nerve of the original
degenerate game and, in particular, the degenerate game will contain at least as many
equilibrium situations as the non-degenerate game it has been transformed into.
Alternatively assume the number of equilibrium intersections in the non-degenerate game
is greater than or equal to the number in the original degenerate game. Then the non-
degenerate nerve will need to be regularised (of course we cannot discount this from being
a possibility in the first case either) which will have the affect of reducing the number
of intersections in the non-degenerate covering. Consequently, once again the regularised
non-degenerate nerve will be a subcomplex of the degenerate one.
Remark
If the translation from degenerate into non-degenerate introduces new intersections within
the covering then in the nerve this has the affect of increasing the number of simplices
shared by a face and hence affects the conditions of non-ramification. Regularisation is
therefore required and each application of this process will reduce the number of intersec-
tions occurring at the ramified face by 2. This can be repeated for intersections occurring
in any finite number of connected components and as such regularisation will always re-
duce the number of intersections to a number smaller than found in the original degenerate
game.
Finally, we arrive at
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Theorem 6.5 (Generalised Nash’s Theorem)
All generalised games Γ∗ have at least one equilibrium situation. When Γ∗ is non-degenerate
the number of equilibrium situations is finite and odd.
Remark
Compare this to Lemke and Howson’s original constructive procedure [Lemke and Howson
Jr, 1964] (Shapley does not discuss degenerate games). Then a small perturbation to
the convex polyhedra, defined by Lemke and Howson, describing a degenerate game will
result in a large enough distortion to identify a non-degenerate ‘sub-game’. That is the
resulting convex polyhedra represents a non-degenerate game where the total number of
equilibrium situations is at most the number contained in the original degenerate game.
In our representations, this is equivalent to a small shift in covering elements to ensure all
intersections are transverse.
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Chapter 7
Consequences and Examples of
Generalised Games
The objectives for this Thesis as set out in Chapter 3 have now been fulfilled. We use this
Chapter to discuss the consequences of our results and provide some general examples of
its application.
7.1 The Consequences of a Generalised Result
The key to our result lies in the representation of each player’s optimal strategies, firstly as a
covering and then as a simplicial complex. Using this approach enabled us to gain an insight
to a generalised model which contained a suitable formalisation of Nash’s Theorem. This
afforded us the ability to prove the original formulation of Nash’s Theorem combinatorially.
In particular our work justifies Nash’s Theorem is not a special consequence of polylinear
payoff functions, indeed we have gone further and shown that Nash’s Theorem is not a
result dependent on the properties exhibited by a payoff function, but rather is a specific
example of a more general model.
The proof of Theorem 3.11 demonstrates the existence of a general form of Nash’s Theorem
in the simplicial game complex S. This combined with our result that those simplicial
complexes arising from game theory are examples of S allow us to draw the following
conclusion.
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We have successfully provided a proof of Nash’s Theorem without the need for
any geometric considerations. In particular we have shown Nash’s Theorem can
be proved using an abstract version of Sperner’s Lemma. Additionally we have
defined a simplicial complex model for which an analogy of Nash’s Theorem
exists. This has allowed Nash’s Theorem to be proved for a class of abstract
games where the payoff function is no longer required to be an expectation.
The consequences of Theorem 6.5 for game theory lies in the ability to define and construct
more complex and abstract games for which Nash’s Theorem will be applicable. As such
we have demonstrated a larger category of games will be guaranteed to contain at least
one equilibrium situation.
Throughout this Thesis we have also compared our result to the work by Lemke and Howson
[Lemke and Howson Jr, 1964]. In particular the method of identifying an equilibrium
situation arising from our combinatoric proof not only replicates the description of the
constructive procedure provided by Shapley [Shapley, 1974] but also generalises it. In
particular we have shown the paths described by Shapley appear in our generalised games
and simplicial game complexes.
An important point to observe is the ability to provide a refinement to the definition of
the simplicial complex of order n for the case n = 2. This mimics the behaviour of game
theory where bimatrix games afford simplifications over the general N -player (and even
3-player) case. This suggests the added complications introduced when N > 2 is also a
result of the underlying mathematical model and not a direct consequence of the game
theory formulation.
7.2 Examples
We provide some examples of generalised non-cooperative games which satisfy Nash’s The-
orem. We will include games with non-polylinear payoff functions and games with different
input strategies.
Remark
The term game now extends to our generalised games Γ∗, Definition 4.4, and therefore is
a broader definition than given previously. As such the games given as examples in this
Section will be of an abstract nature.
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7.2.1 Payoff Function
In this Thesis we have proven the polylinear payoff function Gi can be replaced by a
total order i. However in Chapter 3 we observed certain games would still require a
payoff value and in such circumstances the use of a total order would be too restrictive.
Therefore in this section we provide examples of games defined by payoff functions and total
orders. Naturally all examples in this section will satisfy Theorem 6.5, Nash’s Theorem
for Generalised Games.
To ensure simplicity in representation, all examples in this section will be for bimatrix
games. For i = {1, 2}, if |Si| = li then let Si = {s1i , . . . , slii } represent the set of pure
strategies and pi = (x1i , . . . , 1− (x1i + . . .+ x(li−1)i )) ∈ Pi be a mixed strategy situation for
player i.
Example 7.1
To enable easy comparison, this first example is the traditional bimatrix dyadic game where
the payoff functions are polylinear. In this case the payoff function assigned to player 1
can be written generally as:
G1 : P1 × P2 7→ x11(a1x12 + a2(1− x12)) + (1− x11)(a3x12 + a4(1− x12)) (7.1)
Without loss of generality assume a3 < a2 < a1 < a4. In order to construct the coverings
discussed in Chapter 4, for all situations p ∈ P , we consider the restricted payoff functions
of G1. This results in 2 payoff functions, each defining straight lines. These functions are
given by:
G11 = G1(p, s
1
1) : {s11} × P2 7→ a1x12 + a2(1− x12) (7.2)
G21 = G1(p, s
2
1) : {s11} × P2 7→ a3x12 + a4(1− x12) (7.3)
Graph (i) in Figure 7.1 represents equation (7.2) and graph (ii) represents equation (7.3).
Combining the graphs from Figure 7.1 onto the same axis, as seen in Figure 7.2, allows
easy identification of player 1’s optimal strategies for all situations in P2.
We can now translate this information to generate a covering of the simplex P2. Since we
are considering a bimatrix dyadic game, P2 is a 1-dimensional simplex. Figure 7.3 shows
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a
0 (i) 1 x
G
a
a
0 (ii) 1
x
11
1
2
21
21
4
3
21
Figure 7.1: Player 1’s restricted payoff functions as given in (7.2) and (7.3)
G
a
a
a
a
0 y 1 x
G
G
1
4
1
2
3
0 2
1
12
11
Figure 7.2: Determining optimal strategies by comparing the two restricted payoff functions
the covering of P2 formed with respect to the information contained within Figure 7.2. For
the set of mixed strategies {(x12, 1−x12) | 0 ≤ x12 < y0} player 1’s optimal strategy is x11 = 0
i.e., s21 is optimal. When player 2 uses any mixed strategy from the set {(x12, 1− x12) | y0 <
x12 ≤ 1} player 1’s optimal strategy is s11. Finally when x12 = y0 player 1’s optimal strategy
is a totally mixed strategy situation. Each segment in Figure 7.3 is labelled by player 1’s
optimal strategy.
0
s12 s11 x21y0 1
Figure 7.3: The resulting covering over P2
142
Repeating this process for player 2 produces a covering similar to that seen in Figure 7.3,
where by similar we mean consists of just two distinct covering elements. Then the two
coverings over P = P1 × P2 is shown in Figure 7.4. Each segment in Figure 7.4 is labelled
by the optimal strategies for player 1 and 2.
0 1s22 s12
s21
s11
x12
x11
1
Figure 7.4: The resulting covering over P
(End Example)
The simple division of the simplex into two segments (as seen in Fig 7.3) is the most that
can be achieved using polylinear functions (in the bimatrix dyadic game). Equivalently
this is the most complex a game could be while ensuring Nash’s Theorem holds. We now
give some examples which demonstrate the power of Theorem 4.24 in extending Nash’s
Theorem to much more advanced games.
Example 7.2
Let Γ∗ be a generalised bimatrix dyadic game where for player 1
G1 : P1 × P2 7→ x11(cos(4pi × x12 + pi) + 1) + (1− x11)(cos(4pi × (1− x12)) + 1) (7.4)
First observe this function satisfies our requirements of a total order, Definition 4.3. In
particular, for any value x12 the function G1 becomes linear in x
1
1 and therefore a maximum
must occur at at least one of the pure strategies. If both pure strategies are maximum
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then the function has 0 gradient and therefore all mixed strategies are best responses.
The two restricted payoff functions are given in (7.5) and (7.6) and are shown in Figure
7.5
G11 = G1(p, s
1
1) : {s11} × P2 7→ cos(4pi × x12 + pi) + 1 (7.5)
G21 = G1(p, s
2
1) : {s21} × P2 7→ cos(4pi × (1− x12)) + 1 (7.6)
11
21
21
210 (i) 1 0 (ii) 1
G
x
G
x
11
Figure 7.5: Player 1’s restricted payoff functions as given in (7.5) and (7.6)
We now compare the graphs of the restricted payoff functions on the same set of axis. This
allows for easy comparison and subsequent construction of the required covering. This is
shown in Figure 7.6
For all p1 ∈ P2, Figure 7.6 identifies player 1’s optimal pure strategies which in turn
produces the covering given in Figure 7.7. Each element of the covering is labelled by
player 1’s optimal strategy.
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Gx
12
21
1
0 1
G11
G1
Figure 7.6: Determining optimal strategies by comparing the two restricted payoff functions
0 1
s2 s1
x21
s12 s121 1 s11
Figure 7.7: The resulting covering over P2
Where the nerve of the covering given in Figure 7.7 is as seen in Figure ??.
s2 s1 s12 s121 1 s11 s22s12
Figure 7.8: The nerve for the covering given in Figure 7.7
Define a payoff function for player 2 which produces the same results, then Figure 7.9
shows the two coverings for the two players over P . In Figure 7.9 those strategies in boxes
denote the labels of the boundary faces. We know equilibrium situations occur when there
is complete labelling, or in this case all ‘colours’ are present at the intersection. In this
game there are 13 equilibrium situations, all are marked in Figure 7.9.
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10 1
x21
x11
s11 s12
s22
s21
s11
s11
s21 s21
s12
s12
s12
s22 s22
Figure 7.9: The resulting covering over P and the equilibrium situations of the game
We return to the constructive procedure contained in Lemke-Howson as described by Shap-
ley [Shapley, 1974]. As discussed in Chapter 4.4 and Chapter 5.3, the coverings over P1
and P2 (with the additional vertex (0,0)) are equivalent to the graphs F1 and F2 defined by
Shapley. These graphs are shown in Figure 7.10 and show a path starting from the artificial
equilibrium point (0,0) and terminating with an equilibrium situation. From (0, 0) pure
strategy s22 is chosen as the label to be dropped. In the order in which they are visited,
the path consists of the following nodes (0, 0), (A, 0), (A, b), (C, b), (C, d).
0
s2 s1 s12 s121 1 s11
s12 s22 0
s1 s121
s12 s22 s12 s22A bC d
F1 F2
Figure 7.10: Graphs F1 and F2
This path only be represented on Figure 7.9 once it has moved completely away from
the point (0, 0), as this is not represented in this Figure. Therefore the path starting at
(A, b) and progressing through to (C, b) and finally terminating with the equilibrium point
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represented by (C, d) is illustrated in Figure 7.11.
s22
s21s11
s12
x2
x1
1
1
(A,b)
(C,b) (C,d)
Figure 7.11: Example Lemke-Howson path
(End Example)
The advantage in being able to use more generalised functions is clear to see when com-
paring the covering of the original payoff function in Example 7.1 to the one generated
in this Example 7.2 (Figures 7.4 and 7.9). Our generalisations allow games to use payoff
functions which allow a greater variation in optimal strategies, especially with regards to
the number of connected covering elements a given strategy can be optimal across, while
still guaranteeing the existence of an equilibrium point. Previously to ensure the existence
of an equilibrium situation the payoff functions of the game had to be polylinear. This is
no longer the case. We continue with some more examples of where Nash’s Theorem was
previously unable to be used.
Example 7.3
Once again let Γ∗ be a generalised bimatrix dyadic game. However this time we assume a
total order (defined by any means) defines the covering elements over P as
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B1(s11) =
[
0,
2
3
]
× [0, 1] (7.7)
B1(s21) =
[
1
3
, 1
]
× [0, 1] (7.8)
B2(s12) = [0, 1]×
[
0,
2
3
]
(7.9)
B2(s22) = [0, 1]×
[
1
3
, 1
]
(7.10)
Then this covering takes the form seen in Figure 7.12.
s
s s
s
22
12
21
11
0
1
1
2/3
1/3
2/31/3 x1
1
x21
Figure 7.12: Coverings over P
Those labels occurring away from the covering indicate the labels of the corresponding
boundary faces, while the shaded areas mark the equilibria of this game. The set of
equilibrium points consists of two isolated points (0, 0) and (1, 1) and the square
[
1
3 ,
2
3
]×[
1
3 ,
2
3
] ⊂ P .
Observe in games of this nature constructing the Lemke-Howson path, as in Example 7.2
is not applicable in its current form. However it is easy to check the nerve of the covering
(with boundary) satisfies Definition 3.1. Then within the simplicial complex setting a path
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of sub-equilibrium and equilibrium simplices can be constructed inline with the Lemke-
Howson algorithm.
(End Example)
Example 7.4
Let Γ and Γ∗ be a bimatrix games where |S1| = 2 and |S3| = 3 then a generic best response
correspondence with respect to payer 2 in the traditional case can be seen in (a) of Figure
7.13 and the best response correspondence in (b) is an example of a generalised game.
(a) (b)
Figure 7.13: best response correspondence over P for Γ and Γ∗ with respect to player 2
(End Example)
Example 7.5
All coverings seen in the previous example are those arising from generalised bimatrix
games. However our proofs also apply to coverings which do not arise naturally from
games. Consider the coverings over [0, 1]× [0, 1] given in Figure 7.14
As before, those labels which appear away from the covering refer to the labels of the
boundary faces but note since this covering does not reflect a game we are not using the
notation seen previously. The covering shown in Figure 7.14 consists of two coverings over
the space [0, 1]×[0, 1]. The first divides the space into two sets ‘horizontally’ along the edge
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312
4
3
4
3
1
2
Figure 7.14: Coverings over [0, 1]× [0, 1] formed without relation to games
going from boundary face 3 to 4 and are labelled by 1 and 2. The second covering divides
[0, 1]× [0, 1] into three segments, labelled by 3, 4 and 3 via the two remaining edges. Now
observe the nerve can be constructed as before and will also satisfy definition 3.1. Then
the shaded circles highlight the 7 equilibrium points of the covering.
Remark
While this example was constructed as an arbitrary covering, similar coverings can be seen
in [von Stengel et al., 2002] as a representation of a extensive form game.
(End Example)
7.2.2 Input Strategies
We now turn our attention to a different consequence of our result. Not only does our work
allow for the generalisation of the payoff functions but also for a less restrictive approach
to the strategy sets. The following example is intended as an insight to the opportunities
and benefits our Theorem can provide. For a bimatrix dyadic game we denote the mixed
strategy set for player 1 by the 1-simplex P1. However we assume the mixed strategy set for
player 2 is the union of two 1-dimensional simplices or the set of real numbers [0, z1]∪ [z2, 1]
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for z1, z2 ∈ (0, 1). Observe if z1 = z2 then the mixed strategy set for player 2 is the usual
1-dimensional simplex. To denote this distinction we will call this mixed strategy set Pˆ2.
The total order 1 for player 1 then identifies player 1’s preferred strategy for all strategies
from Pˆ2.
Remark
We still require player 2’s mixed strategy situation to satisfy the conditions of a probability
distribution
Figure 7.15 shows an arbitrary covering over sets P1 and Pˆ2 where each segment is labelled
by player 1 and player 2’s optimal pure strategy for the corresponding strategies from Pˆ2
and P1 respectively.
x12
x11
s12 s11
s21s22
z2z1
0
0 1
1y1 y2
w1 w2
(a)
(b)
s12 s12 s11
s22
Figure 7.15: Coverings across (a) P1 and (b) Pˆ2
Let the 1-dimensional segment [0, z1] of Pˆ2 be denoted by L1 and segment [z2, 1] by L2
with corresponding nerves η21 and η22 . Assume the optimal pure strategy for player 1
when player 2 selects strategy z1 is the same when player 2 selects strategy z2. Then we
claim the simplicial complex defined by (η1∗η21)∪(η1∗η22) represents a simplicial complex
which satisfies the definition of S where the construction of the union is to be described.
First consider the boundary of the simplicial complexes. Previously the boundary faces
of the nerve η represent the situations from P which are not totally mixed; in this case
this is equivalent to one player selecting a pure strategy. Observe the coverings over L1
and L2 are not bounded in this sense. In particular since the strategy for player 2 at z1
(respectively z2) is totally mixed the boundary point represents a strategy for player 1 and
not player 2. Figure 7.16 describes all simplices from (η1 ∗ η21) and (η1 ∗ η22) which are
affected by this. The column labelled P1 list the vertices from η1 and for i = {1, 2} the
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columns labelled Li lists the vertices from η2i .
Simplex Number P1 L1 L2
1 [0, y1] [w1, z1]
2 [0, y1] [z2, w1]
3 [y1, y2] [w1, z1]
4 [y1, y2] [z2, w1]
5 [y2, 1] [w1, z1]
6 [y2, 1] [z2, w1]
Figure 7.16: Simplices on the ‘boundary’ of (η1 ∗ η21) and (η1 ∗ η22)
By Definition 3.1, the face of simplex 1 and 2 which should belong to the boundary is
the one formed by removing vertex y1. However on the assumption z1 and z2 are to be
interpreted as boundary faces, and not covering elements, a second face can be identified
which also satisfies the boundary definition. This face is the result of removing either z1
or z2 and leaves the face {0, y1, x1} for both simplices. This can be repeated for the 2
other pairs {3, 4} and {5, 6}. Therefore the simplicial complex η = (η1 ∗ η21)∪ (η1 ∗ η22) is
formed by connecting (η1 ∗ η21) to (η1 ∗ η22) via the shared ‘mis-defined’ boundary faces.
This result in a simplicial complex with a boundary, which by repeating Lemma 4.21,
satisfies Definition 3.1. Additionally, for this example, the nerve η already satisfies the
conditions of non-ramification.
We finally observe the vertices in η1, η21 and η22 can all be labelled following the rules of
Section 4.3 with vertices z1 and z2 taking on the roles of boundary faces. Since z1 and
z2 are real numbers, this introduces labels which are not contained within {S1 ∪ S2}, but
once again in the construction of η no vertex is left without a label. In the construction
of η we observe all ‘mis-defined’ boundary faces are connected by removing the vertices z1
and z2 and since these vertices only appear at these points then η does not contain any
vertex labelled by z1 or z2. As before those simplices which are completely labelled in η
must correspond to equilibrium situations from the game, and all equilibrium situations
must be represented in this way. Therefore (η1 ∗ η21) ∪ (η1 ∗ η22) is a particular example
of S as defined in Definition 3.1 and consequently Theorem 4.24 assures there are a finite
and odd number of equilibrium simplices and thus equilibrium situations in the game.
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Chapter 8
Comparing New to Old
We compare our approach to prove Nash’s Theorem with those discussed in Section 1.7.
This will provide a detailed analyse of the differences and similarities our work has to
previous papers. The similarities provided us with a path our proof may, and indeed
would, follow, while the differences highlight our intuition in developing the result further.
The work published by Nash in 1950 and 1951, [Nash, 1950b] and [Nash, 1951] respectively,
focuses only on proving the existence of equilibrium situations. Nash’s use of a fixed point
theorem was more than sufficient to allow him to produce two short proofs for this result.
However fixed point theorems will not tell us anything about the cardinality of the ‘fixed
point set’ as shown in the later proofs of Nash’s result. Nash made use of Brouwer’s
fixed point theorem which can be proved by using Sperner’s Lemma and a convergent
sequence. We believe the appearance of Sperner’s Lemma here as well as in our work is
unrelated. Sperner’s Lemma in relation to Nash’s proof is used as a tool to help identify
an approximate equilibrium situation (albeit a very good approximation). In our work
Sperner’s Lemma is used in its abstract form and it’s its underlying combinatoric properties
we used. Additionally not all simplices satisfying Sperner’s Lemma can be applied to our
work.
The connection between the constructive procedures found in our work and that of Lemke
and Howson [Lemke and Howson Jr, 1964] has been well documented throughout this
Thesis by comparison to the description of the Lemke-Howson procedure produced by
Shapley [Shapley, 1974]. In particular our work is an exact generalisation. In Chapter 1.7
we included a description of the proofs by Roseunmu¨ller, [Rosenmu¨ller, 1971], and Wilson,
[Wilson, 1971]. Recall these proofs provided a constructive procedure for finding Nash
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equilibrium situations in a N -player non-degenerate game which once again relied upon
the use of completely labelled paths. We believe our work is also a direct extension of
theirs too, but we have not attempted to answer this question here.
Moving away from the constructive procedures and looking at the underlying proofs is
where the main differences arise. In summary our proof removes the remaining geometric
considerations currently used. In particular, the proofs of Nash’s Theorem published by
Lemke and Howson, [Lemke and Howson Jr, 1964], Rosumu¨ller, [Rosenmu¨ller, 1971], Wil-
son, [Wilson, 1971], and Harsanyi, [Harsanyi, 1973] rely on the construction of a certain
geometric object, of course with identifiable differences for each author. The approach
taken by Lemke and Howson, Rosumu¨ller and Wilson resulted in the construction of a
geometric object formed by considering strategies which satisfy a specified subset of the
criteria for an equilibrium situation. Edges and nodes were shown to be a subset of situa-
tions contained in the geometric object which satisfied a higher number of these conditions.
Harsanyi took a different approach and achieved his geometric object by defining a class
of logarithmic functions with parameter t. By looking at the combined solution set of the
games for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 branches were identified with definable end points.
In all cases paths were constructed by connecting adjacent branches, or edges, which shared
the same end point. Since any node is the end point of at most two edges the paths are well
defined and do not allow for ambiguity with the route which should be taken. Equilibrium
situations are then those end points which belong to just one arc or branch; this is true
for all approaches to the construction of the geometric object.
The condition of their being a finite number of equilibrium situations was attained by a
simple observation. All equilibrium situations are a subset of all nodes in the geometric
object. Since the total number of nodes is finite then so must the total number of equilib-
rium situations. This then leaves the proof of their being an odd number of such situations
in the non-degenerate case. In the papers by Lemke and Howson, Rosenmu¨ller and Wilson
unbounded edges, that is those edges with just one end point, were introduced. By show-
ing there are an odd number of such unbounded edges and that any end point of a path
is an equilibrium situation, the paths containing unbounded edges must identify an odd
number of equilibrium points. All other paths with defined end points would introduce
two additional equilibrium situations. Therefore if such paths exist then they will have the
affect of increasing the total number of equilibrium situations by an even number and so
the total number of equilibrium situations must be odd.
The proofs presented by Rosenmu¨ller and Wilson use induction to obtain their result, with
both mathematicians using the proof by Lemke and Howson to verify the result for the
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two player game. By assuming there are an odd number of equilibrium situations in the
subgame involving N −1 players, Rosenmu¨ller and Wilson were able to ensure the oddness
result in the N -player game. In contrast, the proof by Harsanyi proved there was just one
equilibrium situation for the class of games when t = 1. This was then shown to be an
end point of a branch which terminated with an equilibrium point of the original game.
All other branches with distinct end points identify two equilibrium situations in the game
under consideration so once again identifying an odd number of equilibrium situations.
The underlying process of our proof of Nash’s Theorem does follow a similar structure.
We have described a geometric object and created a series of paths which have allowed
us to determine there are a finite and odd number of equilibrium situations in the non-
degenerate game. Our geometric object is constructed by considering optimal strategies
for each player or alternatively we restrict ourselves to a sub-game for which at least one
player the conditions of an equilibrium situation are met. This is much less restrictive than
previous proofs.
While the foundations and interpretations of our geometric object are similar to those seen
previously we do not interpret the information in the same way. Where previous proofs have
defined a set of equations and inequalities which need to be satisfied we have interpreted
our conditions in terms of a covering. By observing the most important properties of this
covering are the points of intersection and the relationship between the covering elements
(and boundary faces) we translated our covering into a well defined geometric object, a
simplicial complex. This is in comparison to previous proofs where for the bimatrix case
Lemke and Howson defined a convex polyhedron and for N -player games Rosenmu¨ller and
Wilson made use of some real algebraic geometry . The lack of equation set to govern our
geometric object first of all allowed an insight to a more generalised model and secondly
lead us to a combinatoric proof.
From the onset of construction it is clear our geometric object, η, is overly complicated
and so we simplify matters by defining a graph G which contains all the paths connecting
equilibrium and sub-equilibrium simplices. Again similarities are appearing and to com-
pound this we insist the graph is of degree 2 which coincides with the requirement that
nodes are the end points of at most two arcs and like before a given vertex belongs to just
one unique path. However our paths have one substantial benefit. They are not governed
by a set of equations or inequalities, instead the graph can be considered as it is without
the need for identifying edges and nodes as those situations from P which satisfy a tighter
set of inequalities. Therefore our graph is a simpler geometric representation than those
seen before.
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The vertices of our graph are considered in terms of being normal and extreme, where
these properties are not mutually exclusive and a vertex can satisfy both conditions simul-
taneously. Once again we look at the degree of these nodes to establish certain properties
about them. Rather than demonstrating there are an odd number of paths which contain
just 1 equilibrium situation and all others contain two, we make use of the properties of a
graph and Lemma 2.22. This is a combinatorial result which does not require the tracing of
some finite path through a convex polyhedron nor does the proof need to be completed in
stages. Previous proofs require the identification of an odd number of paths which contain
just one equilibrium point and then show any other equilibrium point occurs in a pair.
This procedure is all contained within Lemma 2.22 which leaves us just to determine there
are an odd number of vertices satisfying the condition to be extreme and so reduces the
steps in the final proof.
The finite result comes directly from the resulting simplicial complex being bounded and
containing a finite number of simplices and thus there are a finite number of vertices in G.
Since all equilibrium situation are a subset of these vertices we must have a finite number
of equilibrium situations. Our proof also uses induction on the size of the game which
clearly mimics the approach by Rosenumu¨ller and Wilson.
The main difference our approach offers is in the construction and interpretation of the con-
ditions defining our geometric object, but in doing this our proof also encounters a difficulty
not previously encountered. In the proofs discussed in Section 1.7 the requirements that
paths are unique and no node is the end point for more than two of the edges was a natural
consequence of the geometric object defined. For our work we required this property of our
graph G. Recall the vertices of G correspond to equilibrium or sub-equilibrium simplices
from η and an edge connects two vertices if the corresponding simplices share an equilib-
rium face. Thus G will only be of degree 2 if and only if a sub-equilibrium face belongs
to at most two simplices. This is equivalent to the property of non-ramification. However
we have provided examples where this situation does not naturally hold and ultimately
this will prevent the use of Lemma 2.22 to determine Nash’s Theorem. We overcame this
problem by observing, in the non-degenerate case, the nerves can be regularised without
affecting the parity of equilibrium situations it contained. This step was not needed previ-
ously. The reasons for this complication lies in the construction of the simplicial complexes
which are more general than the convex polyhedra seen in previous proofs.
The paths, defined to the be union of 1-dimensional adjacent edges, as described by Lemke-
Howson, Rosenmu¨ller and Wilson are originally defined to be points satisfying partial
equilibrium situation conditions. However observe such paths can also be identified in our
approach as the intersection of covering elements of a finite covering of P . Consequently
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the paths can be interpreted as a subcomplex of a certain simplicial complex, namely a
modified nerve of the covering. This leads us to the largest and most important difference
between our proof and those described in Section 1.7
We have presented a generalised model defined completely independently from any notion
of game theory and it was this which was used to determine the oddness criteria in the
way described above. In particular we started by defining a simplicial complex S, as
economically as we can, so that on one hand, the analogy of Nash’s Theorem still holds,
and, on the other, the traditional case of a non-cooperative game is covered. Within
the simplicial complex setting no properties of game theory have been used to prove the
more general result and so rather than prove non-degenerate games have a finite and odd
number of equilibrium points we have shown this property to be true in a much broader
setting. In particular the existence of equilibria for S allows us to extend Nash’s Theorem
to generalised games in which mixed strategy payoff functions are no longer required to be
polylinear and may in fact be replaced by some total orderings. In such generalised games
the paths defined by Lemke-Howson, Rosenmu¨ller and Wilson may no longer exist in the
naive sense (as demonstrated in Example 7.3) but are replaced by their interpretations
as sub-complexes of nerves of coverings. As a result of this we have demonstrated Nash’s
Theorem, as traditionally given, originates from underlying combinatoric properties of a
much more general model and is not a result confined to game theory.
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Chapter 9
Further Work
In this Thesis we have proved Nash’s Theorem can be extended and applied in a mathe-
matical setting much larger than previously published work allows. In doing this we have
achieved a result which we hope will have implications and consequences for a wide range
of applications. Staying with game theory the range of non-cooperative games which are
now guaranteed to contain an equilibrium situation have increased. Therefore if the sit-
uation under consideration can be modelled more accurately and realistically with payoff
functions which are not polylinear, then this can be done with the assurance that the
game will still satisfy Nash’s Theorem. Of course such games will be abstract in nature.
Once Nash’s Theorem can be applied to a game then we are automatically assured we can
identify at least one equilibrium situation, or solution, without risk of failure.
Having shown the existence of equilibrium situations is a result of an underlying combina-
toric property exhibited by game theory, our work may additionally provide an avenue to
explore other areas of current research in game theory. These may include the development
of efficient algorithms to identify equilibrium situations or for greater understanding of the
topology of equilibrium situations in the non-degenerate and degenerate case.
The representation of non-cooperative game theory we have used in this Thesis differs
greatly to the formation traditionally used. As such it may therefore be possible to translate
and interpret other branches of game theory in this way, for example coalition games where
two or more players work together to achieve optimal payoffs. Our Thesis also supports
previous work and demonstrate the 2-player non-cooperative game is substantially simpler
than the case for N -players. Examining the properties of functions (satisfying the definition
to be a total order) may identify additional sub-classes of games which are simpler and
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easier to analyse.
Chapter 5 on bimatrix games provides an insight to another avenue of investigation. In
the game Γ the nerve η can be represented as the join η1 ∗ η2. However when we extend
this to our generalised game we can no longer guarantee η is a non-ramified complex. Of
course in this case η will still be of the correct dimension. However because η failing to
be a non-ramified complex must result in either η1 or η2 failing this condition too, it is
not clear how regularisation can be used here. To rectify this problem it appears a mod-
ification to the covering needs to be made. To ensure all intersections are maintained it
seems unlikely this will cause a sufficient perturbation of the covering elements. Therefore
it seems the correct approach would be the introduction of tubular neighbourhoods at the
points of intersection. However this still may not provide sufficient protection against the
associative nerve failing the conditions of non-ramification (the result of a disjoint inter-
section). Dividing the covering elements (first before the introduction of neighbourhoods)
and taking each segment as a new covering element may help matters, for example by con-
structing a triangulation of each covering element. This appears to be more complicated
than the proof provided in this Thesis but perhaps should not be discounted. Clearly the
form of the coverings is important, but can we find a method or process to simplify the
intersections of the covering elements without losing information about the corresponding
situation? Alternatively is there another way to define the nerve η such that in the non-
degenerate case it will always satisfy the conditions of non-ramification without any need
for regularisation?
Our work has demonstrated Nash’s Theorem is not a consequence of game theory but
instead is the result of underlying combinatoric properties of a much larger mathematical
model. Therefore the consequences of this Thesis are unlikely to be constrained to game
theory but may have implications in other branches of mathematics. By equation (1.25)
and Definition 1.10 an equilibrium situation of a non-cooperative game is the solution to
a finite set of inequalities and equations and as such the set of all equilibrium situations
is necessarily a semi-algebraic set. It is then natural to ask if our generalisation to game
theory can at the very least replicate current results within semi-algebraic geometry.
The key result in proving Nash’s Theorem for simplicial complexes is an abstract version
of Sperner’s Lemma. This leads us to realise that our simplicial complex also contains
Sperner’s Lemma as a particular example. Equivalently, as in the game theory case, our
simplicial complex provides a much larger model which generalises this result. In partic-
ular we can deduce the underlying mathematical properties which allow Nash’s Theorem
and Sperner’s Lemma to be true are shared and as such they are both the result of the
same mathematical phenomena. Therefore on analysing the simplicial complex model it
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maybe possible to identify other branches of mathematics, or possibly other unrelated the-
ory, which prove to be an special example of our simplicial complex and thus forging an
unexpected connection to both Sperner’s Lemma and Nash’s Theorem.
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